

MAY 1961

Commentary

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
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THE FUTURE OF NATO

DENIS HEALEY

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 was the culmination of the most creative period in recent diplomatic history. In just over two years from the time the Truman Doctrine was announced in 1957, the United States had developed a coherent philosophy for inspiring its action as a new world power, had launched the Marshall Plan for European recovery, and, finally, in NATO, had committed itself to a system of collective security which demanded closer cooperation than any alliance yet known. There were many on both sides of the ocean in those early days who saw NATO as the embryo of an Atlantic community which would knit together Western Europe and North America in every field of policy.

The outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 confronted NATO—only a year after its formation—with seemingly dangerous inadequacies in the military field. Attention was then concentrated on building up NATO ground forces in Central Europe and on trying to find a strategic concept to justify their existence. Meanwhile, the Truman administration's readiness to explore NATO's economic and political potentialities was increasingly restricted by the rise of McCarthy and the prior demands of Far

Eastern problems. Their first spasm of resolve over, the European allies found that their own failure to meet SHAPE's strategic demands had brought war no closer, and NATO began to stagnate.

The election of NATO's Supreme Commander as President of the United States in 1952 raised hopes of a more active American policy for the alliance. But Eisenhower did not even mention NATO in his first State of the Union address, and a year later his Secretary of State went so far as to imply that America might end her military contribution to NATO altogether, unless her allies met her demand for the admission of West Germany. Throughout Eisenhower's first term America's only evident political enthusiasm was for some sort of federation in Europe which would ultimately enable her to reduce the overseas commitments she clearly still regarded as abnormal.

Eisenhower's second term was marked by the chauvinist revolt of Britain and France against the general trend of America's policies in Africa and Asia, and by a search for some agreement with the new Soviet leaders through a summit conference. Though the second Berlin crisis (1958–59) exposed a disturbing inflexibility in NATO's military posture, none of the member governments seemed much concerned to change it. By the time Eisenhower left the White House, the alliance seemed threatened with disintegration. Its Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, resigned to return to Belgian politics and made no secret of his disenchantment.

Since Kennedy's inauguration, America has appeared determined to give a high priority to revitalizing the Western alliance. There has already been a spate of Presidential messages concerning NATO, all em-

DENIS HEALEY, from a British point of view, here continues the discussion (inaugurated by Hans J. Morgenthau and H. Stuart Hughes in our February and March issues) of various aspects of American foreign policy in the new circumstances of the 60's. Mr. Healey is the Labor party's official spokesman on foreign affairs and a counselor of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He contributed "H-Bombs for Everybody?" to our January 1960 number.

phasizing its importance to America and Europe as the framework for military interdependence. Dean Acheson has been appointed head of an impressive task force whose job it is to reappraise the role of NATO in the foreign and defense policies of the United States. In some respects the appointment seems to symbolize the hope that the Western alliance may now begin to evolve once again from the point where it left off when Acheson ceased to be Secretary of State. Yet if one thing is certain it is that NATO cannot now turn the clock back ten years and start again. In at least four major respects the world is now quite a different place. Individually and collectively, the members of the alliance are facing new problems, and the alliance will not survive unless its policies are revised to meet them.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, military technology has been developing at a staggering rate both in America and in Russia—and, equally important, its fruits are becoming available faster than anyone imagined to many smaller countries both inside and outside the two main power blocs. Quite apart from the unsolved strategic problems facing NATO since Russia acquired an invulnerable thermonuclear retaliatory force, there is evidence that political leaders both in Washington and Moscow are increasingly worried by the extent to which their atomic arms race has acquired an autonomous dynamic which not only threatens to bankrupt them both but also undermines the potential stability of the existing military balance of power. The stability of the Soviet-American balance is even more directly threatened by the spread of atomic weapons capacity. Britain and France have already joined the nuclear club, Sweden and Switzerland are considering joining, Israel is possibly beginning to produce nuclear explosives, and China has the declared intention of becoming an atomic power within the next few years. Altogether, some thirty countries are capable of producing atomic weapons for themselves within the next ten years if they decide the economic expense is less than the resulting political and military advantages.

The most important result so far is that both America and Russia are beginning to realize that it may be easier for them to achieve national security through coopera-

tion in the military field. Negotiations on disarmament and arms control have begun to acquire unprecedented realism. It is significant that the first measure of arms control on which agreement seems possible is a ban on nuclear test explosions whose main relevance is to obstruct the independent development of nuclear weapons by countries which do not already possess them.

The incentive for America and Russia to cooperate in halting the arms race is greatly increased by changes in the balance of power inside each of the alliances they head—changes that have taken place to the disadvantage of the two leaders. The recovery of Western Europe was practically complete five years ago. Perhaps the most striking index of the new balance of economic power in NATO is not so much the weakening of the American dollar as compared with the German mark, but the fact that in 1960 the six countries of the European Common Market together produced more steel than the United States. For while the threat to the U. S. balance of payments demands a more equitable sharing of defense burdens inside the alliance, Western Europe's new economic strength provides a potential bargaining power with the U.S. on political and military problems which was unthinkable ten years ago. Britain and France have both chosen to develop independent atomic striking forces for themselves at the expense of their contribution to the shield forces of the alliance. It is significant that the governments responsible for the decision to do so believed that their joint campaign against Egypt in 1956 was brought to nothing mainly through the opposition of their NATO allies—particularly the United States.

Even more important than the new balance of power within the Western alliance are the changes in the internal structure of the Communist bloc which followed the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's ex-cathedra denunciation of the doctrine of Kremlin infallibility. Although Russia remains by far the most powerful of the Communist countries, she must already be conscious that within a generation she may have to yield that place to China. Even now the growth in power of the East European countries sets limits on Russia's ability to compel their obedience—as was shown in Khrushchev's

yielding to Gomulka in 1956, and by Albania's defiance of Russia's doctrinal leadership this year. Albania's rebellion also demonstrates the extent to which the Kremlin's ideological dictatorship has crumbled as the cement of the Soviet empire. The prolonged wrangling over doctrine at the conference of the eighty-one Communist parties last December produced a communiqué extraordinarily reminiscent in its verbal equivocation of the sort of thing published after a difficult meeting of the NATO council. For the first time since the October Revolution, the Russian leaders are having to face the problems of coalition diplomacy familiar to the West.

All this gives even greater importance to Khrushchev's determination to revise Leninist doctrine so as to allow formally for the possibility that general war between the two camps may not be inevitable, and his persistent efforts to convince doubters that in fact thermonuclear war would be almost as great a calamity for the Communist camp as for its opponents. It is true that the "ideological conflict" which he considers inevitable under "peaceful coexistence" includes all mischief short of war—and for this reason may provoke war even when he does not intend it. But he would scarcely have embarked on so dangerous an enterprise as revising Leninism if he had not sincerely wished to rule out general war as an instrument of policy, and create conditions in which he could embark on serious disarmament negotiations with the West.

On the other hand, it seems probable that he was compelled to admit the necessity for "just wars" of colonial liberation as a concession to the Chinese, and probable, too, that they will hold him as strictly to his word on this matter as their bargaining power permits. This elevates the fourth major change in world politics over the last ten years into first importance so far as current policy is concerned—I refer to the emergence of nearly forty new independent states in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

ONE THING nearly all these states have in common is the desire to be neutral in the cold war—insofar as the cold war is a struggle between power blocs under Soviet and American leadership. The Afro-Asian conception of neutrality is quite compatible

with savage treatment of indigenous Communist parties, as Nasser has shown, but it also implies a desire to obtain aid from countries in the Soviet bloc as well as the West—a tendency which the Russians and the Western governments sometimes have equal difficulty in understanding. But since these countries are now independent and intend to remain so, their policies must be judged by their own standards, not by ours. Moreover, in a world of "peaceful coexistence" the United Nations becomes an important forum for the political struggle, and here the Afro-Asian countries constitute a floating vote of immense power, capable not only of awarding victory to the side they favor on a particular issue, but also of imposing their own will whenever they are united and can obtain the necessary complement of votes from countries outside.

Most of the Afro-Asian countries are still internally unsettled, and many have precarious or artificial frontiers. Undergoing, as they are, social, economic, and political revolutions of shattering profundity, they are likely to remain highly unstable both in their internal and external relations for at least a generation. Any policy which depends on maintaining the status quo in these continents is foredoomed to failure. Even a policy which hopes to insure that change is peaceful has only doubtful chances of success.

This revolutionary instability in Afro-Asia could create a major danger of war between the Western and Communist camps unless they can reach agreement in advance to refrain from intervening in local conflicts—or agree that each should intervene only in its own recognized sphere of interest. Yet a policy based on spheres of interest is most unlikely to succeed even if it were acceptable to Russia and to the West, for it would certainly be unacceptable to the Afro-Asians themselves. On the other hand, a policy based on non-intervention has a chance, since it could be made to conform with the Afro-Asians' own passion for neutrality in the cold war. Laos has shown how difficult it may be for the West to accept non-intervention when it is likely to mean victory for its opponents in a local conflict, while the Congo has shown that the same is true for Russia.

Unfortunately, the members of the West-

ern alliance disagree with one another more profoundly on Afro-Asian problems than on any others. Most of the ex-colonial powers in Europe refuse to accept the implications of Afro-Asian independence, and so far, the United States has been slow to come to terms with the Afro-Asian demand for neutrality in the cold war. On China, Indochina, Algeria, Suez, the Congo, Laos, and Angola, the NATO countries have been in conflict with one another. Even in the field of economic aid, where they all agree that Western action is necessary, there is disagreement over the purpose and machinery for such action. The ex-imperial countries tend to see aid as a means of maintaining national political influence in their former colonies, and are reluctant to abandon bilateral arrangements for this reason.

II

IF ONE COMPARES the general pattern of world politics today with that of ten years ago, the outstanding difference is that whereas in those days the cold war was seen on both sides as an unlimited struggle between two power blocs, each of which was under centralized control by a single state, today the dynamic of the arms race and the dangerous instability of Afro-Asia have given America and Russia certain common interests which can only be satisfied by common action in both the military and diplomatic fields. However, their power to obtain cooperation on this or anything else is much reduced—indeed China on the Soviet side, and Continental Europe on the American side, seem inclined to oppose any agreement which would prevent them from increasing their power relative to both America and Russia.

In this changed situation, what would be the role of NATO? The answer to this question must depend on whether one wishes to help or hinder the forces which are pushing America and Russia toward agreement on arms control. For my part, I believe that agreement between the great powers on arms control offers the only real prospect of security for any country—allied or neutral. It is also the essential precondition for any extension in the authority or scope of the United Nations. For this reason, NATO's policies in future must be determined as much by their impact on the prospects of

disarmament as by their contribution to Western strength in the arms race.

On the other hand, NATO will not survive for long unless it is felt to contribute to the security of its members during the cold war. It is primarily a military alliance, and unless it fulfills this major purpose it cannot hope to develop any of the additional political functions some of its supporters wish. There is thus a danger in the fashionable view (often expressed by Spaak) that since the Communist threat has become political and economic rather than military, NATO must now turn from its strategic role to new fields of cooperation. NATO came into existence and acquired its present membership only because the countries concerned felt it was indispensable for their defense. Its membership is not in fact naturally appropriate for Western economic and political action outside the Atlantic area, and there is little chance of overcoming its wide divergencies of view about the problems of Africa and Asia unless its members come to feel that their stake in continued military cooperation requires them to compromise on other issues.

In fact the root cause of all NATO's present weaknesses is its failure to satisfy its members that it does offer them adequate military security in the new conditions of atomic plenty. Somehow or other the alliance must contrive to adjust its strategy and organization so as to provide short-term defense against possible Soviet attack without prejudicing the long-term chances of agreement with the Soviet Union on arms control. It must maintain the strength from which to negotiate without taking steps which make negotiation impossible or futile. Above all, it must do nothing which will encourage the spread of atomic weapons either inside or outside the alliance.

In this respect NATO has particular advantages as an alliance which frankly aims at interdependence rather than independence for its members. For while the logic of atomic strategy may force a small neutral country like Sweden or Switzerland to consider producing its own atomic weapons, membership in NATO may make it possible for even large countries like Germany, France, or Britain to do without them. Thus NATO may be able to produce a pattern of military organization and deploy-

ment in the Western world which maximizes the incentive for arms control agreements with Russia that would be quite impracticable if the alliance did not exist.

The central problem is to reach agreement inside the alliance on the role of atomic weapons in its strategy and on how to control their use. This problem did not exist ten years ago, when the United States was committed to massive thermonuclear retaliation for any Soviet attack upon an ally and her allies trusted her to implement her threat, since she could do so with impunity. Now that massive retaliation may mean suicide for America herself, Europe and the United States are each trying to strengthen NATO strategy by contradictory means. America is trying to find alternatives to massive retaliation through various strategies for limited war in Europe. The European countries on the whole are trying to make massive retaliation a more credible deterrent by insuring that they may be able to commit America to all-out war even against her will. Britain and France are trying to build thermonuclear striking forces for themselves which would trigger off the Strategic Air Command in case of war. Germany at present prefers to rely on increasing the size, range, and number of so-called "tactical" atomic weapons along the Iron Curtain, so that any local war is bound to become atomic, and as difficult as possible to limit.

IT IS EASY to understand Europe's reluctance to accept a strategy for limited war, since NATO has never made any serious attempt to establish the possibility of any limitation in local conflict other than a limitation in the theater of operations—and this type of war is as catastrophic for the country which forms the battlefield as any total war, while the threat to meet aggression with limited war is far less effective a deterrent. But the path Europe has taken toward turning any local conflict into a global thermonuclear holocaust is bound to impose intolerable strains on the solidarity of the alliance.

What is required is a compromise between the courses favored by Europe and the United States which would involve Europe's agreeing to raise the threshold at which America is committed to all-out war

in return for America's agreeing to give Europe more control over the decision to use her atomic weapons.

Some sort of bargaining along these lines seems already under way inside NATO. The difficult problems are to agree how high the NATO shield forces should raise the threshold, and how to establish collective control of the alliance's atomic forces. There is no political possibility, whatever academics may urge, of persuading the European countries to aim at producing a NATO shield force which is capable of holding back an all-out Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe with conventional arms alone. And there is no chance, so long as NATO remains an alliance of sovereign states, of persuading the United States to accept an agreement which would enable Europe to launch the Strategic Air Command against America's will.

Both problems are perhaps insoluble in theory. But in practice NATO does not have to plan to meet every contingency which the RAND Corporation can conceive. It must plan to meet situations which may arise in the real world over, say, the next ten years. When it is physically impossible to prepare for everything, it is important that priorities should be set according to the best possible appraisal of Russia's likely behavior. Most of the nightmares with which American military theorists have been trying to make our flesh creep arise from the seminal blunder of trying to solve strategic problems in a political vacuum, divorced from the real life context in which they actually present themselves.

Whether we examine Soviet military doctrine over the last ten years or Soviet behavior in the various international crises which have arisen—some contrived by Russia herself—we find no evidence whatever that the Soviet leaders are inclined to explore the presumed reluctance of the United States to commit suicide on behalf of an ally. Korea was the first and last time Russia took the slightest risk in challenging America's fortitude by launching Communist armies across an international frontier—and in the case of Korea, American official statements had made it seem there would be no risk at all. So long as the United States has the capacity to inflict devastating atomic blows on the fabric of

Soviet society, Russia is most unlikely deliberately to test her willingness to use it. The contrast between the military risks Russia ran during the first Berlin crisis, when America still had an atomic monopoly, and her extreme caution during the second period of tension (1958-59) suggests that she has been far more impressed by the tremendous increase in America's thermonuclear striking force over the last ten years than by the potential decline in America's will to use it. Although Russia still maintains large and highly efficient ground forces in Eastern Europe, it is difficult to find any responsible Western statesman or general who believes that Russia intends to exploit her local superiority in actual war.

The only real danger is one to which the deterrent posture of the West is not immediately relevant—that fighting might break out between Soviet and NATO troops as a result of some political explosion near the Iron Curtain arising not from a deliberate decision in Moscow or Washington, but from the revolt of ordinary men and women against a regime they detest. A repetition of the risings which took place in East Berlin and the Soviet Zone in 1953 might well involve the West German forces another time—they did not exist eight years ago, and even then it was only the exceptional discipline exercised by Willy Brandt and others which prevented the West Berliners from intervening.

If such a situation should arise again it would be absolutely vital that the NATO command should be able to contain the fighting without stepping on to the nuclear escalator—although the availability of nuclear weapons to the West would be a necessary deterrent against a Soviet decision to extend the conflict so long as Russia keeps her local superiority in Eastern Europe.

NATO's MOST URGENT need, therefore, is a conventional fire brigade sufficiently mobile to reach any point along the Iron Curtain within a few hours of fighting breaking out. In order to insure that atomic weapons are not used without a political decision to that effect by the alliance as a whole, there should be no atomic weapons so near to the Iron Curtain that they might be overrun in a local conflict—for in such a case no prior agreements

on control could be binding on the soldiers with physical possession of the weapons.

Moreover, if the role of so-called "tactical" atomic weapons in NATO is to provide an alternative to all-out war rather than to make all-out war the inevitable response to any level of provocation, there is no reason for deploying them in NATO's front line—on the contrary. Most of the "tactical" atomic weapons available to NATO are carried by aircraft or missiles with substantial ranges, and targeting in any case would have to be arranged by wireless. It is also difficult to understand the enthusiasm in some NATO quarters for developing and deploying the very small weapons like the atomic bazooka, since the Russians would certainly respond to any atomic initiative by the West with the much more destructive battlefield weapons they possess.

On the other hand, so long as the West remains so much inferior to Russia in its conventional forces in Europe, it will have to retain some "tactical" nuclear capacity, not only to deter the Russians from initiating nuclear war, but also to deter a large-scale Soviet conventional attack. For it is inconceivable that Russia would concentrate the large masses of conventional forces required for an invasion of Western Europe when the West still had the capacity to bomb them with nuclear weapons.

Providing the West does not attempt to match Russia's existing conventional strength in Europe, but simply tries to provide a mobile and efficient conventional fire brigade, the manpower requirements are not likely to be excessive—particularly if Britain and Germany maintain their existing commitments, and if France restores some of the forces withdrawn to Algeria. The real problem is not manpower but conventional equipment—where all the NATO forces except the Americans are dangerously inferior to the Russians—and even more, doctrine and deployment. The existing organization of the NATO forces would make it almost impossible to limit any fighting in Central Europe.

In addition, so long as the NATO forces in Germany are armed, trained, and deployed to fight with atomic weapons from the first moment, it is impossible to organize any collective political control over the de-

cision to use atomic weapons on the battlefield. And if General Norstadt had his way and NATO had hundreds of Polaris missiles deployed on the continent of Europe against "tactical" targets inside the Soviet Union, it is difficult to see how there could be any control over the use of the American strategic forces. For it is inconceivable that the launching of hundreds of atomic missiles against Soviet territory would not lead to all-out Soviet retaliation against the West as a whole, and therefore it would have to be accompanied by a counterforce strike from the SAC.

Unless the intention is that all-out atomic war should be NATO's automatic response to any challenge in Europe—in which case control of Western atomic forces is irrelevant—any control system must depend on a military posture which allows time for allied consultation in case of limited war. In this sense NATO's sword and shield depend on one another—but it is vitally important to keep them separate both in terms of weapons and command structure. An efficient conventional shield force would gain the time needed for consultation, providing atomic weapons were withdrawn from the vicinity of the Iron Curtain.

Ideally NATO should aim at a situation in which it would never need to use nuclear weapons first, whether tactical or strategic. Given the reluctance of Western soldiers to accept the Red Army's standards of comfort, this is perhaps too ambitious a goal—for to equal the Red Army's fighting strength in Eastern Europe, the Western countries would have to put three or four times as many men in uniform. But it should be possible to achieve by agreement with the Russians what is hopeless without such agreement. By far the best answer to NATO's current strategic problems would be an understanding with Russia on the limitation and control of arms and forces in the widest possible area of Europe on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

This is a suggestion which has been raised again and again over the last six years both in the Communist camp and in the West. The Dulles-Eden proposals at Geneva in 1955, the Macmillan-Khrushchev communiqué in 1959, the Rapacki plan for Central Europe, the American proposals for preventing surprise attack: all these official

initiatives had in common the idea of co-operation between Russia and the West in maintaining a stable balance of forces in Europe which would not only greatly reduce the possibility of calculated aggression, but also well-nigh rule out the danger of war by accident or miscalculation—a danger which must worry the Russians as much as the West.

In the past these initiatives have come to nothing mainly because Chancellor Adenauer believed that arms control in Central Europe would in some way make German reunification less likely. But no one now believes German reunification is likely in the foreseeable future in any case. Even in Germany itself there are few illusions left that NATO will be able to force Soviet political concessions by building up its military strength. On the contrary, it seems proven that political concessions by Khrushchev in Eastern Germany are inconceivable so long as Central Europe is the theater of a local arms race between East and West, and control of the Soviet Zone is essential to Russian security. Whether the opposite is also true will remain unknown until the experiment is tried. But at least it is probable that any chance which may exist of German reunification would be increased to the extent that the strategic importance of Central Europe for both sides is reduced. In the existing situation strategic considerations allow neither side the slightest political flexibility on German reunification.

I BELIEVE THAT a revision of NATO strategy along these lines would meet the real military needs of the Western alliance, and simultaneously encourage agreement between Russia and the West on arms control. This, however, depends on satisfying the European allies that they do not need to produce or possess independent strategic striking forces of their own. Unfortunately, the desire of some European governments for "independent deterrents" is only partially inspired by the sort of strategic considerations which a revision of NATO policy might meet. Probably the major factor behind both the British and the French decisions to give priority to national atomic striking forces is the vague feeling that atomic independence is the badge of great power status in the modern world. The meg-

aton missile has become the virility symbol of the atomic age, and it is significant that Britain and France both clutched at it in the shock of having their military impotence exposed at Suez.

To the extent that this is the real motive, proposals for interdependence inside NATO will only exacerbate the situation—as de Gaulle has made clear. All one can hope is that the emotional element behind French and British atomic policies will die away as the humiliations which produced it recede into the past. Already in Britain discussion of the government's atomic arms program is far more rational than it was in 1957, and the French Assembly would probably have rejected de Gaulle's program last December had it not feared a public test of strength with the General before the Algerian problem was resolved.

Providing NATO's strategy makes sense, the European countries will almost certainly decide that atomic independence costs far more than it is worth politically or militarily. But it is important for this reason that the United States should do nothing to reduce the economic cost of European deterrents—particularly through bilateral arrangements which create bad blood inside the alliance.

Fear that the credibility of American retaliation will dwindle to the point where it ceases to be a deterrent is much less widespread than might seem. When it is quoted to justify the pursuit of atomic independence by America's allies, it is essentially an *ex post facto* justification of a policy adopted for quite other reasons. It is significant that of all the European leaders, Macmillan and de Gaulle express the least fear of Soviet aggression in Europe, although it is they alone who have opted for atomic independence.

There is nevertheless a real problem in the waning credibility of American retaliation. For although it may require only a 5 per cent probability of retaliation to deter Soviet aggression, America's allies are unlikely to feel satisfied if there is a 95 per cent possibility that America will not retaliate on their behalf. Though absolute certainty is impossible in this field, some way must be found of narrowing the gap between what is needed to deter the Russians and what is needed to reassure the allies. The problem

is essentially a psychological one which requires a political rather than a military solution. It is to create a greater sense of solidarity inside the alliance, and above all to create greater confidence in American leadership.

It is no accident that European anxiety about the credibility of American retaliation reached its peak last summer when European confidence in American leadership had reached an all-time low following the U-2 incident and the collapse of the Paris conference. By the same token, the new sense of direction imparted to American policy by the Kennedy administration will make the strategic problems of NATO more tractable even though it is displayed in fields like aid to Latin America which have nothing directly to do with NATO.

Leadership in a free society depends more upon the consent of the led than on the power of the leader—above all on creating a sense of unity in a common enterprise. So far, the Kennedy administration has shown a sensitive touch in this respect, and it is likely to be helped rather than hindered by the more equal distribution of power inside the alliance which has followed on the recovery of Western Europe.

I HAVE DEALT at length with NATO's military problems because the further development of the alliance depends above all on their solution. The essential function of NATO is to guarantee a stable balance of military power between the West and the Soviet bloc as a precondition for negotiations to halt the arms race and provide a more satisfactory basis for world order. But though agreement between the great powers is a necessary condition for any extension in the scope or authority of the United Nations, it is not by itself enough. It will rarely be possible—or indeed desirable—for the Communist and Western powers to join in enforcing obedience to their common will upon third countries. When we consider NATO's potential role outside the military field we must bear in mind that its long-term aim and final justification must be the establishment of world order through the United Nations by general consent.

It is natural enough that enthusiasts for NATO should wish to extend its action into the economic and political fields, and be-

yond the North Atlantic area to Africa and Asia. But it is the tragedy of social action that groups tend to assert their unity only by exaggerating their separateness from those outside. NATO must take care that in seeking to strengthen the ties which unite its members it does not make it more difficult to achieve a wider unity with countries outside NATO, whether Communist or uncommitted.

Thus, though political consultation should be automatic inside NATO on all issues of common interest, it must not be expected necessarily to produce agreement—but only to insure that the NATO countries do not disagree unnecessarily. The one field of policy where agreement inside NATO is highly desirable is that which abuts directly on NATO's military functions—including problems of arms control in Europe, Berlin, and German unification. But even here some flexibility is desirable; if every one of the NATO nations had the right to veto an allied policy with which it disagreed, negotiation with the Soviet Union would become practically impossible.

So far as the problems of Africa and Asia are concerned, it is far better for the NATO countries to be right separately than wrong together. If NATO felt itself compelled to take the side of its members whenever they were involved in a dispute with African or Asian countries the alliance would become a major propaganda weapon for Soviet penetration of those continents. Damage has already been done in the United Nations by the appearance which the NATO countries have given of ganging up together on issues like colonialism and the Congo, though this period now seems to have come to an end. In fact, American opposition to Britain and France over Suez, and the refusal of France's allies to support her war in Algeria, have done much to limit the damage which the West as a whole would otherwise have suffered. In any case, none of the NATO countries has the slightest claim to allied support when it finds itself in difficulties over policies it has adopted without consulting them—whether France in Algeria, Belgium in the Congo, Britain at Suez, or America in Laos.

In most cases, the NATO countries would do best to develop their Afro-Asian policies in conjunction with the Afro-Asian countries themselves rather than with one another—

and some of the ex-imperial countries have special advantages here. By allowing the Commonwealth to develop from a family of white nations into a multi-racial association with certain agreed rules, Britain has immensely increased its potential value as a bridge between the West and Afro-Asia.

Tidy academic minds have an irresistible urge to rationalize international institutions. But in the real world there is everything to be said for pursuing policy through a proliferation of overlapping organizations which help to create the sort of organic social tissues on which a living international order must depend.

Similar considerations should govern NATO's economic activities. There is everything to be said for further extending NATO's role in distributing the burdens of defense more equitably throughout the alliance—particularly now that the balance of economic power inside NATO has shifted. It is high time that the NATO governments accepted the economic implications of the military interdependence they proclaim and agreed to specialize and standardize in the research, development, and production of their armaments.

But there are no other economic functions which would not be better carried out by some other organization than NATO. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a far better institution for harmonizing Western trade policies and organizing aid to the developing countries, since it also includes the Western neutrals. Though in many cases the distribution of Western aid would be better arranged through the United Nations, there is a vital role for OECD in helping to produce Western economic policies which will guarantee the developing countries a steady demand of stable prices for their foodstuffs and raw materials. As Dag Hammarskjöld has pointed out, the Afro-Asians lost more money through Western failure to maintain economic growth in 1959 than they had received from both Western and Communist sources in the previous five years.

THERE HAS BEEN much discussion since the European Common Market was set up about the internal structure of the Atlantic alliance. Should it consist of an American sun with a lot of European planets? Should

it be a tripartite system consisting of the United States, the Common Market Six, and Britain with the rest of the Seven and the Commonwealth? Or should it rest on two single piers on either side of the Atlantic: namely North America and a European unit which includes Great Britain? In my opinion it is neither practicable nor desirable to see the problem in this way. Any tendency to create closed groupings inside NATO can only weaken the alliance as a whole. Though the Continental Six have certain common economic interests which may be best satisfied by forming a single market, it is not likely that they will develop a single foreign policy, and it is scarcely conceivable that they will be able to develop a defense policy which does not depend primarily on the support of an outside power—the United States.

France finds herself alone among the Six in her policy toward the alliance—and none of her partners in the Common Market are prepared to let her speak for them in any Three Power directorate in the alliance. Germany is not prepared to support Belgium, Holland, or France in their colonial entanglements. In fact, the danger that the economic division of Western Europe will lead to a serious political division is slight so long as NATO continues to fulfill its basic military function. The economic division itself need not be so damaging as hostile propaganda suggests, providing Britain and the Seven support America's pressure on the Six to observe liberal trade policies and keep their external tariff barrier as low as possible. Indeed some proposals for a merger of the Six and Seven behind a high tariff wall would do harm to the alliance by isolating the United States and Canada.

IN TERMS OF POWER, the United States is the only possible leader of the alliance. Moreover, it is clear that none of the European countries would prefer one of their own number to the United States. Their natural jealousies of one another stand in the way, and though they often doubt American wisdom, they usually find it easier to take American sincerity for granted than trust one another.

On the other hand, effective American leadership in the alliance will depend even more than in the past on creating a sense of real partnership—of interdependence rather than dependence. Genuine interdependence may well imply a degree of European influence on the internal as well as the external policies of the United States which few Americans are yet prepared to envisage. But by far the most important condition of American leadership is to restore the old image of the United States as a vigorous and purposeful society with a strong sense of direction: a society which regards change as its ally, not its enemy. Even in its first few months the Kennedy administration has gone a long way toward achieving this transformation—with electric effect on European public opinion, particularly among the younger generation whose picture of America had been formed in the days when her foreign policy seemed inspired by a self-righteousness softened only by laziness. The older generation may find the new style of American leadership more exhausting than invigorating, but in my view Kennedy's greatest service to the alliance will be to call on the immense reserves of frustrated idealism in Western Europe which have been rotting through disuse for the last ten years.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

THE POLICY DECLARATION and the appeal to the peoples of the world adopted last December by the Moscow conference of eighty-one Communist parties mark the end of one phase in the dispute between the leaderships of the ruling parties of China and the Soviet Union—the phase in which the followers of Mao for the first time openly challenged the standing of the Soviet Communists as the fountainhead of ideological orthodoxy for the world movement. But the “ideological dispute” which began in April 1960 was neither a sudden nor self-contained development: it grew out of acute differences between the two Communist great powers over concrete diplomatic issues, and it took its course in constant interaction with the changes in Soviet diplomatic tactics. Hence the total impact of this phase on Soviet foreign policy on one side, and on the ideology, organization, and strategy of international Communism on the other, cannot be evaluated from an interpretation of the Moscow documents alone, but only from a study of the process as a whole, as it developed during the past year on both planes.

To say that the 1960 Chinese challenge to Soviet ideological authority grew out of pragmatic disagreements over foreign policy is not to take the view that the varieties of Communist ideology are a mere cloak for conflicts of national interest. The profound differences in the history of the Soviet and

Chinese Communist parties, both in the strategy by which they conquered power and in the methods they used afterward for transforming society, have clearly produced a different ideological climate, different forms of inner-party life, and a different “style of work”; and the fact that Mao Tse-tung could only win control of the Chinese party and lead it to victory by repeatedly defying Stalin’s advice has contributed to the formation of a Chinese Communist leadership which is highly conscious of those differences.

This is not the place either to discuss the origin and nature of the distinctive ideological climate of Chinese Communism in detail, or to trace its various manifestations from Mao’s first “rectification” movement of 1941 to the methods adopted after his victory for the “re-education” of hostile classes, or from the reaction to Soviet “de-Stalinization” and the subsequent crisis in the Soviet bloc to the “Hundred Flowers” campaign and to the creation of the communes. Suffice it to say that while some of these manifestations of Chinese originality took an apparently “liberal” and others an apparently “extremist” form, their common characteristic is a historically conditioned tendency to believe that almost anything is possible to a revolutionary party armed with the right consciousness—an exaltation of faith and will over all “objective conditions” of the productive forces and all given class structures which exceeds that shown by the Bolshevik model, and is even more remote from the original Marxian doctrine than the latter.

A party leadership conditioned by this ideological climate will obviously perceive both the internal problems and the national

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interests of the state it governs in a peculiar way; to that extent, the ideological difference constitutes a kind of permanent potential for rivalry between the two Communist great powers. Yet it does not by itself explain the timing and content of any particular dispute between them. For given the manifestly overriding importance of their common interests, the potential rivalry can only become actual when concrete policy disagreements arise which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of intra-bloc diplomacy, and which the weaker and dependent ally regards as sufficiently vital to take recourse to the public use of the ideological weapon. This was done by China in muted hints during the 1958 disagreements, and much more openly in 1960.

THE POLICY DISPUTE

In both cases, Chinese misgivings seem to have been based on a sense of insufficient Soviet diplomatic and military support in their long-standing conflict with the United States, and to have been acutely aggravated by Mr. Khrushchev's efforts to achieve a Soviet-American *détente*—by his repeated bids for a summit conference without Communist China, and by his visit to the U.S. in September 1959. The Chinese leaders apparently feared, probably not without reason, that such a *détente* would further diminish Soviet interest in taking serious risks on their behalf, and increase Soviet interest in preventing them from taking any such risks themselves.* Above all, Soviet willingness to make disarmament one of the main items on any summit agenda, combined with the agreed temporary ban on nuclear test explosions and the continued negotiations for a permanent ban, must have given rise to Chinese anxiety lest the Russians might be willing on certain conditions to enter a commitment to close the "nuclear club." The mere fact of negotiation on that subject apparently precluded them from receiving Soviet aid in developing nuclear

* Since this was written, a report based on unpublished Communist documents in the possession of Western governments has stated that a scheme for a joint Russo-Chinese Pacific naval command broke down owing to Soviet fears of being drawn by the Chinese into a war over Formosa. See Edward Crankshaw in the London *Observer*, February 12, 1961.

weapons of their own, and thus helped to delay their becoming a world power of the first rank; an actual Soviet commitment would have faced them with the choice of either accepting permanent inferiority in this field, or—if they went ahead successfully in developing and testing the weapon themselves—of defying in isolation an agreement of the world's leading powers.

Whatever the Chinese may have said in their private representations to Moscow, they did not think it advisable to spell out these fears in public. But during the winter of 1959–60—roughly from Khrushchev's visit to Peking, on his return from his talks with Eisenhower, at the beginning of October to the Moscow conference of the Warsaw Pact states in early February—they openly attacked the assumptions on which the effort to achieve a Soviet-American *détente* was officially based. The core of their argument was that the policy of American "imperialism" and of Eisenhower, its "chieftain," could not change in substance even if it was temporarily disguised by peace-loving phrases; hence nothing could be gained by seeking an understanding with the U.S. in an atmosphere of *détente*, only by isolating this "main enemy" and putting pressure on him. A period of quite visible, concrete disagreement on policy toward the Eisenhower administration thus preceded the Chinese Communists' generalized, ideological attack on Soviet authority.

The most striking characteristic of that period is the apparent unconcern with which the Soviet leaders pursued their preparations for a summit conference, despite the increasingly outspoken Chinese protests. The impression that Mao Tse-tung had refused to approve the concept of a *détente* based on "mutual concessions" as advanced by Khrushchev was confirmed when the latter, addressing the Supreme Soviet on his return to Moscow, coupled his advocacy of that concept with blunt warnings against the "Trotskyite adventurism" of a policy of "neither peace nor war," and when the theoretical organ of the Chinese Communists developed an analysis of American foreign policy directly opposed to Khrushchev's optimism in the following months. Nevertheless, Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960 a substantial reduction of Soviet con-

ventional forces and military expenditures as his advance contribution to the ten-power disarmament negotiations, and also indicated willingness to help overcome the deadlock in the negotiations on an inspection system for a permanent ban on nuclear test explosions—a most sensitive issue from the Chinese point of view.

Within a week, the standing committee of the Chinese National People's Congress, in a resolution formally approving the Soviet disarmament proposals, solemnly announced to the world that China would not be bound by any agreements to which she was not a party; but when this stand, together with warnings against illusions about a change in the character of American policy, was repeated at the conference of Warsaw Treaty ministers in early February by the—possibly uninvited—Chinese observer, his speech was not published in any European member state of the Soviet bloc, and the declaration adopted by the conference showed virtually no concessions to his point of view. To cap it all, Khrushchev spent most of the remainder of February, including the tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance, in India and Indonesia, two countries with which China was involved in acute conflicts of national interest, and showed throughout the journey an almost ostentatious detachment from Chinese claims and actions.

All during the winter, the Chinese thus experienced the inherent weakness in the position of a dependent ally who urges the stronger partner to pay more heed to his interests, but is unable to switch sides if the latter turns a deaf ear: none of their objections, raised first in secret and then with increasing publicity, were able to deflect Khrushchev from his course. There remained to them one weapon—to interfere directly not with the Soviet policy of *détente*, but with the *détente* itself—by urging on Communist and revolutionary nationalist movements in the non-Communist world a bolder forward policy than was compatible with the plans of Soviet diplomacy. But this meant that the Chinese Communists must set themselves up as rivals to their Russian comrades in advising these movements—in other words, that they must generalize the dispute and raise the question of ideological authority.

During the later part of the winter 1959–60, a number of cases became known where Chinese representatives had opposed Soviet delegates in closed sessions of the directing organs of such international front organizations as the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the World Federation of Trade Unions, etc. The central issue in these clashes was whether the “peace campaign” was the priority task to which all other forms of revolutionary struggle must be subordinated, as the Russians maintained, or whether it was only one among many forms of the struggle against imperialism, which must in no circumstances be isolated and “set in opposition” to more militant forms of revolutionary action, as the Chinese argued. It was as a platform for these discussions in the international movement that the Chinese Communists published in April their ideological statements on the teachings of Lenin—documents which, despite all later elaborations and modifications, have remained basic for that phase of the dispute.

IDEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

It has been implied in subsequent Soviet polemics against “dogmatists and sectarians” and innumerable times spelled out in Western comment, that the central thesis of these Chinese statements was the continued validity of Lenin’s belief in the inevitability of world war. That is not so. Every one of the Chinese documents in question quoted with approval the sentence in the 1957 Moscow declaration (based in turn on the resolution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) that, owing to the growth of the forces of peace, “it is now realistically possible to prevent war.”* What none of them approved, however, is the formula of

* This applies to all Chinese texts available for scrutiny. Crankshaw’s summing up of the secret Communist report referred to above repeats the Soviet charge that the Chinese regard nuclear war as inevitable (see particularly his second article in the *Observer*, February 19). But he quotes no Chinese statements and indicates that the report in question was given by the leader of a satellite Communist party favoring the Soviet view, and may have come into Western possession by a deliberate Soviet leak.

the 21st Congress on the emerging possibility "even before the full victory of Socialism in the world, while capitalism continues to exist in part of the world, to banish world war from the life of human society." The difference is that in the Chinese view the latter phrase implies the disappearance of any serious *danger* of world war while capitalism still exists; the Chinese Communists felt that this presupposed a change in the nature of imperialism—and that they had to deny such a possibility in order to contest the Khrushchevian hope of converting the ruling circles of the U.S. to a genuine acceptance of "peaceful coexistence" from realistic motives.

The picture drawn by the Chinese was that of an unchanged, though weakened, imperialism which would resort to war whenever it could to defend its sphere of exploitation, but might be prevented from doing so in any particular case by the "forces of peace." In practice they agreed with the Soviets in regarding an all-out attack on the Soviet bloc as unlikely, but argued that inter-imperialist war was still possible, and insisted that colonial wars against national liberation movements were virtually inevitable: the latter could only be "stopped" by vigorous support for the revolutionary movements. But the Communists would fail to give support if they were "afraid" of another world war, if they "begged the imperialists for peace," or if they tolerated or even spread illusions about the warlike nature of imperialism, instead of mobilizing the masses everywhere for an all-out struggle against it.

This analysis implied three charges of "muddle-headed concessions to revisionism" against Khrushchev's policy: exaggeration of the dangers of nuclear war, which might paralyze the will to resist imperialism or at any rate lead to excessive caution; illusions about the growth of a "realistic" tendency toward peaceful coexistence among such "chieftains of imperialism" as Eisenhower, which might lead to a relaxation of vigilance among the Communist governments and movements; and as a result, excessive reliance on diplomatic negotiation as a means to avert war, causing a desire to restrain revolutionary movements and "just wars" of liberation, instead of welcoming them as the best means to weaken the

imperialists and stop *their* wars. Accordingly, the Chinese ideologists argued that it was all right for a Communist to seek a meeting with Eisenhower, but wrong to say that he believed in the latter's peaceful intentions; all right to propose "general and complete disarmament," but wrong to tell his own followers that there was a real chance of obtaining it; all right to propagate peaceful coexistence, but wrong to advise the Algerian nationalists to try and negotiate a cease-fire with President de Gaulle. They accepted peace *propaganda* as a means of revolutionary struggle against imperialism, but not peace *diplomacy* of a kind which might even temporarily mitigate the forms of that struggle.

THE RUSSIANS, in turn, aware that there could be no serious negotiation without an atmosphere of *détente* and at least the pretense of believing in the peaceful intentions of the other side, recognized that this was an attack on the whole coexistence diplomacy; but they had to answer it on the ideological plane. Through the mouth of Otto Kuusinen, a member of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU who had begun work in the Comintern in Lenin's time, they insisted that Lenin had differentiated between militarist diehards and possible partners for peaceful coexistence in the imperialist camp, and had foreseen that changes in military technique might one day make war impossible. They argued that the growing strength of the "Socialist camp" and the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and long-range rockets had in fact provided a realistic basis for a diplomacy based on similar differentiation at the present time, and claimed as telling proof of their thesis the success of Khrushchev's personal diplomacy in general, and of his "historic visit" to the U.S. in particular, in largely dispersing the climate of the cold war and restoring businesslike relations between the two different social systems. Yet only a few weeks later Khrushchev himself, even while maintaining this position in theory, reversed himself in practice to the extent of wrecking the summit conference on the ground that negotiation with Eisenhower had become impossible after his assumption of responsibility for the U-2 incident.

SUMMITRY & THE CHINESE RESPONSE

Western discussion of the causes of this *volte-face* necessarily remains inconclusive in the absence of direct evidence of the motives of the Russian rulers and the course of their deliberations in the critical period. But a coherent analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute is impossible without at least venturing a hypothesis. I have elsewhere stated my reasons for rejecting the theory that a decisive weakening of Khrushchev's position by some combination of "neo-Stalinist" or "pro-Chinese" elements in the Soviet leadership took place at the time*; indeed, I know of no convincing evidence for the assumption that such a grouping exists at all. On the other hand, Khrushchev's Baku speech of April 25 showed his anxieties, following a number of authorized American policy statements, lest the summit meeting might fail to yield the Western concessions on Berlin which he expected, and his desire to increase the pressure in that direction; and his initial reaction to the U-2 incident is consistent with the assumption that he regarded it not as a reason for evading the summit conference, but as an occasion for making the pressure more effective by driving a wedge between Eisenhower and his "diehard militarist" advisers.

By marking the complete failure of this crude attempt at differentiation, the President's assumption of personal responsibility for the spy-flights, whatever its other merits or demerits, must have been a double blow to Khrushchev: it deprived him of the last hope of obtaining substantial concessions at the summit, and it put him clearly in the wrong on one important part of his public argument with his Chinese allies. A failure to reach his summit objectives thus became certain at the very moment at which, from the viewpoint of his prestige in the "Socialist camp" and the Communist world movement, he could least afford such a failure: hence it seems natural that, with the full support of his colleagues, he decided instead to wreck the conference in advance unless he could still force a last-minute differentiation by obtaining a public apology from Eisenhower.

* "The Nature of Khrushchev's Power," *Problems of Communism*, July/August 1960.

Within a few days, Khrushchev demonstrated by his refusal to go ahead with an East German peace treaty pending a possible summit conference with Eisenhower's successor that he had not abandoned the "general line" of his diplomacy but only intended to change the time schedule. But the Chinese Communists not only were not content with this, but felt that now that they had been proved right by events they were in a strong position to force a broad change of policy by pressing home their ideological attack.

THE ATTEMPT WAS MADE officially and in fact publicly at the beginning of June at the Peking session of the General Council of the WFTU by the Chinese Vice-President of that body, Liu Chang-sheng, and there is reason to suppose that even more comprehensive and outspoken criticisms of Soviet policy were communicated non-publicly at the same time, at least to selected leaders of the Communist world movement. Liu's speech went beyond the April documents in demanding a "clarification" of the Communist attitude toward war, denouncing "indiscriminate" opposition to war, and calling for active support for "just wars" of liberation; in sharply opposing the formulation of the Soviet 21st Congress about "eliminating war forever while imperialism still exists" as "entirely wrong" and leading to "evil consequences of a serious nature which, in fact, we already see at present," though he too admitted the possibility of preventing a new world war; and in condemning any belief that proposals for general and complete disarmament could be accepted, and that the funds formerly earmarked for war purpose could be used for the welfare of the masses and for assisting underdeveloped countries while imperialism still existed, as "downright whitewashing and embellishing imperialism" and thus "helping imperialism headed by the U.S. to dupe the people."

Yet the Chinese had misjudged their chances of forcing a change of the Soviet line. At the World Federation of Trade Unions session they found themselves vigorously counterattacked by both the Russian and the major European movements, and finally isolated with only the Indonesian trade unions on their side. Moreover, this

seems to have been the point at which the Soviet leaders decided to give battle in defense of their ideological authority, and first of all to whip into line those European satellite parties which had in the past shown signs of sympathy for Chinese intransigence. They took the initiative in calling a conference of all ruling Communist parties to meet on the occasion of the Rumanian party congress later that month; and in the meantime the Soviet press began to publish warnings against the dangers of "dogmatism" and "sectarianism" in the international movement, while the Italian delegates returning from Peking published the fact that the Chinese had been isolated and defeated in a major international discussion on the problems of the struggle for peace and disarmament.

THE BUCHAREST STALEMATE

Now that the issue of authority was in the open, the field of the dispute kept broadening. Already in April, the speaker at the Peking celebration of Lenin's birthday, Lu Ting-Yi, had claimed for Mao's creation of the communes the succession to Lenin's concept of "uninterrupted revolution," and had attacked people who in Socialist construction "rely only on technique and not on the masses" and deny the need for further revolutionary struggle in the transition to the higher stage of Communism. Now *Pravda* quoted Engels and Lenin for their criticism of the Blanquist wish to "skip all the intermediate stages on the road to Communism" in the illusion that "if power were in their hands, Communism could be introduced the day after tomorrow." Yet the original Sino-Soviet disagreement about the communes had been ended in the winter of 1958-59 with the withdrawal of the Chinese claim that this institution constituted a short cut to the Communist stage, and an understanding that the Chinese would go on developing and the Soviets and their European satellites rejecting that institution without further debate. The revival of the issue now only made sense as part of the attempt by each side to throw doubt on the other's ideological orthodoxy.

On the eve of the Bucharest conference, in June, a *Pravda* editorial stated bluntly that "among Socialist countries, there can-

not be two opinions on the question of peace or war. Socialists believe that in present conditions there is no necessity for war, that disarmament is not only needed but possible, and that peaceful coexistence between nations is a vital necessity." Coupled with a quote from Khrushchev's December speech to the Hungarian party congress about the need for all Communist governments to "synchronize their watches," and his warning that "if the leaders of any one of the Socialist countries would set themselves up to be above the rest, that can only play into the hands of our enemies," this indicated the Soviet leaders' intention to force a clear decision that would be binding on all ruling parties.

But at Bucharest, this intention was at least partly foiled by the Chinese. Khrushchev's public attack on people who quote the words of Lenin without looking at the realities of the present world, and whom Lenin would set right in no uncertain manner if he came back today, was plain enough for all the satellite leaders to understand that the time for maneuvering between the two colossi was over, and for all but the Albanians to rally round. His account of how Soviet strength and Soviet skill had again and again foiled the war plans of the "imperialists," from Suez in 1956 to the Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1957 and the U.S. landing in the Lebanon after the Iraqi revolution of 1958, if historically dubious, was propagandistically effective as a demonstration of the meaning of his "peace policy" for a Communist audience. But the Chinese delegate P'eng Chen was clearly instructed neither to submit nor to carry the ideological debate to a conclusion at this point: he evaded a decision by a skillful withdrawal to prepared positions.

In public, P'eng Chen appeared as the advocate of Communist unity at almost any price, to be achieved on the basis of the 1957 Moscow declaration to which all but the Yugoslavs had agreed. This committed the Chinese once more to recognition of the possibility of preventing or "checking" imperialist wars—a possibility that, P'eng claimed, could only be fulfilled by the united strength of the "Socialist camp" and the determined mobilization of mass action against the imperialists. But it was also intended to commit the Russians once again

to the 1957 thesis that the aggressive circles of the U.S. were the main enemy of peace and all popular aspirations, and that "revisionism" was the main danger within the ranks of the Communist movement. Having said that much, the Chinese representative spoke no word about *détente*, disarmament, or the "elimination of war from the life of mankind" before the disappearance of capitalism.

Behind the scenes, he seems to have argued that the 1957 conference of ruling Communist parties had been called chiefly to settle problems of Communist power and "Socialist construction"; the questions now in dispute, being concerned with world-wide revolutionary strategy, could only be decided by a conference representing the whole Communist movement. Khrushchev might well complain about Chinese "factional" methods of carrying the quarrel into the ranks of other parties; in the end he had to agree to put up the dispute officially for world-wide inner-party discussion in preparation for a November conference in Moscow, and to content himself with a brief interim communiqué which, while stressing the primary importance of the "peace campaign," did not go beyond the 1957 declaration on any controversial point.

THIS FELL FAR SHORT of what the Soviet leaders had expected. The decisive showdown was not only postponed for several months, but it would take place before an audience of revolutionary parties many of whose members were less closely tied to Soviet control than the East European satellites and might well regard the Chinese slogans of unconditional revolutionary solidarity as more attractive than the Soviet readiness to subordinate their struggle to the needs of coexistence diplomacy whenever that seemed expedient. Thus an Algerian Communist might prefer Chinese offers of aid for the FLN to the repeated Russian advice favoring negotiation with de Gaulle; an Iraqi Communist might recall that neither Soviet support for Kassem's regime nor his own party's Soviet-ordered retreat from its earlier offensive policy had obtained for it a legal, let alone a dominating, position under that regime; an Indonesian Communist might resent the manner in which Khrushchev had ignored

his party during his official visit, and the general Soviet wooing of the "bourgeois nationalist" regime of Sukarno that limited the democratic rights of the Communists as well as of other parties and favored a neutralist bloc with the "renegade" Tito. And would not the Communists of Latin America be sensitive to the Chinese argument that as Yankee imperialism was the main enemy, any attempts to relax Soviet-American tension were bound to weaken Soviet support for them as well as for China?

Yet without the cooperation of these movements, Khrushchev's coexistence diplomacy could not be carried through: he needed their discipline, and the Chinese had launched their ideological attack on his authority precisely in order to undermine that. Now they had created a situation in which the objects of the struggle, the Communist movements *in partibus infidelium*, were to act to some extent as its arbiters. True, the Russians had still the advantage of the prestige and resources of a world power as well as of older organizational ties: all the foreign Communists knew that the Soviets *could* help them more—financially, diplomatically, and ultimately militarily—than the Chinese, yet they were less certain that the Soviets *would* always help them to the limits of their ability. Hence Khrushchev seems to have felt that in preparation for the November meeting, not only the circulation of new Soviet documents and the dispatch of new emissaries to the wavering parties were needed, but above all new proofs of the spirit of revolutionary internationalism animating his foreign policy.

The fact that he had already decided to postpone his new summit approach until after the U.S. presidential elections made it easier for him to furnish that proof: for he could now afford to increase rather than relax tension for a time without serious damage to his future diplomatic chances, and perhaps even hope to improve them by creating a dark backdrop for the next display of his sunny smile—provided only that he did not allow matters to get really out of hand. The weeks after Bucharest thus offered the strange spectacle of the Soviet leaders conducting themselves on the world stage in the very style which Peking's ideological theses had seemed to demand,

while at the same time launching a vigorous campaign against those throughout the Communist world movement!

DIPLOMACY; IDEOLOGICAL MANEUVERS

The Bucharest communiqué had not yet been published when Russia demonstratively walked out of the ten-power disarmament talks at Geneva, just before the Western counter-proposals for which she had been calling so insistently were officially submitted. There followed within a few days the shooting down of an American plane over the Arctic, the first Soviet note on the Congo accusing all the Western powers of backing Belgian military intervention as part of a plot to restore colonial rule, and, as a climax, Khrushchev's personal threat to use inter-continental rockets against the U.S. if the latter should attack Cuba. Yet during the same period, Khrushchev used his visit to Austria to insist again and again on the horrors of nuclear world war and on the need to avoid even local wars because of the risk that they might spread; and even in his most reckless gestures he took care not to do anything irrevocable. The Geneva test negotiations were *not* broken off; the Cuban rocket threat was soon "explained" as symbolic, while in the Congo the Russians refrained from backing their policy with force; and a proposal for taking the disarmament negotiations out of the UN and for calling instead for a disarmament conference of "all governments" including China, which the Chinese managed to get adopted by a Stockholm session of the World Peace Council in July, was promptly dropped down the memory hole by Moscow in favor of Khrushchev's suggestion that all heads of government of the member states should personally attend the next UN assembly session in order to discuss the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament.

The same contradiction between the desire to keep the lines of negotiation open and the need to pose constantly as an uninhibited revolutionary agitator also dominated Khrushchev's subsequent behavior at the UN assembly itself. He did not back the neutrals' initiative for a new summit meeting but left the onus of killing it to the West. He depreciated the importance of his own proposals for "general and complete dis-

armament," for the sake of which so many heads of government had come, by devoting far more energy to his attack on "colonialism" in general and on the UN secretariat in particular, and by choosing a language and style of behavior more apt to inspire revolutionary movements outside than to influence delegates inside the assembly hall. He followed his attack on the secretariat by proposals for a reform of the latter and of the Security Council which appealed to the natural desire of the new African and Asian member states for stronger representation in the leading organs of the UN, but then suggested that any such changes in the charter should be postponed until the delegates of the Chinese People's Republic had been seated. These inconsistencies are incomprehensible unless the fact is borne in mind that during all this time Khrushchev was engaged in an effort to prove his revolutionary zeal and international solidarity in preparation for the Moscow conference.

Meanwhile the line for the ideological campaign itself had been laid down by a meeting of the central committee of the CPSU in mid-July, which had approved the conduct of its delegation at Bucharest led by Khrushchev, oddly enough after a report by secretariat member F. R. Kozlov who had not been there. As developed during late July and August in the Soviet press and the statements of pro-Soviet leaders of foreign Communist parties, the campaign showed some significant changes of emphasis. It was more uncompromising than ever on the need to avoid the horrors of nuclear war and the rejection of all attempts to belittle them or to regard any kind of international war as desirable. It insisted that good Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries were entitled and indeed obliged to adopt conclusions different from Lenin on this matter, both because of the new techniques of destruction and because of the change in the relation of world forces to the disadvantage of imperialism. It vigorously defended the possibility not only of stopping each particular war, but of altogether "eliminating war from the life of society" with the further growth of the strength of the "Socialist camp," even while capitalism still existed on part of the globe, as the 21st Congress had laid down; and it claimed that the Soviet program of general and complete disarma-

ment was a realistic policy goal that could be achieved, even though this might require time, "mutual concessions," and compromises. Any opposition to this general line of peaceful coexistence was to be eliminated from the Communist movement as "Trotskyite adventurism."

But the new campaign no longer laid stress on Khrushchev's differentiation between "realistic statesmen" and "diehard militarists" in the enemy camp, and no longer mentioned "relaxation of international tension" as a condition of coexistence diplomacy. Instead, the goals of peace and disarmament were now put forward, in language first used by the Chinese critics, as having to be "imposed" on the imperialists by the strength of the "Socialist camp" and the relentless struggle of the masses. Peaceful coexistence was now described as "the highest form of the class struggle," and justified as leading not to an even temporary weakening, but to an intensification of revolutionary movements everywhere, including civil wars and colonial revolts whenever the imperialists attempted to hold back the rising tide by force. It was only international wars, wars between states, that should be avoided by the policy of peaceful coexistence; and it was explicitly admitted that imperialist intervention against revolutionary movements might lead to "just wars of liberation," and that in that case the duty of the Socialist camp was to support the latter—though not necessarily with troops—and to seek to end the intervention. In short, it was now claimed that there was no contradiction at all between the diplomacy of coexistence and the policy of unconditional revolutionary solidarity: both had become compatible in an age where, owing to the growing strength of the "Socialist camp," the "dictatorship of the proletariat had become an international force" as once predicted by Lenin.

This interpretation of Soviet policy evidently placed its authors in a very strong position to meet the Chinese ideological challenge; yet as the Chinese had intended, and as Khrushchev's simultaneous actions illustrated, it was bound greatly to reduce the credibility and effectiveness of the coexistence campaign in non-Communist eyes. The Soviets could hope to succeed in restoring their international ideological au-

thority to the exact extent to which they were prepared temporarily to weaken the political impact of their diplomacy. It was an expression of that dilemma that when the chief ideological spokesman of Yugoslav Communism, Vice-President Edvard Kardelj, published a pamphlet in defense of coexistence and against the Chinese cult of revolutionary war, *Pravda* immediately turned against him and accused him of all the revisionist sins of which the Chinese had accused the Soviets—not only because he had been so tactless as to name the Chinese as his target, which the Soviets had never done, but because he had taken a consistent position with which they could not afford to identify themselves. For Kardelj had argued that real peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems required that these systems should not become the basis of permanent "ideological blocs" in foreign policy; and this concept was, of course, as incompatible with Soviet practice as with the new definition of coexistence as "the highest form of the class struggle."

DURING THE SAME PERIOD, the Chinese Communists were also shifting their ground. They stopped belittling the horrors of nuclear war and claiming that only cowards could fear them, and repeatedly protested their willingness to fight for peaceful coexistence and the prevention or stopping of wars. But they kept rubbing in the formula of the Moscow declaration of 1957 about the role of the aggressive U.S. circles as the center of world reaction and the need for vigilance against its war plans camouflaged by peace talk, which they felt had been borne out by Khrushchev's experience with Eisenhower; and they pictured peaceful coexistence and disarmament as goals which could be "imposed" on the enemy only "to some extent" and for limited periods, without the slightest assurance of permanence or completion before the final, world-wide victory of the Communist cause. In other words, they remained adamant in their rejection of the thesis of the 21st Congress about "eliminating war from the life of mankind" before that final victory.

Parallel with that, the Chinese concentrated on extolling the importance of revolutionary violence, including revolu-

tionary war. While the Russians now *admitted* that peaceful coexistence did not *exclude* colonial uprisings and civil wars, and that imperialist intervention in these cases *might lead to* "just wars of liberation," the Chinese stressed revolutionary violence as the normal and classical road for the advance of the Communist cause, and support for just wars as the *criterion* of true internationalism. In fact, they abandoned the safe ground of the 1957 Moscow declaration (on which they were otherwise relying in that phase) to the extent of attacking its thesis, taken over from the 20th Congress of the CPSU, that the Communist seizure of power might take place in some countries without violent upheaval and civil war, as a peaceful revolution carried out with the help of the legal parliamentary institutions. Ignoring the examples given by the Russians at the time—such as the annexation of Estonia and the Czechoslovak coup of February 1948—the Chinese now insisted that the bourgeoisie would never and nowhere abandon power without resorting to violence, and that it was "muddle-headed" at best to confuse the peaceful construction of Socialism *after* the seizure of power with the necessarily violent conquest of power itself. To this, the Soviets replied with renewed charges of "Blanquism."

IDEOLOGY & DEMAGOGUERY

Of all the differences raised in the 1960 dispute, this argument on the violent and non-violent roads to power was probably the least serious and most purely demagogic one. The Soviets had started talking about the "parliamentary road" in order to ease the tactical position of the Communist parties in the West, and it was the latter who made propagandist use of the formula; at any rate, it contains nothing to which the Chinese could object from the point of view of their interests. But in the weeks before the crucial Moscow meeting, the Chinese effort was chiefly directed at those Communist parties in underdeveloped countries for which the Chinese experience had long been regarded as a natural model—parties which had developed alternately in cooperation or violent conflict with nationalist dictators, but which had certainly no prospect of gaining power by "parliamentary" means. By

dragging in the slogan of the "peaceful road" which nobody had thought of applying to those parties, the Chinese were trying to suggest to them that the real motive for the Soviet counsels of restraint occasionally tendered them (and which were in fact due to the diplomatic expediency of "keeping in" with the nationalist dictators concerned) was a general renunciation of revolution for the sake of "peace"—that the Soviets were passing from the Leninist policy of coexistence between states to the "revisionist" position of peace between classes!

The Soviets replied to this twist by a similar piece of demagoguery—accusing the Chinese of a sectarian refusal to work with broad nationalist movements against imperialism unless these movements subscribed in advance to Communist principles and leadership. As a general charge, this was as untrue as the Chinese attack on the alleged "revisionism" of Moscow's "peaceful road"; the close contacts maintained by Peking with the Algerian and many African nationalists proved that daily. But Peking's conflicts with the Indian and Indonesian governments, due in fact not to doctrinaire prejudice but to Chinese chauvinism, and its support for leftish malcontents in several Asian Communist parties against Moscow's wooing of nationalist dictators, gave to the charge a semblance of substance.

SOVIET-CHINESE relations seem to have reached their low point in August and early September. It was during that period that an unusually large number of Soviet technicians left China, while many Chinese students returned from Russia; that the organ of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society disappeared from the streets of Moscow; and that the expected Chinese scholars failed to turn up at the Orientalists' Congress there. It was then, too, that a number of Soviet provincial papers printed an article explaining that in contemporary conditions, not even a huge country like China could build Socialism in isolation and without the aid and backing of the Soviet Union, while Peking's theoretical voice published a statement of the need for China to rely chiefly on her own resources for the fulfilment of her plans. We do not know the inside story behind those visible symptoms—whether Moscow really tried to apply eco-

nomic pressure and failed, or whether Peking made a gratuitous demonstration of her capacity for "going it alone."* Chinese criticism, at any rate, had not been silenced by October 1,[†] when the Russians used the eleventh birthday of the CPR to make another show of friendship; on the contrary, some of Peking's most polemical utterances came in the last weeks before the Moscow conference, whereas the Soviet ideological campaign had rather abated since the middle of September. But by then the Soviets could afford to stop arguing in public, for the Chinese had been largely, though not completely, isolated in the international movement: early in September, even the North Vietnamese party fell in line with the Soviet position.

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

The mere duration of the Moscow conference—almost three weeks of argument behind closed doors—showed that agreement on a new common statement of principles was anything but easy. This time, the Chinese had sent the strongest possible team short of exposing Mao himself to the risk of defeat—a delegation led by Liu Shao-ch'i and the party secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing; and reports that they fought for every clause and comma, and finally yielded to the majority view on some crucial points only under the threat of an open ideological breach, do not seem implausible. Halfway through the debates, the anniversary of the 1957 declaration was commented on by editorials in Moscow and Peking which still showed a marked difference of emphasis: on the primacy of revolutionary struggle in the *People's Daily*, on the "general line" of peaceful coexistence in *Pravda*; while at the same time a Chinese delegate to a session of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee threw off all restraint and claimed publicly that there could be no peaceful coexistence in those countries before the liquidation of colonialism, as the oppressed peoples would never accept "coexistence between the rider and the horse." But it seems established that as the Moscow conclave wore on, the Chinese were only able to retain the support of a few Asian parties that were traditionally dependent on them or largely recruited from the Chinese minorities, of some rather

weak Latin American parties, and of the Albanians long tied to them by common enmity against the Yugoslav "revisionists."

The long document on the strategy of international Communism that was agreed on in the end thus marks a clear Soviet victory on almost all the points that were still in dispute in the preceding three months. But the Soviet position as defended since the July session of the central committee of the CPSU already contained substantial concessions to the original Chinese criticism of Soviet policy.

The 1960 Moscow declaration starts from the Soviet analysis that Lenin's views are partly outdated because the present epoch is no longer primarily that of imperialism, but of the growing preponderance of the "Socialist world system" over the forces of imperialism. On this basis, it accepts not only the possibility of ending war forever with the world-wide victory of Socialism, but of "freeing mankind from the nightmare of another world war even now"—of "banishing world war from the life of society even while capitalism still exists in part of the world." The thesis of the 21st Congress of the CPSU which the Chinese had fought to the last has thus been reluctantly accepted by them, and so has the full description of the horrors of nuclear war. The declaration also proclaims the possibility not of preventing all local wars, but of "effectively fighting the local wars unleashed by the im-

*Since the above was written, it has been reasonably well established that the Soviets took the initiative in withdrawing large numbers of technicians, giving as their reason Chinese attempts to influence them ideologically against official Soviet policy. Both the pro-Soviet secret report summarized by Crankshaw and a pro-Chinese account by the West Bengal Communist leader H. K. Konar, published in the Indian weekly the *Link* and quoted by Boris Nikolaevsky in the *New Leader* of January 16, 1961, agree on this.

†According to the report summarized by Crankshaw, the Chinese Communist party circularized their systematic counterattack to the Soviet charges, going back to their disapproval of Khrushchev's 1956 "de-Stalinization" speech and to complaints of "unprincipled" Soviet behavior in Poland and Hungary later that year, only on September 1960. Once again, the reported Chinese position is confirmed by the pro-Chinese account of Konar (referred to above) and based on statements made to the author by Chinese representatives at the North Vietnamese congress at about the same time.

perialists" and extinguishing them, and stresses the unanimity of all Communists in their support of "peaceful coexistence" and negotiation as the only alternative to destructive war. Finally, it recognizes the "historic" importance which a fulfillment of the Soviet program for general and complete disarmament would have, and states that its achievement, though difficult, may be accomplished in stages if the masses and the governments of the "Socialist camp" resolutely fight for it.

AT THE SAME TIME, "peaceful coexistence" is described as "a form of the class struggle" (not, as in some Soviet documents, as "the highest form," because in the Chinese party doctrine that rank remains reserved for revolutionary war). The hope of preserving peace is squarely based on the strength of the "Socialist camp," the revolutionary movements and their sympathizers; it is admitted that the latter may be found also in "certain strata of the bourgeoisie of the advanced countries" who realize the new relation of forces and the catastrophic consequences of a world war, but this appears as a marginal factor. Gone are Khrushchev's "realistic statesmen" and his successful goodwill visits; the emphasis is on the fact that the aggressive, warlike nature of imperialism has not changed and that "American imperialism" as such—not only, as stated in 1957, "the aggressive imperialist circles of the United States"—has become the "main center of world reaction, the international gendarme, the enemy of the peoples of the whole world." While condemning "the American doctrine of the cold war," the document thus defines coexistence in rigid cold war terms.

The declaration allots to the "peace campaign" pride of place as likely to unite the broadest possible fronts under Communist leadership and rejects the "slander" that the Communists need war for extending their sway or believe in "exporting revolution." But it also calls for the most determined international support, both by the mass movement and by "the power of the Socialist world system," of revolutionary movements anywhere against "the imperialist export of counter revolution." The statement that "the Socialist states . . . have become an international force exerting a pow-

erful influence on world developments. Hence real possibilities have appeared to settle the major problems of our age in a new manner, in the interest of peace, democracy and Socialism . . ." assumes a special meaning in this context: for the first time since Stalin's victory over Trotsky, active support for international revolution is proclaimed as an obligation of the Soviet government and all other Communist governments. But the crucial question of whether that obligation includes the risk of war, of whether "peaceful coexistence" or "revolutionary solidarity" is to receive priority in case of conflict, is not settled explicitly—for the possibility of conflict between the two principles is not admitted.

On the question of violent or peaceful roads to power, the view of the Russians and of the 1957 declaration that both may be used according to circumstances is clearly upheld. Equally "broadminded" are the declaration's new directives for the policy of the Communists in underdeveloped countries toward their "national bourgeoisie"—i.e., toward the nationalist, neutralist, and non-Communist, though in fact hardly ever toward bourgeois regimes that have emerged from the struggle for national independence. The Communists are advised to aim at "national democratic" regimes, defined by their willingness to support the Soviet bloc against the "imperialists," to create the preconditions of progressive internal development by land reform, and to grant full freedom for the activity of the Communist party and of Communist-controlled "mass organizations." They are told that those sections of the "national bourgeoisie" which oppose land reform and suppress the Communists, having taken a reactionary turn at home, will sooner or later also side with imperialism abroad. But again, the crucial question of a nationalist dictatorship that is willing to take Soviet aid and to vote anti-Western in the UN but jails its own Communists, is shirked*; nor is there any clear indication of who is to interpret the ambiguous directives in case of conflict.

*In practice, President Nasser's regime in the UAR continues to enjoy Soviet diplomatic backing while being vigorously attacked in Soviet-controlled organs of the Communist world movement.

THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITY

Thus matters come back to the ultimate issue of ideological authority—of the right to interpret ambiguous principles in a changing situation. Here, the Soviets score a clear but very limited victory: they emerge as the most successful, but not as the only orthodox interpreters of the true doctrine. The Soviet Union is hailed as the only country that, having completed “Socialist construction,” is engaged in building the “higher stage” of Communism; the Chinese communes are not even mentioned, and the Soviet argument that Communist abundance is not possible short of the highest level of technical productivity, including automation, is hammered home. The CPSU is unanimously declared to be “the universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement,” and its superior experience in conquering power and transforming society is stated to have fundamental lessons for all parties; the decisions of its 20th Congress in particular are said to have opened a new era for the whole international movement. But that new era now turns out to be an era of polycentric autonomy—just as the bolder spirits thought at the time.

For under the new declaration, the spiritual authority of the CPSU is not incarnated in the shape which all doctrinaire authority, and certainly all authority in the Bolshevik tradition, requires by its nature—the shape of hierarchal discipline. It is not only that the declaration repeats the ancient pious formula about the independence and equality of all Communist parties; it is that it fails to establish a visible, single center for their dependence. It provides for irregular conferences, whether world-wide or regional, for mutual coordination, and for bipartite consultations between any two parties in case of differences. This may be intended to rule out the circulation of Chinese attacks on CPSU policy to third parties before they have raised the matter in Moscow directly; but it does not, on the face of it, prevent them from broadening the discussion again the next time they fail to get satisfaction in their direct contact with the “vanguard of the world movement.”* Clearly, the primacy of that vanguard is no longer that of an infallible Pope: the rule

of *Moscow locuta, causa finita* is valid no more. For the first time in its forty years of history, international Communism is entering a “conciliar” period.

One phase of open ideological controversy between Moscow and Peking has thus ended. The Chinese have withdrawn their open challenge to the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy of the Soviet Communists, but not before they had extracted from it as much advantage for their foreign policy as they could hope to gain without risking an open breach. The underlying differences of interest and viewpoint remain, though their public expression will now be muted for some time. But the phase that has now closed has not only had a considerable immediate impact on Soviet foreign policy; it is bound to produce lasting changes in the constellation of factors shaping that policy, in Soviet-Chinese relations, and in relations within the Communist world movement.

A measure of the immediate effect is the uncertainty of direction shown by Soviet diplomacy from the wrecking of the summit conference in May to the end of 1960. Having set out to induce the U.S., by a mixture of pressure and courtship, to abandon some exposed positions and allies for the sake of a temporary understanding with their chief antagonist, the Kremlin did not indeed abandon that objective, but wavered visibly between it and the Chinese objective of isolating the U.S. as the one irreconcilable enemy. The oscillations were too fast, the conciliatory gestures too half-hearted, and the brinkmanship too risky to be explained merely as the conscious use of zigzag tactics to “soften up” the opponent; even if the Soviets intended all the time to reserve the next serious offer of relaxation for the next American president, a cool calculation of diplomatic expediency would hardly have led them to commit themselves in the meantime to the point to which they have gone over, say, in Laos or Cuba. By depriving them of the power automatically to subordinate all revolutionary movements every-

*According to the report summarized by Crankshaw, the Chinese explicitly affirmed their right to form factions in the international movement during the Moscow discussions, and finally accepted the declaration only on condition that another world conference should be called within two years.

where to Soviet diplomatic needs, the Chinese forced Stalin's successors to compete for authority over those movements by playing up to them to some extent; and this meant that, while failing to impose on the Kremlin a policy made in Peking, the Chinese forced it to deviate from its own concepts to a significant extent.

Nor have they lost this power of interference as a result of the Moscow conference. True, they have failed to establish a power of veto over Soviet diplomacy in general and Soviet-American contacts in particular, as would have been the case if the Chinese theses of an unconditional priority of revolution over peace and of the hopelessness of any serious disarmament agreement with the "imperialists" had been adopted. There is nothing in the Moscow declaration that would make it *impossible* for the Soviets still to agree with the Western powers on a permanent ban on nuclear test explosions with proper guarantees of inspection, hence on an attempt to close the "atomic club." But there is much in it that will enable the Chinese to make it more difficult, and generally to raise suspicion against any direct Russo-American talks, and nothing that specifically endorses Khrushchev's methods of personal diplomacy, from his pursuit of summit meetings to his proposals for "reforming" the United Nations. In fact, if the text of the declaration is viewed in the context of the events leading up to it, it suggests that the Soviet Communist party was only able to win on the controversial questions of principle by silently disavowing some of the more spectacular actions of its leader, and that the latter has emerged from the fight with his personal prestige noticeably impaired.

The declaration's approval of the "general line" of peaceful coexistence and of the aim to eliminate world war in our time permits the Soviets to go on pursuing their strategy of using both negotiation and violence short of world war as means to gain their ends; but it is not enough to assure them of tactical freedom to decide, in the light of their own interests alone, when and how far to use one or the other. To regain that freedom of maneuver, the Soviets would have either needed a plain and brutal statement that local revolutions may in certain circumstances have to be subordinated

to the interest of preserving world peace and thus protecting the achievements of "Socialist construction" against a nuclear holocaust; or they would have required an equally plain recognition of their right to act as the only legitimate interpreters of revolutionary doctrine for the world movement, and to enforce the strategic and tactical consequences of their interpretation by means of centralized discipline. But either way of insuring Soviet primacy, so natural in the Stalinist age when the Soviet Union alone was "the fatherland of all toilers," proved impossible in the post-Stalinist age of "the Socialist world system" proclaimed by Khrushchev himself.

On one side the doctrine that "the dictatorship of the proletariat has become an international factor," first announced in Russia by M. A. Suslov and now substantially incorporated in the declaration, amounts to a partial repeal of Stalin's "Socialism in a single country": it does not, of course, deny what was achieved under the latter slogan, but it restores, in the new world situation, the idea of a duty of the Communist powers to aid the progress of world revolution for which Trotsky fought. Even if this principle of solidarity is not formulated as an absolute and unlimited obligation, it is enough to expose Soviet diplomacy to constant pressure to take bolder risks—pressure of the kind which the Chinese mobilized effectively during the past year, and are free to use again.

THE POLYCENTRIC BLOC

On the other hand, the declaration's recognition of the Soviet Communist party as the "vanguard" of the world movement falls far short of establishing a permanent and unchallengeable doctrinaire authority, let alone a single center endowed with disciplinary powers. It even falls far short of the position conceded to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist party at the time of the 1957 Moscow declaration—on Mao Tse-tung's initiative. Then, the Soviet Union was consistently described as being "at the peak of the Socialist camp," and Mao publicly went out of his way to speak of the need for a single leader among Communist states and parties, and to insist that only the Russians could fill both roles.

Now, the Chinese talk quite openly and naturally about the special responsibilities of "the two great Socialist powers," the Soviet Union and China; and in the declaration itself, the vanguard role of the Soviet party is balanced in part by the recognition of the "enormous influence" exerted by the Chinese revolution on the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America by its encouraging example to all movements of national liberation. In 1957, the failure to found a new formal international organization only increased the influence of the large international liaison machinery developed within the secretariat of the central committee of the CPSU, compared with which all bilateral and regional contacts were bound to be of subordinate importance. Now, the failure formally to establish a single center legitimates the *de facto* existence of two centers in Moscow and Peking, both with world-wide links and without any agreed division of labor, which will continue to cooperate on the basis of the declaration but also continue to give different advice on the questions still left open and to compete for influence. And if Moscow is still the stronger power and the older authority, Peking is closer in its type of revolutionary experience and the emotional roots of its anti-colonialist ardor to those parts of the world where the chances of Communist revolution are most promising.

In a long range view, the relative victory of the Soviets in the 1960 phase of the dispute thus appears less important than the fact that this phase has marked a new stage in their abdication of their former position of exclusive leadership. The reports that the Soviets themselves expressed during the Moscow conference a wish that they should no longer be described as being "at the head of the Socialist camp" may well be true: finding themselves unable any longer to exert effective control over the whole world movement, they may have preferred not to be held responsible for all its actions by their enemies. In a bloc containing two great powers, in an international movement based on two great revolutions, such a development was indeed to be expected as soon as important differences appeared between them. But while the two protagonists remain as determined to continue to cooperate as they are unable to settle their disagree-

ments, the result is not a two-headed movement with neatly separated geographic spheres of control, but a truly polycentric one: many Communist parties outside the Soviet bloc may in future be able to gain increased tactical independence, based on their freedom of taking aid and advice from both Moscow and Peking, simultaneously or alternately—with all the risks that implies for the future unity of its doctrine and strategy.

The victory of Communism in China, and the subsequent growth of Communist China into a great power, thus appears in retrospect as the beginning of the end of the single-centered Communist movement that Lenin created, and the single-centered Soviet bloc that Stalin built. The process took a decisive step forward in 1956, when the 20th Congress of the CPSU recognized the existence of a "Socialist world system" and of different roads to power, and when the destruction of the Stalin cult inflicted an irreparable blow on the type of Soviet authority that had depended on the infallibility of the "father of nations." Mao's victory had killed the uniqueness of the Soviet Union; Khrushchev's speech buried the myth built around that uniqueness.

It was at that moment that the specter of "polycentric Communism" first appeared. But when de-Stalinization was quickly followed by the crisis of Russia's East European empire, the façade of single-centered unity was restored in the following year with the help of China's prestige and Mao's authority. Now that China herself has brought back the specter she helped to exorcise three years ago, the process is no longer reversible. This time, polycentric Communism has come to stay.

Postscript

The above was written before the publication of Khrushchev's report on the Moscow conference, given on January 6 to the party organizations of the Higher Party school, the Academy of Social Sciences, and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Compared to the text of the declaration, the report is distinguished by two diplomatic omissions and two theoretical elaborations.

Khrushchev has made no mention of the

role of U.S. imperialism as "the gendarme of world reactions," etc., which would have embarrassed him in resuming diplomatic approaches to the new American administration; reactions to President Kennedy's first statements in Moscow and Peking have already confirmed that the original foreign policy difference between the two great Communist powers remains intact after the formal burial of the ideological dispute that arose from it.

The report also fails to define the new concept of "national democracy," created to designate the desirable type of regime for the underdeveloped, ex-colonial countries, by the criteria of land reform and freedom of Communist organization given in the declaration. In view of the diplomatic importance of Soviet relations not only with Nasser's UAR, but with the traditionalist autocracy of Morocco, this is understandable.

But Khrushchev is more precise than the declaration in his comment on "wars of national liberation." He goes further than any previous Soviet participant in the debate in agreeing with the Chinese that such just wars are "inevitable" so long as imperialism and colonialism exist, and he is emphatic about the need for all Communists to give them their fullest support. But he solves the apparent contradiction with his preceding condemnation of "local war"—which might lead to the disaster of nuclear world war—by arguing that these wars of liberation are in their origin not "wars between states" but popular insurrections, and that the support which the Communist powers must give them should consist not in taking the initiative in internationalizing

the conflict, but in preventing the intervention of the major imperialist powers by the threat of their own counter-intervention—as in Vietnam and in the Cuban revolution—and thus assuring the victory of the people. This is the most explicit formulation yet of the Soviet practice of "all aid by threats and indirect support short of war" for revolutionary movements.

Finally, Khrushchev confirms publicly that it was the Soviet delegation that asked for the omission of the flattering formula placing the Soviet Union "at the head of the Socialist camp" and the CPSU "at the head of the Communist world movement," which Mao had bestowed on them at the 1957 conference; and he bluntly states his reason: that this would have been a source of difficulties rather than advantages, as the Soviets are in fact no longer in a position to act as a single center giving directives. The polycentrism implicit in the declaration is thus made explicit for the first time through the mouth of the highest authority of Soviet Communism.

In the circumstances, Khrushchev's assurances that the Communist parties will in future be able to "synchronize their watches" without the help of a statute regulating their relations, merely by the light of their common ideology, amounts to little more than the hope that Russia and China will continue to be able to compromise their differences in the light of their common interests. Even assuming that this will still be true for a long time, nothing so far indicates that the achievement of compromise will in future be easier, or the effects on the world Communist movement less critical, than in the recent past.

RICHARD CHASE

THE CHRONICLES OF DOS PASSOS

THE LONGER JOHN DOS PASSOS writes, the more one admires his integrity, his hard-won skill, his capacity for work, and whether one agrees with him or not, the forthrightness of his political views. He looks good, too, in relation to the general run of new novelists; compared with their thin volumes of personal analysis, there is something grand about Dos Passos' massively researched and solidly constructed social novels. Yet the fact remains that in the last two decades Dos Passos' reputation has not fared so well as those of other writers of his generation—Faulkner, Hemingway, F. Scott Fitzgerald—nor does time seem likely to redress the balance.

In recent years Dos Passos has directed a good deal of cantankerous irritability toward those who speak of "generations." Interviewed in the *New Leader* (February 23, 1959), he delivered the following philippic: "Take Jack Kerouac and his *On The Road*, the tale's been told before, and better. There's little attention to style and no discipline. And this talk of a 'Beat Generation.' The whole subject of 'generations' seems to me to be a crashing bore. Some huckster picks up some idiotic and misleading classification, like the 'Lost' or the 'Beat,' and drums it into everybody's

ears until you'd think they'd vomit. The odd thing is that they don't. All these pigeonholes relieve people of the effort to use their own minds. I say to hell with them." Several years earlier Dos Passos wrote a short essay taking issue with the eulogists and commentators who had responded to the death of Fitzgerald by labeling him a member of the "lost generation" and asserting that he had never been able to get beyond the attitudes of the disillusioned 1920's and had thus become increasingly irrelevant as a novelist. Dos Passos went on to praise Fitzgerald's novel *The Last Tycoon*, left unfinished at his death, for its quality of "detaching itself from its period while embodying its period." He thought that in this novel Fitzgerald had established for the first time "that unshakable moral attitude toward the world we live in and toward its temporary standards that is the basic essential of any powerful work of the imagination. A firmly anchored ethical standard is something that American writing has been struggling toward for half a century."

Clearly there is something personal in all this, and the truth is, of course, that Dos Passos himself has been customarily labeled a member of the defunct lost generation, though with a difference. The difference is that although he undertook immediately after World War I to live and to write about all the accredited experiences of the disillusioned yet romantic group that included Hemingway, E. E.

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Cummings, and Fitzgerald, he was able to speed along into the 1930's in high gear while the others faltered, halted, or backtracked. With sufficient prescience one might have predicted that this would be so on the evidence of Dos Passos' war novel *Three Soldiers* (1921). For despite its similarity to other works of the period, such as Hemingway's *The Sun Also Rises* and *A Farewell to Arms*, it differs from these by showing the author's strongly emerging interest in the social and political structure of modern civilization. The nature of the army bureaucracy behind the battle line fascinated Dos Passos as much as did the combat experience (of which the novel takes little notice), or even the aesthetic and moral yearnings, the love affairs, and the growing despair of the hero, although the private life and death of the hero are the novel's main focus. Thus, after the somewhat abortive but still remarkably interesting *Manhattan Transfer* (1925), full of transitions of attitude and experiments in form, he was able to embark on the three related novels which he published between 1930 and 1936 (*The 42nd Parallel*, *Nineteen Nineteen*, and *The Big Money*) and which he brought together under the title *U.S.A.* This impressive chronicle of American life from the turn of the century down to the eve of the depression is generally said to represent the culmination of Dos Passos' power as a novelist, beyond which none of his subsequent writings has been able to go, except chronologically.

But despite the fact that *U. S. A.* is worlds apart from the early novels of Hemingway and Fitzgerald, and differs in many ways from those of Dos Passos himself, this enormous work failed to liberate the author from the lost-generation category. As the years have gone on Dos Passos has become more and more the moralist, journalist, historian, and chronicler and has continued to be a novelist mostly by drawing repeatedly on the limited arsenal of techniques and literary devices which he experimented with in

Manhattan Transfer and worked out fully in *U. S. A.* And it has become increasingly difficult not to think of Dos Passos, the significant novelist, as existing in the early works up to and including *U. S. A.*, and of these early works as something of a unit. Alfred Kazin's idea (see *On Native Grounds*) that *U. S. A.* was still a lost-generation novel with the single difference that the doomed hero was society itself, rather than the sensitive young man who usually figured in such novels, seems as true as it ever did.

YET THIS "single difference" has apparently been the crucial circumstance in Dos Passos' subsequent development or, since this is the point, lack of development. For one thing, it strikes me that Dos Passos' faculties of sympathy and imagination were damaged early in his career because, with all the machine-like efficiency of his mind, he annihilated the sensitive, suffering, aspiring young hero, a projection of himself, whom we meet in the earliest books. If Faulkner and Hemingway have shown more power of development and change in the long run than has Dos Passos it is in part because they did not annihilate their youthful selves but found new forms in which they could appear and new worlds in which they could live. But let me return to this a bit later.

Certainly Dos Passos' new novel, *Mid-century*,* inspires one to observe *plus ça change*, etc. With modifications the author still relies on the external effects of immediacy and topicality which he achieved in *U. S. A.* by means of what he called the camera eye, the newsreel, and the biography. In the new novel the biographies—short impressionistic sketches interspersed among the passages of fiction in somewhat whimsical typographic arrangements—have a measure of the old vividness, as in the portraits of John L. Lewis, General MacArthur, Senator McClellan, Dave Beck, Walter Reuther, and Mrs.

* Houghton Mifflin, 496 pp., \$5.95.

Roosevelt (although in the latter biography Dos Passos seems hardly able to restrain himself from telling some of the famous improper jokes, so strong is his contempt for "the rover"). There is less of the camera eye in this novel than one might have hoped for, less, that is, of the personal, introspective reminiscence Dos Passos likes to cast, often with rather embarrassing results, into poetic form by breaking up the lines and using italics (from these passages one sometimes gets the impression that Dos Passos believes poetry can be produced by writing prose and then crossing out the the's, a's, and my's). The newreels—pastiche of headlines and brief topical quotations calculated to give one a sense of the idiocy of the culture—are still effective.

BUT ALL THIS IS only what meets the eye first. The novel proper consists of several interwoven stories—contrived fables, really—dealing with various aspects of the labor movement, plus one calculated apparently to show that businessmen too are human. Although Dos Passos has written a good deal about the labor movement in earlier novels, this is the first time he has made it his main subject, redeeming, thus, a promise of long standing. From one point of view *Midcentury* is interesting by default, there being so little good fiction devoted to what would seem to be a rich and significant subject. There was no shortage of novels about labor in the 30's, but with the exception of one or two, notably Robert Cantwell's *Land of Plenty*, these novels were so simple-minded and so charged with an apocalyptic but still tiresome ideology that they make dreary reading today. Sinclair Lewis never did get around to redeeming *his* promise to write a labor novel revolving about a Eugene Debs-like character. If he had, it would doubtless seem to us to be somewhat shallow intellectually and superficial in its grasp of political realities. Still, there is no doubt that it would have been sharp, satirical, and amusing, and sometimes,

coming up for air from Dos Passos' efficient, relentless pages, one wishes one could turn to Lewis' unwritten book.

The "unshakable moral attitude" Dos Passos believes the novel must move toward is in *Midcentury*, and with a vengeance. The reader who (like myself) is ready to become just as disturbed as Dos Passos about corruption and all the ills and injustices of bigness in the modern labor movement, but who would also like to read a good novel on the subject, will feel let down by the author's willingness to forgo the requirements of good fiction in order to contrive his fables for didactic purposes—see the long stories or short novels about Terry Bryant and Frank Worthington. The lesson Dos Passos teaches is familiar to anyone who has followed his later career, but it may be news (probably good news) to many of the readers who are currently sending the book up the best-seller list that the author finds virtually nothing good in the labor movement since the heroic days of independence and intransigence exemplified by the IWW.

The best part of the book consists of the several sections devoted to the story of Blackie Bowman. In this story of an itinerant "working stiff"—an individualist and perpetual seeker for freedom who in his youth had become involved with the Wobblies and with bohemian intellectuals and artists and had participated in such causes as the great strike of the silk mills in Paterson, New Jersey (not to mention the absurd Madison Square Garden pageant that allegorized the strike)—Dos Passos is doing what in essence he has often done before, but he is still doing it well. Even so, as always, there is something a bit too self-conscious in Dos Passos' projection of himself as a working stiff. Once in a while in reading this novel you want to exclaim: Come off it, O solemn chronicler—son of Harvard, aesthete *manqué*, squire of country acres—what do you *really* know about working stiff? But Dos Passos is not the first in this country's

roster of patrician radical-reactionaries—that valuable species—to project himself incongruously.

EXCEPT IN PASSING, I have not until now raised the matter of Dos Passos' reactionary political views as these have evolved in recent years, although I believe many people who undertook to say something about this author would have begun by talking about his views and pointing out the supposed damage they have done to his fiction. It has become a cliché of routine liberalism that when Dos Passos gave up his earlier liberal-radical convictions, supported Senator Taft for president, and began to write for the *National Review*, his powers of imagination failed, his capacity for human sympathy dwindled, and his view of life in general became narrow, bleak, humorless, and grim. I do not myself find this very persuasive. The limited imagination, the hard-boiled stance, the bleakness and grimness—all these can be seen in *U. S. A.*

In a sense, Dos Passos' views have not changed as much as would appear, a fact on which the author likes to insist. After his early "Marxism" and attraction to the Communist party, his disaffection from which is chronicled in *Adventures of a Young Man*, Dos Passos fell back on a temperamental, individualistic dissidence, which, in different contexts, may be as significantly practiced by a reactionary capitalist as by a revolutionary anarchist. A self-proclaimed "Jeffersonian," Dos Passos has preached ever since the New Deal that we must decline every gambit of organized political power. This may be quixotic as political theory, but it is morally sound and not likely in itself to damage the imagination of a novelist. In the light of Dos Passos' later career, one begins to see, by the way, that he has perhaps owed less to Marx and Veblen (who influenced him far more than Marx) than to John Dos Passos, Sr. The novelist's father was a brilliant man in his way, a lawyer and maverick Republican who

wrote books on jurisprudence and related matters and whose views were a curious mixture of crusty reaction and democratic idealism.

Like his father, Dos Passos has the impulse of the pamphleteer, which is what he has increasingly become since *Manhattan Transfer*. His fictions are inspired less by imagination than by anger and zeal, and are alive, all too often, not with the thriving independent life of the characters who appear in them but with the egotism and assertiveness of the author. And this is true of *U. S. A.*, it seems to me, even though we remember with an impression of their vividness the main figures of that grandiose social pageant: Fenian McCreary, Janey Williams, J. Ward Moorehouse, Richard Savage, and the rest.

If Dos Passos' fictions are not quite able to possess our minds as fictions, it is partly because he has never found a language that we recognize as his. One cannot open a book by Hemingway or Faulkner without knowing immediately that one is in a unique world fashioned by the author's own idiom. Yet I'm not sure that if I were presented with a spot passage by Dos Passos I could tell who wrote it, unless one of the familiar external devices (the camera eye, etc.) were visible or unless I hit on one of his portmanteau words like the irksome one in the new novel: "dimshining." (No doubt "dimshining mist" is very poetical, but how does one get rid of the first impression that "dimshining" is a typographical scramble of "diminishing"?)

Dos Passos' external devices are so obtrusive as to make us suspect that they are a mechanical attempt to establish a unique style and language not otherwise forthcoming. Clearly Dos Passos has *wanted* to discover a language which would be *internal*, in the sense of being an organic quality of his fiction, informing the whole with its tonality and structure. This quest for a language is suggested in the prologue to *U. S. A.* Here we have

the familiar theme of the homeless young man on the road, and after a Whitmanesque catalogue of the places he has been to, the young man muses "it was the speech that clung to the ears, the link that tingled in the blood; U. S. A. . . . mostly U. S. A. is the speech of the people." This may remind us of other writers who are in the Whitman tradition: Thomas Wolfe—"Remembering speechlessly we seek the great forgotten language"—and William Carlos Williams—"What common language to unravel?" And it reminds us of Whitman himself, the Whitman of *Democratic Vistas*, who says that it is the duty of American writers to find a language which is at once a personal style and an archetypal expression of the culture. Lacking the thaumaturgic power to turn this difficult trick, Dos Passos has manufactured over the years a style that is energetic, efficient, and mostly anonymous.

EVERYONE SPEAKS of Dos Passos' integrity and of his single-minded devotion to his work. These are admirable qualities, but the artistic implications of his particular kind of integrity are worth reflection. In the essay on Fitzgerald, he wrote that "to attain the invention of any sound thing, no matter how trivial, demands the integrated effort of somebody's whole heart and whole intelligence." This sounds convincing, but we also read that "no durable piece of work, either addressed to the pulps or to the ages, has ever been accomplished by a double-minded man." Here we are brought up short. We think of the famous "doubleness" of Hawthorne, Melville, Mark Twain, and so many other important American writers, including Fitzgerald. We may even think of the persistent polarities of American culture itself, and we wonder whether Dos Passos has never perceived these facts (he whose most famous utterance is "allright we are two nations"!), or whether he has perceived them and decided that they are sources of weakness only, and never of strength—in which case he is at odds with almost everyone

else who has been reflecting during the last two or three decades on the "double-mindedness" of our best writers.

But perhaps this is to take his words too seriously. It is hard to tell, because he does not make clear what opposing quantities are contained in the doubleness of which he speaks. He is ostensibly pointing out nothing more complicated than that Fitzgerald suffered as a man and writer because he tried to satisfy both Mammon and his own conscience and that these irreconcilable purposes left him with an agonizing "split personality." But out of Fitzgerald's case Dos Passos attempts to generalize on doubleness, and here is where the obscurity sets in. "The young American proposing to write a book," he says, "is faced by the world, the flesh and the devil on the one hand and on the other by the cramped schoolroom of the highbrows with its flyblown busts of the European great and its priggish sectarian attitudes. There's popular fiction and fortune's bright roulette wheel, and there are the erratic aspirations of the long-haired men and shorthaired women who, according to the folklore of the time, live on isms and Russian tea, and absinthe and small magazines of verse. Everybody who has put pen to paper during the last twenty years has been plagued by the difficulty of deciding whether he's to do 'good' writing that will satisfy his conscience or 'cheap' writing that will satisfy his pocketbook." Leaving aside one's impression that this rather fantastic picture of American culture comes from middlebrow folklore rather than direct observation, we are amazed to find that after the sarcastic remarks about highbrows, "good" writing" is being identified (so it would seem) both as what the highbrows demand and "what will satisfy" the writer's "conscience." Perhaps this is merely an example of careless or incomplete argument (I don't think the nervous quotes around "good" clear anything up). Or it may be just another example of the untenable position of the middlebrow

polemist, with his routine attack on the highbrow and then his admission, conscious or not, of dependence on him.

IF THE POLARITIES of Dos Passos' cultural dialectic are not very clear, there is no doubt that he is against them. "Double-ness" may have a variety of meanings, referring, for example, to an impulse toward Mammon and an impulse toward disinterested art, a genteel morality con-sorting uneasily with a demonic imagination, a sexual ambivalence, or simply the power (as Fitzgerald put it) "to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function." In any case I would not suppose that a psychic doubleness is something to be pursued on purpose, even though it can obviously be a source of great strength. And there is of course much to be said for Dos Passos' ideal of "the integrated effort of somebody's whole heart and whole intelligence." Still, if psychological truth induces us to speak of the two Mark Twains, the two Fitzgeralds, etc., it also induces us to speak of the one Dos Passos.

What would have kept Dos Passos' mind freer, more accommodating, and more flexible? I have only a suggestion, based on the fact that *Manhattan Transfer* is my favorite among the author's books. In this work Jimmie Herf, the sensitive unhappy young man, who is rather obviously Dos Passos himself, is at the center of the action, as was John Andrews, the aspiring composer from Harvard, in *Three Soldiers*. In later works the Dos Passos figure is either moved into the periphery or rather violently transmogrified into the itinerant "working stiff" or political seeker. Thus the early books with their vital interplay between the young hero and society came to be replaced by books which lack the author's immediate, personal, and emotional sense of the happenings he describes as they bear upon his most cherished inner aspirations. The famous machine-like style,

the angry intelligence, and the encyclopedic reportorial observation were won at too great an emotional cost (as is suggested by the novel of two years ago, *The Great Days*, evidently a book of more or less distant "spiritual" autobiography and one of Dos Passos' weakest works). By contrast to Dos Passos' unhappy annihilation of his youthful self, callow and overly sensitive as this self may have been, both Faulkner and Hemingway have transformed, without obliterating, their earlier selves into a series of later characters. Just as Quentin Compson of *The Sound and the Fury* lives on in the Gavin Stevens of Faulkner's later works, so Hemingway's Nick Adams (*In Our Time*) lives on in a character like Santiago in *The Old Man and the Sea*.

It can be said, to be sure, that Dos Passos' early self-portraits were not so interesting to begin with as were those of Faulkner and Hemingway. This is true, but his young heroes are still very much worth our attention. At the end of *Manhattan Transfer*, Jimmy Herf sets out on the road with three cents. He is in a mood of euphoria, his hero of the moment being a man in Philadelphia who was shot for wearing a straw hat too early in the spring. But Jimmie Herf is not being merely flip. It is not only the man with the straw hat that occupies his mind; he is genuinely in quest of selfhood and reality. Reality, which a novelist ought to be able to conceive of as plastic, fecund, emergent, and in motion among balances and tensions, had become for Dos Passos in *U. S. A.* a fixed idea: reality was a great, grim, menacing monolith against which all good things are broken. The quest for selfhood came to interest him no longer, because it seemed to be the pre-occupation of the self-indulgent, romantic, highbrow decade of the 20's. But the trouble is that in the mind of every great novelist reality remains unfixed and the discovery and fulfillment of the self are a perpetual possibility.

EMIL L. FACKENHEIM

APOLOGIA FOR A CONFIRMATION TEXT

It is unusual nowadays for serious thinkers of any kind to address themselves directly to an audience of children, but it is perhaps even more surprising to find a Sunday school text being written by a leading Jewish religious thinker. Consequently, when Paths to Jewish Belief (Behrman House, 157 pp., \$2.75) was published, we asked its author, EMIL L. FACKENHEIM, if he would discuss in an article for us why he undertook to write such a book and what kinds of problems he encountered in trying to explain difficult religious concepts to children.

Another new work by Dr. Fackenheim, of an altogether different order, Metaphysics and Historicity, has just been issued by Marquette University Press; the substance of the book was originally given as the 1961 Aquinas Lecture at Marquette. Dr. Fackenheim—who was ordained a rabbi in Berlin in 1939—has taught for many years in the philosophy department at the University of Toronto; he is now an associate professor. Over the years he has been a frequent contributor to COMMENTARY, his last previous article (October 1960) having dealt with “The Dilemma of Liberal Judaism.”

IN THE NOT SO distant past, after lecturing at the university all week, I used to spend Sunday mornings teaching a confirmation class in a Liberal synagogue. My practice invariably was to open the first session of these confirmation courses by asking whether anyone present was prepared to state a Jewish belief to which he subscribed. A lengthy silence was apt to follow, until finally one student might volunteer some such answer as “one God,” or “the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man,” or simply “the brotherhood of man.” Upon being asked why he believed as he did, the volunteer would reply, “That’s the way I was taught.”

“Then how about people who believe differently?” was my next question, and again came the unhesitating reply: “Why, they believe as *they* were taught!” At

this point I would raise my voice, in what I hoped was a dramatic manner: “Then who is right?” And the response to that was usually a dead silence.

I confess that I have for many years been deeply disturbed by this disposition of our present-day synagogue-trained adolescents to assume that all religious and moral beliefs are wholly relative to upbringing and environment. What is wrong with a synagogue school if it can impart no substantial conviction to these young people? Nothing is wrong, I may be told; their attitude merely reflects an admirable broad-mindedness—a wholesome self-criticism. Yet it is hard to find anything wholesome in the rest of the standard opening discussion that used to take place in these former confirmation courses of mine.

In trying to challenge the relativism

of my students, I would cite extreme and repellent examples of conflicting belief. "What about cannibalism? What about Nazism? Wouldn't you say that at least these are absolutely wrong and false beliefs?" On this, some of the students would surrender. But others were prepared to regard even Nazism with relativistic "impartiality." "*We* may think we are right and they are wrong. But *they* think the exact opposite. So who is to make an impartial decision?"

II

IT HAS FREQUENTLY been said that relativism springs from an acquaintance with the sciences. If it is true that people in different societies (or with different psychological make-up) believe different things, is it not also "scientific" to conclude that religious belief is entirely a matter of upbringing and environment? But relativism does not logically follow from psychological or anthropological premises. If all members of a given tribe were brought up to believe that two and two make five, we on our part should still regard this belief as simply mistaken. Why should it be denied that in morality and religion, too, one can find *grounds* for choosing between conflicting beliefs—to be sure, very different grounds from the mathematical kind, but grounds all the same? However, the relativism of our adolescents (or, for that matter, of their parents and teachers) is scarcely ever the result of thought—knowledge of the facts and persistent reflection on them. It is, almost invariably, a convenient substitute for thought. For once one has embraced a wholesale relativism on questions of moral or religious truth, one is freed of the necessity to give them any further thought. My impression is, indeed, that it is precisely because relativism provides so easy a solution to difficult problems that the social sciences are seized upon to lend their support to it—the social sciences are not themselves the original source. Nor can the source be regarded as a desire on

the part of our adolescents to be broad-minded, pluralistic, and tolerant. For tolerance not only does not imply relativism, but is actually incompatible with it.

It is entirely possible to defend everyone's right to his individual beliefs, and even to strain every nerve to understand the beliefs of another, and yet to be passionately convinced of the truth of one's own beliefs. Indeed, to believe in tolerance is to regard at least *one* thing—tolerance itself—as *absolutely* right, and to condemn, as absolutely wrong, at least all beliefs which conflict with it. Had they, for example, merely believed in tolerance, my students should not have hesitated for a moment to condemn Nazism as the worst form of intolerance imaginable. Why, then, should the absurd presupposition that in order to be tolerant one must embrace relativism be so popular in our liberal middle-class society?

The true cause, I am convinced, of the popularity of moral and religious relativism in the "enlightened" sector of our contemporary society lies neither in genuine skepticism born of a hard search for truth, nor in the desire—although doubtless this is genuine—to be broad-minded, pluralistic, and tolerant. At the base of such relativism lies a desire to avoid facing up to ultimates, or—as a young student of mine, teaching confirmation class this year, puts it—the desire to shrink from a sense of urgency in moral and religious matters.

Facing up to ultimates is a business from which, with at least part of his being, nearly everyone wishes to shrink. For it means facing up to one's ultimate responsibilities, and to ultimate limitations like death. It means being driven toward the making of a commitment, and toward suffering all the doubts and crises which go with such a commitment. Moreover, it is to be compelled to disagree with others, even to have to seem "tactless" enough to voice this disagreement.

Serious and often terrifying as all this always is, in present-day middle-class

society it is an awkward business as well. Taking ultimates seriously means "being different"—something to be avoided today at all costs. Being a genuine believer is being odd. (So is being an honest agnostic or atheist.) And who nowadays wants to be odd?

A social science-style relativism is the perfect ideology for avoiding every kind of religious oddness. For this ideology enables one to agree that all religious beliefs are fine as far as they go, while denying that any one of them goes very far. This attitude is bound to be especially attractive to the modern middle-class Jew. The committed Jew, among religious men, always bears a special burden: he must stand up for a minority faith. This burden, easier in America today than it ever was in all other respects, is harder in at least one respect. It means having to be different, in a very special way, at a time when no one wants to be different in any way at all. Considering loyalty to Judaism as a duty, the modern Jew nevertheless shrinks from a genuine commitment to Judaism, which would mark him out as *doubly* different: religiously committed—and to a minority faith.

Here once again social science-style relativism comes to the rescue. If every faith has a relative right, this is surely true of the Jewish faith. And if no faith has an absolute right, this is surely true also of the majority faith. In short, being Jewish is not being different at all. Little wonder, then, that relativism should be so popular an ideology among middle-class Jews, synagogue-goers included. And it is even less wonder that those adolescents who are indoctrinated with it should be loath to give it up.

Yet how long can any form of genuine religious life survive when religious beliefs are taken seriously only "as far as they go"? How long can even the secular life of American democracy continue to exist, when the faith on which it rests is treated as just one belief among others? And how long can Judaism remain alive, as a

religion in a non-Jewish majority culture, on the basis of a relativistic ideology? For while such an ideology may demonstrate a person's right to his Jewishness, it must, in due course, destroy every genuine incentive for making use of that right.

III

WHETHER RELATIVISM is, perhaps, a true doctrine, whatever its consequences for religion might be, is a question that need not be raised in our present limited inquiry. This being an essay on religious education in the synagogue, we take a commitment to Judaism for granted. We further take for granted that such a commitment obligates the synagogue school to oppose relativism, and to do so openly and explicitly in the confirmation year. The only remaining question here is just how such opposition should express itself.

Confronted with relativistic and skeptical students, a teacher committed to Judaism will often find it hard to resist the temptation to indoctrinate. Yet attempts at indoctrination, at least at confirmation age, are surely self-defeating. They will be tolerated, if at all, only by the conformist type of student. The bright and skeptical student will regard all such attempts as reflecting the narrow-mindedness of his teacher; and he will be confirmed in his prejudice that broad-mindedness and relativistic skepticism are identical. At the confirmation class level, moreover, the task of the teacher is to stimulate thought, not stifle it; to prepare the adolescent for the intellectual challenges of adult life, not to insulate him from them by indoctrination. What strategy, then, ought to be employed in the assault on relativism?

When I first asked myself this question, I imagined that I would have to cope with it only as a teacher using a suitable confirmation text. I soon found that there seemed to be no suitable texts—all the available ones fell into three categories, and none seemed to me to be adequate.

The old-fashioned liberal text, first, more or less identifies Judaism with liberal humanism, and assumes that all mankind is in progress toward such a humanism. This is the text written before—in spirit if not in time—the revolutionary events of our century: totalitarianism, post-colonial nationalism, social science relativism, and, in the Jewish sphere, Zionism; not to mention the new Jewish and Christian theologies, which endeavor to deal with all these challenges.

It would be overly hasty to assert that liberal humanism is today no longer tenable; elements in it are doubtless still valid. At the same time, in the present age liberal humanism is no longer self-evident; and it is even less evident that Judaism is reducible to it. Thus the old-fashioned kind of text (I am of course speaking throughout of Reform texts), which was once regarded as enlightened and rationalistic, but which still talks as if nothing had happened, is, in today's world, a mere indoctrination manual—and ineffectual to boot.

The second kind of text deals with Jewish practice, not in addition to, but in place of Jewish belief, on the grounds that no independent treatment of Jewish belief is in its own right necessary. After all, the author seems to be asking us, has not Judaism always been a “way of life” rather than a “system of beliefs”? And is it not sound progressive practice to induce the pupil to “learn” Judaism by “doing” it?

Much could be said for this approach if it were still true, as it once more or less was, that the study and practice of Jewish rituals and festivals would naturally and inevitably involve the student and practitioner in the beliefs implied by these rituals and festivals. But of course to the modern Jew the beliefs implied by Passover and Yom Kippur are highly problematic, more so than ever before. And the text which refuses to deal with these beliefs in their own right as much as says that new beliefs may at random take the place of the old,

so long as the rituals and festivals themselves remain more or less intact; that any kind of new wine may be used, so long as it is poured into the old bottles. This view (curiously antithetical to that of old-style reformers who wanted to preserve the “essence” of the old wine and get rid of the “unessential” old bottles) is nowadays widely popular. Yet if consistently adhered to, its absurdity becomes obvious. Passover would become just another “festival of freedom,” the Sabbath just another “socially progressive institution,” and Yom Kippur—heaven only knows what; and what is specifically Jewish about these festivals would reduce itself to “folklore,” “customs,” “ceremonies.”

THE THIRD KIND of text was, to me personally, the most promising at first, but finally—and by the same token—the most disappointing. Its paramount objective—to induce the student to think for himself—was admirable, and not only because, if successful in its aim, the text would provide the sole genuine antidote against the easy kind of relativism which I had found so prevalent in my classes. A student who has thought for himself believes whatever he does believe on *grounds*. For he himself has questioned the beliefs in which he was reared; and even if he has emerged from the questioning process with his former beliefs pretty much intact, he will no longer believe as he was taught merely *because* he was taught it. Such a student has abandoned the kind of relativism which is a substitute for religious thought, and has begun to think instead.

And yet in the year in which I used this highly promising text, I found it a painful failure. Originally I thought its failure stemmed from its asking too many questions and giving too few answers. But gradually it became clear that the real fault of this text lay in its positivistic and pragmatic bias.

Teachers since Socrates have known that if one wishes a student to think for

himself, one must ply him with questions, go easy on answers, and refrain from indoctrination altogether. But teachers also have always known that simply to ask questions may, in certain spheres of thought, defeat the original purpose. Perhaps the riskiest of all spheres in this regard is that of religious thought.

IN FORMAL DISCIPLINES such as logic, method alone matters. In religious thought, method and conclusion both matter, indeed are inseparable, and the genuine religious believer stakes his life on both. If a religious text confines itself to asking questions only, it must at least convey the idea that the answers are vitally important. But if answers are important, the adolescent wants to know the author's own answers. If these are not given—for whatever reason—the student is almost bound to conclude that answers are either unavailable or else unimportant; that religious thought, in other words, is a mere game.

Some young readers of such a text might nevertheless manage to pursue the search for religious answers by themselves. The danger, however, is that they might then fall into the trap—and for this an “all-questions-and-no-answers” text would bear direct responsibility—of assuming that their own immature thinking was on a par with the thinking of anyone else; and in no sphere could a view of this kind be more mistaken. The material of religious thought has an experiential richness never wholly possessed by any one individual; and that the thinking based on that material is by its nature cumulative is demonstrated in Jewish history from Philo down to Hermann Cohen, Buber, and Rosenzweig. Thus, a Jewish religious text which merely asked questions would deliberately cut the groping student off from the wealth of Jewish religious experience and the cumulative thought which has sprung from it. Superficially, such an approach might seem “impartial” and “objective.” In fact, it would only insure

that the Jewish faith is judged without having had a proper hearing.

But in fairness to the type of text under discussion, one must acknowledge that it is, on closer inspection, not averse to giving answers. It is averse only to giving “dogmatic” answers. And by these latter it means answers which do not rest on scientific authority.

In this day and age, few will object to scientific answers to religious questions in a Jewish confirmation text. It is always prudent, however, to consider two points more carefully: just how scientific are the answers in the text? And how does the text stand in relation to religious questions admittedly incapable of scientific answers—and to non-scientific answers to them?

The particular text under consideration not only asserts that the theory of evolution and the discoveries of modern Biblical criticism are scientific facts; it also suggests—at least by implication—as facts no less scientific, that (1) revelation is impossible; and that (2) history manifests so thorough an evolutionary trend as to make the best modern thought invariably superior to the best earlier thought, solely and simply because it is modern. But are the latter assertions scientific facts? Are they not, rather, highly controversial modern religious beliefs?

Now in presenting these modern beliefs as having the authority of science, the text does much damage—both to the student's intellect and to his Judaism. Whether the modern Jew can believe in revelation is something the student ought to think about, following the example of the best modern Jewish thinkers. If he listens to the text, however, he will not think; he will accept, on the authority of science, that revelation is impossible. Again, the student ought to consider whether modern is always superior to past Jewish thought; and he ought to examine each individual idea on its own merits. But if he trusts the text we are discussing, he will no longer independently examine past Jewish thought:

he will have been taught that Bible and Talmud can at most only confirm insights which modern man finds elsewhere in a better form. (Even the author dimly recognizes this fault, for he gives appendices containing, in addition to modern texts, quotations from traditional Jewish sources. But these latter cannot undo the damage done by the basic indoctrination. They are but marginal and ineffectual decorations.)

What, next, of the text's attitude to religious questions which are admittedly incapable of scientific answers? The text answers these either not at all, or else only pragmatically: for instance, whether prayer is valid, each person must decide for himself; and monotheism is preferable to polytheism because it is more useful in uniting mankind. But the first type of response suggests that one answer is just as good as any other. (For why otherwise should the author not give his own answer, just as he has done in the case of "scientific" questions?) And the second response suggests that religious truth is unnecessary; that what matters is not the truth of religious beliefs but their utility.

Now religious pragmatism is both unpragmatic and religiously perverse. It is unpragmatic because a religious belief "works" only if the believer accepts it by reason of its truth—and not just because it works. And it is religiously perverse because no genuine believer has ever accepted a belief merely on the ground of its utility. Israel has lived through the ages, and indeed still lives today, not because it lived by fictions known to be fictions and accepted on grounds of utility, but because it chose to follow Him whom it passionately believed to be the one true God.

There was, then, in the end, only one fundamental reason why I found the text under consideration thoroughly unacceptable: its failure or refusal—whatever the cause—to go beyond the limits of science, and take a firm stand on behalf of basic Jewish belief.

IV

REFLECTIONS SUCH as the above led me to the conclusion that an adequate Jewish confirmation text ought to be informed by two principles. It ought whenever possible to make constructive use of rational argument in support of Jewish belief, considering both the nature of Judaism and the age of the readers. And when the limits of such support are reached it ought to take a straightforward stand on behalf of basic Jewish belief.

I have found that application of the first of these principles fills a crucial need in the religious life of the present-day adolescent. He is, as we have seen, disposed to believe that rationality ends where science ends, and that hence (at least to the extent to which they are scientifically undemonstrable) all religious beliefs are rationally on a par. The metaphysical demonstration that all religious beliefs are not equally rational (or irrational) has therefore a revolutionary and extremely wholesome effect. It furnishes the most telling challenge to the adolescent's easy and thoughtless relativism. Nor should the teacher, frightened off by the term "metaphysical," imagine that such a demonstration is wholly beyond the grasp of adolescents. It is quite possible to make clear that monotheism is more logical than polytheism, because the belief in many gods conflicts with the notions of both divine goodness and divine omnipotence, without which God would not be God at all. And it is not at all impossible to show that a wholesale moral relativism fails to explain how the Golden Rule could have emerged, independently, in many civilizations. Finally (to give one more example), the traditional arguments for the existence of God do not entirely exceed the grasp of adolescents; arguments which, however inconclusive, at any rate show that belief in God is not rationally altogether groundless.

So much for the first principle. What

of the second—the text's testimony to Jewish belief when the limits of rational argument are reached? This is a more difficult principle because here theological exigencies easily collide with pedagogic exigencies. Theologically, there is need for testimony to Jewish belief, because while in Judaism reason may corroborate, interpret, and even correct belief, it cannot take its place. Yet as we have seen, pedagogically it is necessary that such testimony should not degenerate into indoctrination.

A possible collision is avoided if the text gives its testimony on behalf of Jewish belief *at the end* of the reasoning process—and only then. The student, having reached the limits of rational argument, will recognize that it can take him no further, and he will, therefore, also recognize what follows *as* belief, and not mistake it for anything else. If the text does its job well, no doubt its testimony on behalf of Jewish belief will impress its young reader. But it will not have induced him to accept this belief on authority. Having made clear that this *is* belief, not a demonstrated doctrine, the text will place the responsibility for acceptance or non-acceptance squarely upon the reader.

Is this still indoctrination? To say so would be to imply that in a world in which all kinds of conflicting causes and values vie for the adolescent's allegiance, the synagogue alone should bow out.

V

ARMED with these two principles, and convinced of the inadequacy of existing confirmation texts, I some years ago decided to write such a text myself. I confess that in the actual process of writing it I often came close to regretting my decision, and indeed to abandoning the whole project. The real difficulties of such a text, it became even clearer, lie not in first principles but rather in execution.

I will refrain from writing about the sort of thing educators usually write about

—devices and techniques. These concern all education, not Jewish religious education for adolescents in particular. The specific problems besetting the latter kind of project devolve almost wholly upon issues of philosophical and religious honesty.

What philosophy major does not know that Kant has refuted the traditional arguments for the existence of God? And yet even if the adolescent can understand the arguments themselves, he is certainly as yet unable to understand Kant's refutation. Did this mean that philosophical honesty required that I should tell my young readers the "truth"—that the existence of God is unprovable? But reflection showed that "telling the truth" in philosophy—and religion—is a far more complex affair than is often imagined. For it is one thing to have contemplated the traditional arguments for the existence of God and then, after much struggle and deep thought, to have concluded that they are inconclusive or even invalid. It is another thing entirely to know nothing of these arguments, and simply to be told that God's existence is unprovable.

In the process of contemplation, the "anthropological" argument arouses wonder about man, an imperfect being who yet has a concept of perfection and hence of God. The "cosmological" argument arouses wonder about existence, about the world which, though existing, might not have existed. Finally the "teleological" argument (which even Kant regarded with respect) arouses wonder about the existence of order where there might have been total chaos. To have contemplated these arguments is to have experienced rational wonder. And this wonder will remain even if the arguments are finally found wanting. The person who truly knows the arguments may not end up thinking he has proved the existence of God, or even believing in God. But he can never again regard belief in God as just one irrationality among others.

Yet this precisely must be the attitude

of the student who is simply told that the existence of God is unprovable. And this is why, though apparently told "the truth," he is in fact not told it.

How then was I to tell the truth? What I finally did was select the easiest of the arguments to understand (the teleological), state it in a form emphasizing rational wonder rather than rational cogency, and suggest (by emphasizing disorder and evil as well as order and good) that the argument is not wholly conclusive. And I tried to cope with every philosophical problem that arose in a similar way.

Having reached the limits of rational argument, and finding it necessary to take a simple stand on behalf of Jewish belief, I came face to face with the problem of religious (as distinct from philosophical) honesty. This is a far more universal problem. It exists, not only for a philosophically- and theologically-minded writer trying to produce a text for adolescents, but for any intellectually sophisticated adult who tries to communicate what he himself believes to anyone younger or less sophisticated. Any parent who has ever tried to speak to his child about God recognizes the problem of religious honesty—provided the parent is neither a naive fundamentalist, nor a naive modernist, nor someone satisfied to tell his child lies which are "good for him." And the essence of the problem is that the parent *can* communicate to his child only what the child can understand, and that he *may* communicate to him only what he himself believes.

The naive fundamentalist has no problem because his beliefs are equally intelligible (or unintelligible) to adults and children. If the naive modernist has no problem, it is because he imagines that he can communicate his beliefs to the child without their being altered in the process of communication. But that this is naive is illustrated by a story told by C. S. Lewis. A mother once tried to tell her young son "the truth" about God, anxious above all

to avoid the myth about the old man with the white beard. She told him that God was the basic Substance of everything. (One may, without altering the moral, substitute "Process" or "the sum total of our ideals.") In trying to imagine something vague, amorphous, and overwhelming enough to qualify as a "basic Substance," the child wound up thinking of God as a huge mountain of tapioca. (To top it all, he didn't even like tapioca!)

HOW WOULD THE more naive kind of "tell-only-the-truth" educator react to Lewis's story—to the fact that the child is an inveterate myth-maker? I imagine he would advise postponing all talk about God until the child is "old enough to understand" the truth, which presumably is that God is "Substance," "Process," the "sum total of our ideals"—if indeed He is anything at all.

But one must be profoundly suspicious of any view of religious truth which implies that children are wholly barred from it. No doubt many states—childhood, insufficient intelligence, or education—bar a human being from scientific truths. But these truths concern the abstract intellect. Religious truth, if it is really religious truth, concerns the whole person and his ultimate quest as a whole person. And are children not whole persons? Do they not have an ultimate quest as whole persons? The poet Rilke was able to detect in children a degree of religious awareness which adults have often lost. In this he showed greater sensitivity to and respect for children than the more naive kind of "tell-only-the-truth" educator. For the latter is driven to the assertion that children in the myth-making stage are wholly barred from religious truth.

This kind of educator, to be sure, *means* to respect the personality of the child, and this is why he quite rightly refuses to tell him lies. In this he has at least grasped the indispensable starting point of any honest student-teacher relationship. If he nevertheless fails, it is because he blindly

assumes that, by adult standards, all myths must simply be lies. And this assumption in turn is due to his naive belief of being in literal possession of religious truth himself. But can God literally be "Substance," "Process," or the "sum total of our ideals"? Quite apart from one's religious position, this must radically be denied. For not one of these—or any other—aspects of the known universe or the known self can literally be the object of religious worship, or literally be part of a religious relationship. They can be either only if the known ("Substance," "Process," etc.) is symbolic of the unknown—in short, a myth. To treat these aspects of the known as literally divine is either not to know what one is doing or else to commit idolatry. The mother in Lewis's story, therefore, only got what she deserved. Committing the idolatry of literally identifying God with an aspect of the known universe (it was only an aspect, for "Substance" excludes "self"), she encouraged her son to commit the idolatry of identifying God with an aspect of the universe which *he* knew. What she should have done was tell a story which pointed to the truth as she herself accepted it—in her own symbolic terms. And along with the story she should have made clear to the child that this was only a story, albeit one which had some connection with her own symbolic understanding of the truth.

But *can* such a complicated impression be conveyed to children? I have never been able to believe that children regard all stories as either literally true or else not true at all. And I have always suspected that, whenever the child holds this simple dichotomy, the fault lies with the adult storyteller, who himself subscribes to such a dichotomy. Is it really always true that the child who thinks of God as Father imagines Him as a father exactly like his own, with only the white beard added? I am inclined to think that the communication of symbol and mystery is impossible only to storytellers who are themselves devoid of a sense of both; storytellers,

that is, who are either devoid of faith or else reduce God to aspects of nature or self.

But adolescents, after all, are no longer children. How was I to cope with the problem of religious honesty in a book addressed to them? So far as I could see, there was only one way. I had to let them in on the secret. I had to discuss the symbolic status of all images and concepts derived from the known, when applied to God. Is God personal or impersonal? To conceive Him as personal is anthropomorphic. Is God, then, impersonal—a "Substance" or "Process"? But this is physiomorphic (if I may coin the term). If God cannot be defined in terms derived from the human person, neither can He be defined in terms derived from nature. Physiomorphism is even less adequate than anthropomorphism: for while quantitatively more than any man, a "Process" is qualitatively less even than a man—who can hear, speak, feel, and think. The upshot is that we can think of God only in symbolic terms, and that personal are less inadequate than impersonal terms. Moreover, if one takes one's stand on the Jewish faith, these personal terms point to a very special truth. For Judaism believes in the co-workership of God and man, in the covenant between God and Israel, and in God's availability in prayer; and the divine-human relationship implied in these beliefs can be thought of only in quasi-personal terms. But while the Jew must admit that the personal terms are not adequate, he believes that the relationship itself is real.

HAVE I MANAGED to solve the problems of philosophical and religious honesty? It is impossible to say. I can only wait and see. For the answer, while depending in some degree on what I have put into the book, depends more on what teachers and students will do with it.

This last is both a disturbing and reassuring reflection. It is disturbing because a book like *Paths to Jewish Belief* is bound

to encourage, through misplaced emphases, unfortunate turns of phrase, or even downright slips, interpretations at variance with those intended. And yet the knowledge that both teacher and adolescent reader will do their own interpreting and criticizing is, in the long run, far more reassuring than disturbing. For the ultimate, inescapable dilemma before the writer of such a text is that, on the one hand, he can do no other than present what he himself believes while yet, on the other hand, he trembles at his audacity in doing so. The writer may, for the immediate purpose, de-emphasize his more personal convictions and emphasize "normative" Judaism; but he cannot ever hope

wholly to succeed in "purifying" the text of his private beliefs. What entitles him to impose them on helpless teachers and students? The answer is that there is no imposition, for neither teachers nor students are helpless. The writer finds reassurance in the knowledge that the teacher who disagrees with the text in part will voice his disagreement vigorously when teaching it, and that the teacher who disagrees with it *in toto* will not use the text at all. But the greatest reassurance of all lies in the knowledge that adolescents, at this or any other time, are apt to respond to an intellectual and religious challenge not with meek submission, but with an honest inquiry of their own.

IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES

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JOAN PEYSER

LINCOLN CENTER: PLANNING FOR MUSIC

AFTER A YEAR-LONG "public participation program," last September, a professional survey sponsored by the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts revealed the following bit of information: "AS MANY PEOPLE KNOW ABOUT LINCOLN CENTER AS KNOW ABOUT THE GREAT PYRAMIDS." This comparative statistic was presented in the September 23 issue of the *Performing Arts*, one of the numerous publications which the Lincoln Center office puts out. Left unanswered, however, was the question: What is it that people know about Lincoln Center?

There are many facets to this vast project which is now being developed in New York City—and surely destined to have a major impact not only on the cultural life of the city but on the cultural life of the nation as well. There is a good deal which still remains unknown about the project's various monetary resources, the real estate transactions its development has involved, and its potential effect, not only on the neighborhood of the West Side of New York where it is being erected, but on the architecture of the city as a whole.

The Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, which, according to present plans, will be completed around 1964, hopes to

bring together a major part of New York's various performing arts into one super-organization, on an area of fourteen acres. Lincoln Center's officials have envisioned their plan as creating a single formidable "culture symbol" for the entire country; issuing a preliminary statement of aims, the directors declared: "Lincoln Center will stand as a symbol of America's cultural maturity, affirming for the . . . world our nation's faith in the life of the spirit." Over a million handsomely designed book covers, for use by high school students, carry the message that "Lincoln Center will make our city the capitol of the performing arts just as the United Nations makes it a capitol for world affairs." Yet in all this euphoric anticipation, the question of what effect such a concentration might have on the vitality of the arts themselves has received surprisingly little attention. Surely, the importance of this question goes almost without saying. Here I propose to discuss what—as things look now—would seem to be the likely results which Lincoln Center will bring forth so far as the musical arts of the city of New York are concerned—and therefore, to a certain extent, the musical life of the whole country.

When it opens, Lincoln Center will comprise the following organizations: the Metropolitan Opera, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, the City Center of Music and Drama, the Juilliard School of Music, the High School of Music and Art, the School of Performing Arts, the New

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York Public Library's Music Division and Music Library. In general, these organizations will have their own facilities—auditoriums, storage space, rehearsal rooms. In addition, one of Juilliard's halls will be used for chamber and solo recitals, and Philharmonic Hall will serve to house visiting orchestras from other cities and from abroad. (The summer-time schedule of events may shift the popular open-air Lewisohn Stadium Concerts to the Center's Philharmonic Hall, which will have removable seats for "Pops" concerts; and the Guggenheim Band Shell in Damrosch Park—in Lincoln Center—will probably take under its auspices the Goldman Band Concerts now given on the Mall in Central Park.) Although the constituent organizations will of course always have first call on their own auditoriums, Lincoln Center intends to book any particular hall whenever the primary tenant is not using it. "In this way," the 1959 Progress Report states, "the Center will be able to plan wisely the total of musical and art services to be presented in the several halls of the Center."

The advantages of belonging to Lincoln Center will, obviously, be varied and numerous. Each hall is to have near-perfect acoustics* and air-conditioning. For the further pleasure and convenience of patrons, performers, and students, there will be spacious lounges, lovely gardens, promenades, terraces, roomy elevators, connecting ramps between buildings, fountains, snack bars; ingeniously designed wheel chairs will be available for disabled music lovers. Every hall will boast seats measuring between 22 and 24 inches wide.† The Philharmonic's great hall will be equipped with a movable apron that can be used in at least four different ways: as an elevator to bring up grand pianos; or, sunk part way down, as a pit for small orchestras; or, resting at floor level, to accommodate extra seats; or, raised to stage level, to provide an additional ten feet of stage space whenever it is needed. The Met will have four push-button stages and

a "theater-box" for tourists: its removable glass wall and a speaker system to pipe in the sounds will allow the curious visitor who passes through during the day to see and hear the performers practicing—undisturbed.

THE JUILLIARD SCHOOL of Music, now situated in the Morningside Heights section of New York City, and which has for fifty-six years functioned as one of the country's great musical conservatories, will be the major institution in a vast educational compound to include also the New York City's High School of Music and Art, and School of Performing Arts. Harold Schonberg, music critic for the *New York Times*, recently has said that if he were a Juilliard student he would be "delirious with joy at the opportunity of being right next to the musicians of Lincoln Center—being able to attend rehearsals and learn how things are done professionally, not theoretically."

The desire to create a "culture symbol," to provide each hall with television equipment so that millions of people can look in from coast to coast, to establish for New York City the prestige that the Center will thus bring to it, are all part of the vision of the people at the offices of Lincoln Center. The Center is taking full

* After many months of studying thirty of the world's greatest halls, several "chief acoustical consultants" hired by the Center decided that 700,000 cubic feet was the optimum number of cubic feet for a hall and that the optimum reverberation time—that is, the time it takes for a sound to decay into inaudibility—was between 1.8 and 2 seconds. This information is related in a film, *Design for Music*, which recounts in detail the acoustical research and preparation by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman. The Public Relations department estimates that the film will be seen by over 5,000,000 people.

† A serious study of seat widths was made by the American Seating Company, public seating consultant to Lincoln Center. R. L. Knowland, its representative, found that Americans have become so accustomed to sitting in front of their television sets that they demand the same kind of ease and comfort in an auditorium. (La Scala's seats, for Milan's lovers of opera, measure 18 inches in width.)

responsibility for raising the money to turn this vision into reality. It has bought the land, hired the architects, employed the lawyers, chosen the consultants, conducted the acoustical tests, measured bottoms, and suffered through all of the big and little conflicts that naturally occur when experts and committees of experts are at work. The Center will serve as landlord, leasing halls to the constituent organizations (and renting them out when they are not being used); and it will also do the general housekeeping. But "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts"—this is the motto of Lincoln Center, and it is meant to indicate that each member organization will retain its autonomy. Beyond assuming "continuity and financial stability," no group is asked to sacrifice anything—in the way of artistic integrity, educational values, or public service. On top of all this, the First Progress Report states that Lincoln Center will "pass on to the constituents any benefits of large-scale, year-round operation and of the Center's tax exemption." To most of the musical organizations that have joined Lincoln Center, resigned as they were to an existence of comparative penury, all these advantages, and the talk of "benefits," must surely sound like a miracle from a more efficient, more organized, and much richer world than the one to which they had quite inured themselves.

SHORTLY AFTER its inception in 1955, Lincoln Center announced its decision to include in its project drama and dance, as well as music. An Advisory Council, consisting of several very distinguished men and women in the field of the dance, was formed to establish a theater for "Dance and Operetta." In the April 1958 issue of *Dance Magazine*, Walter Terry speculated at length as to which New York company would be fortunate enough to be picked. The choice finally fell upon the New York City Ballet; and it is a choice that begins to suggest some of the

unanticipated consequences that may result from the creation of Lincoln Center. The City Ballet is part of the City Center of Music and Drama, an organization formed by Mayor LaGuardia in the early 40's to offer the people of New York tasteful artistic productions at popular prices. The opera company was its first unit, and the Center gradually acquired ballet, drama, and light opera groups. The question now is—in the move of the ballet company to Lincoln Center, which of the other groups will live and which will die?

The answer is by no means clear. One of the public relations men at Lincoln Center seemed quite startled to hear that the City Center even had an opera company. "All of the opera is to be in the Met," he said. On the other hand, the Women's Guild for the New York City Opera is now trying to raise \$20,000 to provide the company with a new production when, in fact, "it opens at Lincoln Center"; informal statements from several members of the City Center's board of directors—to the effect that "we move only as a group, as an entity"—lead these ladies to believe that their activities are entirely justified. Somewhere between these contradictory predictions of things to come is a fairly casual comment by William Schuman, president of the Juilliard School of Music and a member of the Lincoln Center Council (which should be distinguished from the Lincoln Center *Board of Directors*, the Lincoln Center *Officers*, and the Lincoln Center *Committee Chairman*): "It is possible that there may be *some* opera in that building [the City Center's "Dance and Operetta" hall] and some operetta at the Met. As for maintaining a separate [opera] company in the Dance theater . . . ?"—a comment that leaves the whole situation quite unresolved.

But if New York is to lose the City Center's opera company, what would such a loss mean? A little over a mile away, downtown, from where the City

Center now stands is the Metropolitan Opera House, whose patrons can afford high prices but whose stage is rarely graced by either indigenous or new European works. The Met's uncharacteristic commitment to perform a new opera by Gian-Carlo Menotti in 1963 is—characteristically—a well-protected venture, for the management will have an opportunity to see the opera and to study its critical and box-office response when it is performed next year in several European houses. On the other hand, the New York City Opera during the last few seasons has produced not only over a dozen American operas and such challenging contemporary “international” pieces as Dallapiccola's *Prisoner*, Stravinsky's *Oedipus Rex*, Orff's *Carmina Burana*, Eck's *Inspector General*, and Britten's *Rape of Lucretia*, but it has also proved to be the sole company in New York City that provides new ideas in performing the standard repertory and an opera house for patrons who cannot afford luxury prices. The purpose and philosophy of these two professional opera companies—the Met's and the City's—are obviously different. But if both were to be ensconced at Lincoln Center, it is not hard to understand why the Metropolitan might not care to look through its graceful arches and see the New York City Opera, with its current \$3.95 top, staring at it from across the plaza.*

NORTHWEST of the City Center on its present location is the Juilliard School of Music, the city's largest conservatory and certainly one of the greatest in the world. At Lincoln Center, it will offer its usual symphonic and choral concerts, chamber and solo recitals, new and repertory works in the fields of the dance, chamber music, and full-scale operas. To all this it will add performances of the

spoken drama, for the conservatory plans now to be a training school for the repertory theater. It has also decided to discard its undergraduate school, and consequently all these numerous activities will be undertaken with considerably less than half of its present student body. Under conditions of such pressures, it seems unrealistic to expect from Juilliard any great amount of risky, pioneering effort in the field of the lyric theater—particularly in view of the school's productions during the last fifteen or so years. Since 1945, of over seventy operas which the school has produced—in class, seminar, or as full-dress productions—only two have been written by American composers. In short, the New York City Opera would seem to be indispensable: separated from the Met and Juilliard by several miles, with an operatic philosophy of its own and with its own board of directors, it has served both American composers and the city well.

Yet if the entire City Center—its ballet, opera, and “light opera” companies—moves to Lincoln Center, the conflict that would seem to inhere in the principle of constituent autonomy plus Lincoln Center's super-organizational control may then become evident. If, as seems likely, Lincoln Center's board of directors is motivated primarily by the desire to please its wealthier, more generous trustees—those by chance who happen to support the Metropolitan Opera and the Juilliard conservatory—and motivated as well by its rule regarding individual “continuity and financial stability,” it may certainly decide to do without the City Center's opera company. This prophecy is not so speculative that it cannot be spelled out a little. Lincoln Center could supplement the New York City Ballet with visiting troupes like the Bolshoi Ballet, England's Royal Ballet, and the Royal Danish Ballet, and it would present, on its own, such “operettas” as *Brigadoon* and *Finian's Rainbow*. (I have it on good authority that the name “Theater for Dance and

* The projected top for the new City Center Theater at Lincoln Center is tentatively set at \$4.95. This is still a far cry from the tentative \$13.00 top for the Met.

Operetta" does not refer to such gems as Mozart's *Schauspieldirektor* or Rossini's *L'inganno felice*; this genre is too limited to name even half a house after it.) In the process of transferring the City Center from its present location to Lincoln Center, the people of New York will not only lose 510 seats but the city may also lose its only source of experimental and inexpensive opera. And finally, of course, the whole country will suffer from the loss.

WHEN LINCOLN CENTER decided to include within its fourteen acres an "educational institution for training in the arts," it first asked Columbia University, in 1955, to join. For over half a century Columbia has had a distinguished music department which offers undergraduate courses in theory, history, literature, and applied music—and graduate courses in musicology and composition; and for many years now, the university has been trying to raise funds to build an art center where the classroom work can be shown to the rest of the university. Yet when Lincoln Center asked Columbia to transfer the performance work of its music department, the university refused—and without any dissenting voice among its faculty.

One reason for its refusal was the Center's inconvenient location: students of the humanities would have had to travel almost three miles to take a course in music. The more significant considerations, however, were outlined by Douglas Moore, chairman of the Music Department and MacDowell Professor of Music (as well as a noted composer in his own right). Mr. Moore believes that "University performances are free from certain pressures which limit experimentation in the professional market, and it is perhaps better to keep the two separate"; that while "failure should be one's frequent companion in an educational institution," it is unpalatable in a public, commercial world; and, finally that student performers should serve their own artistic and intellectual

communities, and not be placed in an isolated fourteen acres of the city, several hundred yards from the Metropolitan. There was no disagreement at Columbia with Mr. Moore on any of these points.

Columbia having said no, Lincoln Center then invited the Juilliard School of Music to come in. Juilliard officials studied the project carefully for a year and a half. On February 7, 1957, the school accepted. The directors of the school and the trustees of the Juilliard Musical Foundation thereupon agreed to make two major changes in the school's operation when it became part of the Center: (1) to train only advanced students; and (2) to include, among its courses, training in drama along with music and dance.

The first of these decisions will affect something like 700 students. In January of this year, Juilliard had 1,563 students. Of these, 691 were in the regular graduate division (which encompasses both music and dance), 169 were in the extension division, and 703 were in Juilliard's preparatory school. A Lincoln Center-Juilliard press release lists the new criteria for acceptance: "The students will be those giving promise of becoming leaders in their respective branches of the art as performing musicians, actors, dancers; as composers, playwrights, choreographers; as stage directors, designers for the theater; and as artist-teachers in this field."

The number of students to be enrolled finally is still undecided, but there is no doubt that those in the preparatory and probably many in the extension divisions will be forced to study elsewhere. The same press release states that "although there will undoubtedly be a number of exceptions involving younger students, it is anticipated that in general the student body will be in the eighteen to twenty-eight age range." (Composers, according to William Schuman, will most likely be in the twenty-five to thirty-five age range.)

Mr. Schuman is aware of the "serious

void" that these changes will create, but is "optimistic of rescuing the preparatory division." He hopes to preserve both the faculty and student body in a separate institution to come into being somewhere near Lincoln Center—but not under the auspices of Juilliard. If that should prove impossible, Mr. Schuman believes that in any event training in the performing arts has already advanced to the point where "preparatory education can really be left in the hands of others."

Juilliard's emphasis, then, will be on the practical, working situation. Early training for the young composer, the gifted child, the youthful dancer will be sacrificed by one of America's leading conservatories of music. As opposed to this loss, the gain is peculiarly American: technique and polish. But there are other losses as well—more subtle ones—and Mr. Schuman (who is also a distinguished and well-known composer) seems to recognize them. He speaks with pride of the fact that Juilliard has had no public relations department; he sees no reason for anyone's serving as mediator in his communications. He also refers to the large number of the school's musical offerings to which the press is not invited because of the special nature of the work done in a conservatory. He tells of his personal dissatisfaction with the part played by Juilliard in the *Omnibus* program on Lincoln Center presented on television on January 1, 1961—attributing the school's poor showing to the last-minute notification from the Center's main office. Mr. Schuman must know, then, that in a few short years he will be in something very like a large fishbowl, placed conspicuously on a table made of travertine marble, stared at continually and curiously by tourists and critics alike. Thus, in the circumstances of Columbia's rejection and Juilliard's acceptance, there has been revealed another element of what it is that the musical world in New York City will lose as soon as Lincoln Center is completed—the nurturing quiet that the academy provides.

THE DECISION to include a library-museum has been the last in the plans of Lincoln Center, which have come to encompass a "trilogy of education, creative scholarship, and performance."

The New York City Public Library system contains two music branches. (There is also a fairly new department for circulating records.) One of the two branches, called the Music Division, is a research library located in the main building at Fifth Avenue and 42nd Street; the other, the Music Library, housed in a separate building on East 58th Street, circulates musical scores and books about music. As of now, the decision is to move both of these branches eventually to Lincoln Center.*

The Music Division is one of the finest research libraries in the world. Its holdings of scores, manuscripts, books, and microfilms have been collected over a period of years for the benefit of the interested student of music. Precisely for this reason, Paul Henry Lang, professor of Musicology at Columbia University, devoted a fairly lengthy column in the New York *Herald Tribune* to plead that the decision to move the library be reversed. Its holdings, he said, were not collected for professionals in an opera company, symphony orchestra, or conservatory. Mr. Lang quite rightly went on to point out that musical scholarship always straddles at least two fields. If the scholar is concerned with troubador music, it is obvious that he must also have French literary and historic references at hand. The same overlap occurs in studying the German song, Italian cantata, English ballad opera, any of the Renaissance madrigals, and all of church music. But Lincoln Center would house only a music library. Mr. Lang wondered what could possibly "be gained by this costly transfer of a great research

* It is a fact worth noting—though, of course, difficult to assess—that several people, trustees simultaneously of the New York Public Library, the Metropolitan Opera, and the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, are also on the Lincoln Center board of directors.

library into an empire devoted exclusively to the cultivation of music readily available in print. . . ?"

The operating procedures of the second music branch, the Music Library, are quite different, but the purpose is essentially the same: public service. Demands for material are directly related to the programs being performed in the city. When Handel's *Messiah* is scheduled for Carnegie Hall, the library is deluged with requests for the score; otherwise, it is rarely asked for. When the Philharmonic is performing Vivaldi's *Concerto Grosso in D Minor*, then private teachers throughout the area (as well as those working in music schools and conservatories) assign the Vivaldi. But will this be possible when the Music Library is transferred? It seems right to suppose that if Leonard Bernstein, say, wanted fifteen copies of Vivaldi's *Concerto Grosso in D Minor*, the scores would be more readily available to him than to some student who had to first get to the Center by subway. Will the Lincoln Center library, in other words, be able to serve a wider public than the professional Lincoln Center "neighborhood"?

A rather interesting reason seems to lie behind the transfer of the Music Library and the Music Division to Lincoln Center. If all the Center had wanted was an excellent library, it already had one. Any university or conservatory would envy Juilliard's magnificent library—and, after all, only a small fraction of Juilliard's student body will be there to use it in 1964. Without the two city libraries, however, a tourist coming through Lincoln Center during the day might see only an empty concert hall, an empty opera house, an empty dance theater, an empty chamber music hall.* Of course, tourists will, if they wish, be able to see a variety of

groups practicing. But several officials seemed to feel that the Center should be represented by something in its "finished" state. If what at least a dozen people attached to Lincoln Center have told me is true—that the men and women who visit Radio City today will include Lincoln Center on their tours tomorrow—then such tourists should be given as much as possible to "see." This is the reasoning, it seems, which has led to the inclusion of "creative scholarship"—that is, New York City's two public libraries devoted to music—in the trilogy of Lincoln Center's musical complex.

* * *

*Her life has been sold for an old man's
gold,
She's a bird in a gilded cage.*

LINCOLN CENTER may be built of glass and travertine marble, but gold will also be there—and is naturally bound to make a difference to the trustees, the directors, the administrators. For it is the trustees, directors, administrators, and real estate dealers who are responsible for this new center which will "affirm for the entire world our nation's faith in the life of the spirit." In truth, between the anonymous committees somewhere, remote and authoritarian, and the men and women who daily will be performing or teaching at Lincoln Center, or providing a variety of other services, there has been remarkably little communication.

For example, the head librarians of neither the Music Division nor the Music Library were consulted about changing locations. One was informed personally of the decision; the other only read about the move in the newspaper. Moreover, since the press issued the original notices, the librarians have heard little more.

The history of Lincoln Center contains other such examples of gaps in communication. On December 12, 1958, William Schuman advocated the merger of the High School of Music and Art with the School of Performing Arts (two public

* Guided tours are being planned. A great room beneath the central plaza will be the meeting place; its walls will be decorated with bronze plaques bearing the names of those who contributed money to Lincoln Center.

high schools in New York) in a "logical location next to Lincoln Center"—so that the students of these schools might benefit from the activities at the Center. The proposal was announced in the press (somewhat later because of a newspaper strike), and by now the merger has gone through; the schools will eventually be moved to the Lincoln Center area. Yet until the merger—and possibly since then—neither of the principals of the two schools heard about these plans from any source other than the press. Neither of them has received any communication either from Lincoln Center or the New York City Board of Education. One principal told me that if I wanted information about the merger I should refer to a recent article written by Harold Schonberg in the *New York Times Magazine*, for that was where he had received all of his information and he assumed that Mr. Schonberg had been in touch with someone who knew. The other gentleman said: "Everything about Lincoln Center is so nebulous. What I hear is through the grapevine, hearsay, rumor." The principals, librarians, performers—few of them have been asked for their opinions.

At the same time, it is also true that those people who *are* in charge of the Lincoln Center for Performing Arts seem to have had very little involvement in any of the arts. The *New York Herald Tribune*, announcing the appointment of General Maxwell Taylor as president of Lincoln Center, stated quite specifically that the General had "never been known as a patron of the arts." A public relations official has said that General Taylor's chief credential was that of being chairman of Mexican Light and Power, "the largest private enterprise in Mexico." (General Taylor is, of course, the retired Army Chief of Staff.) It would be more than a little naive to think that a man with such administrative experience—or a man like Colonel William Powers, now the executive director of the construction of Lincoln Center, and best known for his con-

struction of "housing, warehouses, bridges, dams, and operational military installations such as the first Bomarc Guided Missile Installation at Maguire Air Force Base"—that such men have nothing to contribute to the building of a complicated, expensive project like the Center. They have their special talents, surely. But it also seems more than a little perturbing that, amid all the plans—no one telephoned the principal of the High School of Music and Art.

In December, shortly after the National Cultural Center in Washington issued an elaborate report concerning "America's cultural needs," Professor Lang of Columbia, writing in the *New York Herald Tribune*, argued that the trustees of the Washington Center, like those of Lincoln Center, had been imprisoned by the net of concepts they had themselves engineered. He concluded: "The sheer weight of steel and concrete stands in the way of the artistic and social implications. Such a basic error would not have been made had [these plans] been entrusted to persons more familiar with the problems of culture and reader and harder in their search for truth."

AS A REPORTER searches for the truth about Lincoln Center, questions abound. Why, to ask a small question, is this complex of education, creative scholarship, and performance to be called "Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts" rather than "Lincoln Center for Music, Drama, and Dance"? And why has the Met been placed so conspicuously in the very center of the Center, with its great imposing tower? Why, too, is the Met's the only auditorium which has had its seating capacity increased and been able to retain even its "boxes"? (Some ladies who work for and attend the Philharmonic regularly are quite unhappy that Lincoln Center took away their boxes. "Mezzanines," one has said, "are for the movies.") All of these and other questions begin to be answered if one recognizes

that what underlies the whole project of Lincoln Center—all of its activities—is the adulation of the performer, which has been symbolized in America's musical culture by the deification of the prima donna.

On the *Omnibus* program devoted to Lincoln Center previously mentioned, Wallace K. Harrison, the Center's chief architect, commented that the Center would be a place "where a child can come and meet all of the great artists of the world." Of course this hardly means that the child will see Stravinsky lolling on the plaza benches or Hindemith grabbing a quick hamburger. But the child may, on the other hand, see Rise Stevens jump into a taxi with her television make-up still on. Lincoln Center's artist will be the interpreter, the virtuoso; it is this symbol which places severe limits on the Center's cultural significance. Is it unreasonable to worry about the effect of this attitude upon the youngsters of the High School of Music and Art and on the climate of the musical life of the country in general? Mr. Harrison's expectations to one side, wouldn't this overemphasis on the glamorous world of performance tend to turn students away from other aspects of musical expression—particularly composition?

Music in this country has always been treated as a sport, or a contest in high fidelity. Van Cliburn reigns, while Roger Sessions is hardly known. The architect for the Center's Philharmonic Hall, Max Abromovitz, recognized this implicitly when he gave his reasons for using glass walls: "Having people on the outside looking in and on the inside looking out is an exciting kind of *game*." Mr. Abromovitz hopes the glass will be part of the "pageantry of the hall as audiences converge upon it." Like many others at Lincoln Center, Mr. Abromovitz seems not to

have realized that the pageantry of glass and the maximum reverberation time of a tone finally has very little to do with one's love of music and with the essential beauty of it.

When James Johnson Sweeney recently resigned as the director of the Solomon R. Guggenheim museum, the growth of fine arts was not critically foreshortened by the actions of either the museum or Mr. Sweeney, whatever the particular issues involved—for there are other museums and other directors. But when Lincoln Center was conceived, its planners assumed that there would be little musical activity in New York outside of it. If this were to be the case, the people of New York City would be the immediate sufferers. For if the musical activity in the three and a half blocks that go to make up Lincoln Center is geared to the principle of "continuity and financial stability," to the taste of nationwide TV, to tourists, and to the glorification of the star, then the entire musical life of the nation will suffer accordingly. Technique and polish can be guaranteed where there is plenty of money; vitality needs more care.

It might be well to glance at what once happened: during the baroque era, the singer was the thing. Opera died then; and it took a popular, middle-class form of the lyric theater to breathe life into it again. It seems to me that the one workable response to Lincoln Center is an off-Lincoln Center—which will act for music as off-Broadway does for the theater. Perhaps one should think about finding a really unusual neighborhood in New York, far away from the new center of things in the West Sixties. Fifty-seventh Street and Seventh Avenue might be a good place to start, in a building like—well, like Carnegie Hall.

THE DEAD HASIDIM: Part II

FOR THE FOLLOWERS of Rabbi Nachman of Bratzlav, a famous Hasidic master (1772–1811), the hearing and telling of their founder's stories is a mode of worship. Of course, all Hasidic masters—as Martin Buber, among others, has shown—beginning with Nachman's great grandfather, the Baal Shem Tov, were adept at clothing their ideas in parables. But the early Hasidic books are filled mostly with wonder stories that tell about the miraculous powers of a particular Rebbe. The stories of Rabbi Nachman (which according to Buber form an entirely new literary genre) contain very little of this miracle element. In them, a fine play of fantasy is coupled with a religious pantheism that blurs all distinctions between man and nature, animate and inanimate. Yet though birds, trees, and winds speak with human beings, the action evolves in terms which do not violate ordinary logic. The plot and the characters move on several levels of meaning. Poetry, ethical observations, shrewd psychological insights, and Cabbalistic doctrine—all are blended with a skill that gives the tales a dreamlike atmosphere, which has caused Nachman's stories to be compared to Kafka's.

Though the Rebbe told many stories, only thirteen were recorded in print. These were taken down by Nachman's famous disciple, Nathan, who lived in a different place, the city of Nemirov, but came quickly when he heard that the Rebbe had begun a new tale. Nathan recorded not only the tales but the circumstances — a chance conversation,

often, or an event—which prompted them.

The themes of the stories are rather similar. They deal with something not in its proper place—lost, or stolen, or captured. Children go astray in the forest, a king's daughter is kept prisoner in a mountain fortress, two birds who are meant for each other live at opposite ends of the world—and the plot evolves out of the search to adjust what has been put out of place, to redeem what has been lost. Always there is this search and the yearning for the "adjustment" which in Hasidic terminology is known as *tikkún*. There is also a similarity in the characters that move through the stories. They are usually opposites, like the wise man and the simpleton, the weak beggar and the powerful hero. The beggar is a favorite, and Nachman's most famous story is called "The Tale of the Seven Beggars." A young boy and girl lost in the forest, hungry and alone, encounter, on seven different days, seven different beggars. The first one is blind, the second one deaf, the third dumb, and so on. Each of the beggars gives the children a blessing that "they might be as he is." Later the beggars explain the true nature of their blessings. The blind beggar, for example, is not really blind, but has "seen" the source of all that is seen in this world, which the mystics call *ayin*—nothingness—and is hence blind to lesser realities. The deaf man is deaf only to the foolish sounds of the world. The beggar with the crooked neck is crooked only because he refuses to stand straight in a world which is not yet straight and pure, and so forth.

Within the "Tale of the Seven Beggars," which Nachman never finishes, telling his Hasidim that the identity of the seventh beggar cannot be known until the coming of the Messiah, there is found a poetic passage which has often been translated.

The first part of HERBERT WEINER's description of the Bratzlaver Hasidim appeared in March. Rabbi Weiner, of Temple Israel in South Orange, New Jersey, has scheduled for fall publication by Doubleday a book on religious life in Israel, *The Wild Goats of Ein Gedi*.

*And there is a mountain,
And on the mountain is a stone,
And from the stone there goes forth a
well;
And everything has a heart.
And this mountain on which rests a stone
From which goes forth the well,
Stands on one side of the world.
But the heart of the world
Is placed on the other side of the world.
And the heart which is placed opposite
the well
Is drawn towards and yearns greatly
To come to the well.
The well also greatly desires the heart. . . .*

The intricate Cabbalistic symbolism here is of the same kind that runs through all the stories. Nachman tells his listeners that he is "clothing" Cabbalistic doctrine in a form which will make it more attractive to the ear and mind. But he also says his stories should be printed because "in any event they are pretty tales." Many of the stories read like classic folktales and may indeed be enjoyed purely as literature.*

RABBI NACHMAN'S followers—unique among Hasidic sects for never having replaced their founder with another leader—still read their Rebbe's stories every Sabbath morning. It was during a visit to Israel last summer that I went to a story session in the central synagogue of the Bratzlaver Hasidim, in the Mea Shearim quarter of Jerusalem. When I arrived at nine o'clock on Saturday morning, the service was well along. Everyone in the congregation was engaged in "work of the heart"—as the Talmud calls prayer—in his own personal way, some walking about, others facing the wall, or seated and rocking over their books. There were occasional handclappings and groans, somehow not disturbing to the subdued yet bright mood which prevailed in the synagogue. By ten, the service was finished, and the men began to fold their prayer shawls. A lad with a shaved head and long earlocks passed among the congregants giving out some small books, which the men immediately opened and began reading aloud. The book was a *tikkún*—the word we have before translated as a "fixing up" or "adjustment." The title page stated that this particular *tikkún* was designed for the "covenant"—a euphemistic term referring to the male sex organ. The introduction ex-

plained further that Rabbi Nachman had revealed to his Hasidim ten psalms which, when coupled with inner repentance, were helpful in all kinds of spiritual and bodily healing, and especially propitious for dealing with the trouble of seminal emissions. The ten psalms were reprinted in the little book, and the introduction reminded the readers that since the "thought was also a deed," sinful thoughts of concupiscence must be controlled by deliberate effort; but, in any case, those evil thoughts which had evaded the effort of a person to turn from them could be "fixed up" by the heartfelt recital—"as one speaks his heart to a dear friend"—of the designated ten psalms. Around me I could hear the Hasidim quietly chanting the psalms which Rabbi Nachman had chosen. They were among the most beautiful in the Bible, and there did seem to be an almost perverse juxtaposition here—the deeply spiritual outpourings and the "sin" of seminal emissions.

After the reading of the *tikkún*, about twenty of the congregation remained, taking their seats around a wooden table near the Ark. Wine and bread were passed along, first to the man with the thick eyeglasses who was evidently going to read to us, then to the others. Some of the little children in the synagogue were called over by their fathers to join in the blessing. It occurred to me that the scene of these men sitting around the table sharing bread and wine could not be much different in appearance from the actual last supper of Jesus and his disciples, though it would be hard to recognize the resemblance from the paintings by Christian artists.†

Sighing with pleasure at the "sweetness" he was about to savor, the black-bearded reader began right in the middle of the tale of the "Master of Prayer." There was no need to recapitulate what had gone before: the Hasidim all knew the story by heart.

Nathan of Nemirov has written down about the "Master of Prayer" that: "Our

* S. Z. Setzer [see the November 1952 issue of COMMENTARY for an article on Setzer by Rabbi Weiner—Ed.] edited an excellent Yiddish edition of the stories.

† Anyone seeking to study parallels between Hasidism and Christianity would find Nachman's emphasis on the need for private confessions before the Rebbe of interest.

Rabbi has said that this whole story is hinted at in the 31st chapter of Isaiah, beginning with the words, 'Woe unto those who go down unto Egypt for help, who lean on horses, trust in many chariots and strong horsemen. . . .' Evidently, in this instance, a verse in the Bible with its train of mystical associations gave Nachman his initial artistic impulse and provided a basic structure for the story. But then the tale moves with its own logic, weaving together literary fancy, quiet humor, even sarcasm. "Once there was a Master of Prayer," it begins, "who lived outside the settled areas of the land." The Master of Prayer is a Hasidic pseudonym for a Baal Shem—a leader like Nachman or his great-grandfather—who preserves a measure of isolation. This Master of Prayer tries to "seduce" men to the service of God, adjusting his technique to each individual. If one needs "rich clothes" for his worship, he is given rich clothes. Another may need "torn clothes," and he is given his chance to worship in utter poverty—each according to "the root of his soul." The majority, however, are led by the Baal Shem to find in fasts and self-mortification "their greatest joy."

THERE WAS A kingdom in those days, the story proceeds, where "money was everything, and the station of each man was determined according to his wealth." There follows a description of a community with startlingly modern overtones: in this land, every individual displays a "banner" to indicate the measure of his wealth, and from time to time he must produce proof of his fortune. A person in this kingdom, to be classed as a "human being," must have acquired a certain amount of wealth. Whoever does not have that minimum is not human, but animal, and the animals are further classified according to their wealth: the richer ones are lions or bears, the poorer may be cows or lowly roosters.

The Master of Prayer is sorry for the inhabitants of this land and tries to make them understand that man's *tachlit*, his ultimate purpose—an important concept in Nachman's stories—is only "to serve God with prayers, song, and praises." But they are too busy to hear him—in fact, everybody is making plans to move to another land, where they have heard that "gold can be

made from the very dust." Here, the community has settled "on the hills" where they will not be contaminated by ordinary people, and the roads leading up are guarded by individuals hired from the lower levels.

When the Master of Prayer comes to this kingdom, he speaks first to the lowly guards. But even they are not open to the Master's words, for they, too, worship the icons of wealth. And if one is finally persuaded by the Master of Prayer that he is missing the ultimate purpose of life, he answers, "But what can I do alone against the majority?"

But a rumor comes of a "hero" who is conquering all lands, and who possesses a wonder-working sword. The leaders of the kingdom of money try to buy this hero off, but, to their consternation, he is uninterested in wealth. The story hints mysteriously that all that the hero wants is "submission." And at this point, some of the people in the kingdom begin to listen to the Master of Prayer, who has been till now a "heretic" and in danger of imprisonment. For the Master of Prayer has "hinted" that he knows this "hero," that indeed they once served the same King. And he tells about an incident that occurred when they were both with the King—a story within a story. The reader who finds this distracting must remember that the Rabbi related his tales over many days, in Scheherazade fashion.

The second story is, in turn, interrupted by yet another tale. This tale involves a king, his queen, and an only daughter, who is married to the aforementioned hero. Disastrous earthquakes and storms strike this kingdom and scatter its inhabitants, who cannot find their way back and who have also lost the "map" even though its "impression" remains in their memories and hearts. Again, the images here are conventional Cabbalistic symbols. The King of course is the King of Kings, his daughter is the *Shekhinah*, the presence of God, and so forth. The great disasters may refer both to the historic exile of Israel from the homeland and to the primal catastrophe which, in Cabbala, precedes the creation of this world. The basic longing of all elements in this world is for the "return," or the great *tikkún*—the mending—that will come about in the days of the Messiah.

It was at this point in the "Master of Prayer" that the Hasidim in Mea Shearim

had taken up the story on the Sabbath when I was with them.

"After the great earthquake which brought confusion in all the world, men agreed to appoint themselves a King. . . . They took counsel and decided that inasmuch as the most important thing was *tachlit*, the ultimate purpose, therefore they would find someone to help them achieve this ultimate purpose, and they would make him King." Slowly, with an occasional sigh, a meaningful shake of the head, the reader went on.

"One group decided that the *tachlit* of life was to get honor . . . for not only during his life but even after his death a man cares for his honor and reputation." The Hasidim around the table nodded and the reader interrupted himself to quote the Talmudic axiom "He who pursues honor—honor flees from him."

"A second group," the story went on, "held that killing was the main purpose of existence." Proof for their view was the fact that everything, "people, animals, plants, grass, were finally annihilated—hence, the end of everything was destruction." Therefore, they decided to find a person whose monstrous temper and capability for destruction made him suitable to be their King. "So they went out in search of such a person, and on their way they heard great crying. 'Why is there crying?' they asked. 'A man is killing his father and mother,' they were told. Then they said, 'This is our man, for is there anybody more cruel than one who kills his father and mother? He is truly a master of the essential purpose of this world.'"

At this point, the reader was interrupted: "There are lands today like that," an elderly man who had recently arrived from Russia said cheerfully, and all nodded. Another person suggested that anybody who wanted to know what kingdom he had chosen, need only ask himself, "What do I consider an important day?" If his great day was one which had been filled with prayer and good deeds, then he belonged to a different kingdom from one whose great day was that on which he had accumulated money, or honor. The bearded leader spoke of the sin of suicide, the greatest of all, since the suicide has no faith in the reality of the world to come. A young man sitting near me re-

minded us of a saying of the holy Rabbi Nachman: "There are those who claim that there is a 'this world' and a 'world to come.' That there is a 'world to come,' we believe and must believe, said the Rebbe, and maybe also there exists a 'this world'—but certainly it cannot be this hell that we're living in now!" The Hasidim around the table laughed appreciatively.

The reader, continuing the story, described how the Master of Prayer met other groups who tried to pick for their kings exemplars of wisdom, of beauty, even of the ability to "talk a lot." Yet another group decided that joy was the essential purpose of life, and they settled on a foolish but happy drunkard and went to live in a country where they had vineyards; they had difficulty rejoicing, however, because they didn't have "with what to rejoice."

Finally, the Master of Prayer came upon a group who believed that "the study of Torah, and prayer, and the bended knee" were the important purposes of life.

HERE THE READER interrupted himself again to offer some comments about the relative importance of study and prayer. Both were essential ways of "reaching the King." But the difference could be illustrated by a Hasidic tale of men who tried to approach a certain village which they thought could only be reached by going along tortuous and difficult paths. One day there came someone who decided to be bold and strike directly across the field to the village. This was the Baal Shem Tov, who came along to say that one could reach the court of the King not only through fastings and self-castigation, but directly through fervent prayer.

"Which means, that one can be an upright Jew and not have such a bad time, either!" one of the men commented, smiling. He had used the Yiddish expression "*leben a guten tag*."

The reader now pointed out that the power of prayer in a Hasidic Rebbe was not passed on as a birthright. The place of the Baal Shem in the Hasidic movement had not been occupied by any of his children, but by Rabbi Dov Baer, and from him it had passed to other individuals worthy of it by virtue of their spiritual power. In this respect, Rabbi Nachman was unique, possess-

ing the necessary spiritual virtue while being also in the "royal" line of birth.

Resuming, the reader came to the end of the passage for the day. "The Master of Prayer finally met the powerful hero," whom all feared. Though the one was very weak and the other strong, they immediately recognized each other and their coming together was an occasion for great joy and tears, "for they knew that each served the same King, though in a different way."

Again the reader explained. "In the Cabalistic scheme of the world's spiritual structure, the sphere of *gvurah*—strength—was always paired with the opposite sphere of *hesed*—kindness and grace. Both are necessary. When true strength and true humility meet—they know each other.

"But the point of what we have been reading is to tell us that the Master of Prayer was able to come to each of these various kingdoms and through his prayer show them how to bring their conception of truth to a higher level. For there is a truth in each of the conceptions held by the people in these kingdoms—only it is not the whole truth. A real Master of Prayer is one who does not deny the truth a person sees, but shows him a way of including it within the larger and greater truth. Rabbi Nachman thought that it was a mistake to insist that everybody follow the same way in serving the King." The Hasidim nodded, agreeing.

The worshippers rose from their seats around the table, and one of the elders began singing a quick little tune, "Sing to Him, Rejoice in Him." Soon everybody in the room, including the children, had formed a circle, a kind of chain with hands locked in front and in back. This was the famous Bratzlaver dance I had heard about—a simple kind of quick step in the rhythm of the sprightly tune which all were now singing. Now the words had changed: "Nevertheless, despite this, He pours grace, abundant grace into all the worlds." It was a thought typical of Bratzlaver Hasidim and of their Rebbe who often remarked that atheism and faith were separated from each other by a hairsbreadth. The singing and the dancing were rather sedate. A few of the Hasidim had smiles on their faces, others simply looked peaceful. The mood was altogether different from the strong outburst of the modern Israeli circle dance; and it

was different, too, from the hypnotic emotionalism worked up in the dancing of other Hasidic groups. The Bratzlaver dance is inner-directed, soft—designed for ghetto walls. In a few moments it was over, and everyone left the synagogue to return home to breakfast and the Sabbath nap which if missed is supposed to leave an Orthodox Jew tired all week. I walked back through the quiet streets thinking about what I had seen and heard.

BRATZLAVER TRADITION attaches a specific mystical "intent" to the dance performed after prayers. Like the clapping of hands, it is supposed to "sweeten the judgments"—the decrees emanating from the "left side" of the world's primordial spiritual structure, according to Cabbala. But the circle dance is an important expression in all Hasidic groups. The Westerner particularly is unaware how the inhibition of bodily movement inhibits the religious mood; the impulse to move one's limbs in response to elemental emotions like love, fear, and awe, is, after all, primary—words came later. In their primal phases, religions combine bodily movements (such as the lifting of arms), prostration, or communal dance, with prayer. The Hebrew word for holiday, *chag*, some scholars claim, may be related to *chug*—meaning circle. Surely the Hasidic dance was a return—opening up again wells of emotional expression long closed. In other ways, also, the Hasidic movement "returned."

The communal third meal, for example, at the close of the Sabbath, with its mystic song and sharing of bread and wine, and the white robes of some *Tsaddikim*—are these not reminiscent of rites described in the Dead Sea Scrolls? The 19th-century historian, Heinrich Graetz, in fact described the Hasidic movement, which was then spreading in Eastern Europe, as a "new Essenism." He denounced it as "grossest superstition" in the era of Enlightenment and said of the Baal Shem Tov that he was himself as "ugly" as both the name "Besht" (by which he was sometimes called) and the movement which he had created. But the pendulum of historical evaluation has come a full swing since Graetz's disapproval—a new appraisal for which Martin Buber can take much credit. More than fifty years ago, Buber turned from his interest in art and

theater to religious scholarship, and announced that he knew of no "teaching" which could so well remind man of his purpose on earth as Hasidism. "Therefore I carry it into the world against its will," he said.

There is ample evidence—in philosophy, theology, and the arts—that Hasidism has indeed been carried into our contemporary world. Sophisticated theologians and philosophers see it today as a variety of existentialism. Influential psychoanalysts and rabbis use its parables as examples of a "healthy" and "humanistic" faith. Only one is reminded of a song by which the "opponents"—as they were called—of Hasidism used to parody the exaggerated faith of the Hasidim in their Rebbe. "Miracle and wonder," goes the song, "the Rebbe goes into the water and comes out wet!" Something like this seems to have happened to Hasidism itself. Its immersion in the world has caused it to emerge dripping with sophistication. But is it Hasidism? One would scarcely guess from Buber's selections of Hasidic tales that half the pages of a source book like the *Praises of the Besht* are dedicated to the wonder-working powers of the Baal Shem Tov—his ability to open wombs, forecast the future, heal with magical herbs, and travel hundreds of miles in the twinkling of a second. We find even scholarly Jewish historians disregarding source material which can be traced to within a few years of the Baal Shem's death in order to make a hypothetical, historically false difference between the original "pure" Hasidism, and the later, degenerate *Tsaddikism*. Buber himself does not make such a clear distinction. But his Rebbes tend to be figures of refined religiosity whose spiritual activities hardly remind one of the frenzied pneumatics who not only clapped hands in their synagogues but often fell into epileptic-like trances during their devotions. It may of course be that only a Hasidism strained of its primitive, queer, unmodern elements can be brought "into the world." But then an encounter with real Hasidim is likely to be a disillusioning shock—as to some of my American friends who visited the Bratzlaver.

ANY ONLOOKER who troubled to take more than a superficial glance, seeing the quiet joy on the faces of the men and

children as they circled in their famous dance, could surely sense the remarkable and positive aspects of life in Mea Shearim. These Hasidim who accept the "yoke" of the 613 Commandments of the Law have received much more than a legalistic burden. The people I saw in the Bratzlaver synagogue were almost all of them poor, uneducated by worldly standards, yet obviously even the children among them were imbued with a sense of purpose and mystery in a universe to which they felt related. Sitting at that wooden table, listening to the stories of the dead Rabbi Nachman, the simplest workman was feeding his mind and emotions on a fare of the imagination, moral insights, and poetic imagery, which is hard to come by in the "outside world." And even if the vision they received must be named myth, it provides the Bratzlaver Hasidim with a purpose—*tachlit*—and a technique for dealing with such realities as pain, or death, or evil—realities before which we see the so-called rational mind often enough helplessly dumb.

On the other hand, the "shell," layer on layer, around the innermost "fruit"—the essence—is still there: grotesque clothes and movements, endless preoccupation with details and descriptions of the Law. Moreover, the winecup which had been passed from mouth to mouth for the blessing and the sanctification had really been dirty. My American friends might well have complained about holiness associated with dirt. Cannot the "pure" elements of Judaism be separated from its impure "shell"—the lofty spiritual movements of the psalms moved away from discussions about seminal emissions? A dualistic approach to life which would separate higher spirit from lower body, the eternal from the trivial, is attractive, and has even profoundly influenced Judaism, especially post-Biblical Judaism.

But in Judaism such a dualism encountered a primary monism: a Biblical insistence that body and spirit were not meant for alternate separation. The classical Jewish faith clings to the idea of bodily resurrection, not just immortality for an abstract soul. We may almost say that the Biblical Old Testament view is that holiness and dirt should indeed go together, that the coming of the kingdom of heaven upon earth means just such an interpenetration. Why should any

natural functions of the body be placed outside the possibility of being "lifted up," transmuted by holiness? Orthodox Judaism refuses, moreover, to recognize any distinction between lesser and greater in terms of religious law. The lofty commandment to "love thy neighbor as thyself" is given no more attention in its Biblical context than the injunction against wearing an admixture of wool and cotton, or eating forbidden foods. It may seem wrong—it has seemed wrong—to some of the prophets that "essentials" and "details" should be allowed equal importance. But classical Judaism sees the tremendous as mysteriously interwoven with the trivial, and chooses to regard the trivial incident as a mystery whose seeming insignificance opens up to dimensions of reality beyond our comprehension.

But if the Bratzlaver do not reject dirt with their holiness, one must, nevertheless, not have an exaggerated notion of the actual amount of real dirt to be found in Mea Shearim. In fact, the countless purifications and cleansing of body and home enjoined by Jewish law, its holy days and its Sabbath, leaves very little dirt either in Mea Shearim or in that quarter of Jerusalem called Sharey Chesed, the Gates of Mercy, where the family of my young Bratzlaver friend Arele lived.

THE ROOM in Arele's home into which I was ushered on Saturday night was small but spotless. His father, Rabbi Wolf Chessin, received me cordially and introduced me to the male members of his family, including a bearded young man, his son-in-law. Several of Rabbi Chessin's grandchildren, along with Arele and his brother, took their seats around the dining-room table still covered with its white Sabbath cloth. Rabbi Chessin's wife, a sturdy, good-looking woman wearing a kerchief on her hair, served us tea as we talked.

I asked Rabbi Chessin's son-in-law about the loyalty of his Hasidic group to a dead Rebbe—was it not paradoxical? Rabbi Nachman had himself talked so much about the importance of a Rebbe to the life of Hasidim.

"Rabbi Nachman never forbade us to have another Rebbe," he said. "He only hinted that we would not need one after him." As to the way in which Bratzlaver

Hasidim were different—apart from their loyalty to Rabbi Nachman—the son-in-law knit his brow. The belief that "there is no place empty of Him," or the commandment to "serve the Lord with joy" or the emphasis on *kavannah*, the inner movement of the heart, and *dvekut*, constant clinging to God—these were all elements found in traditional Judaism as well as in Hasidism. Perhaps the one quality which Hasidism particularly emphasized was freshness—*frishkeit*, as he said in Yiddish. This thought also was not new in Judaism, but Rabbi Nachman had given it new force with his constant reminder: "It is forbidden to be old." Everyone and everything must be engaged in constant renewal. Oldness—sameness—is sin.

Some other members of the family ventured their opinions about Bratzlaver Hasidism. Rabbi Chessin's grandson, a handsome blond boy of ten, told a story while the others in the room proudly listened. He stumbled a bit, but the point was clear. A King had once invited guests to his garden, which contained trees bearing golden fruit. Everyone came, delighted at the King's invitation to pick the golden fruit, but the King had prepared a surprise for them. He had invited also to the garden a most marvelous orchestra, and they played wonderfully enchanting music. All the people, when they heard the music, began dancing to it, and soon forgot the invitation to pick the golden fruit. Then a man came who was deaf and could not hear the music. He started picking the fruit. In the eyes of those who were enjoying themselves dancing to the music, he appeared crazy. But he kept on picking the fruit. Suddenly the King announced that the party was over. The orchestra stopped playing, and it turned out that not he who had been picking the fruit was crazy—for he had the golden fruit—but the others who had been diverted by the music.

"Will you sing us a song?" Rabbi Chessin's blond grandson asked his sister Dvorele, a little three-year-old dressed prettily in a Scotch plaid, with long sleeves. The boy held out some sunflower seeds as a reward. Without hesitation the little girl began to sing "Let the Heavens rejoice," while her grandfather kept time by tapping on the table.

"Don't forget to make a blessing," said Rabbi Chessin quickly as Dvorele suddenly finished her song and reached for a piece of cake on the table. But the grandfather's warning was too late. The cake was already in the little girl's mouth. "She forgot," said Rabbi Chessin indulgently. Before I left, Rabbi Chessin asked me rather bashfully whether I wouldn't like to visit an institution for orphans in the neighborhood. He nodded regretfully when I told him I had no time.

Later, Arele walked with me back to the hotel. "The Rebbe says that when the Hasidim came into the world, Satan neglected the rest of the world to concentrate on the Hasidim. When Rabbi Nachman appeared, Satan left the other Hasidim to work only on the Bratzlaver." Arele was proud of the special attention he and his group received from Satan. "That one," as he called Satan, "knew of whom to be afraid."

At the door of the King David Hotel, Arele gave me a book which I had asked him to obtain for me, a collection of prayers written by Nathan, the scribe of Rabbi Nachman. "They are sweet, are they not—our prayers?" Arele asked again. And he reminded me that Nachman in *Gematria*, the Cabbalistic science which equates letters with numbers, spells Shimon bar Yochai, the author of the Holy Zohar. "Incidentally, if you should be in Jerusalem the week after the holiday of Succoth—for the festival of the drawing of the water, you could see us really dancing." Arele's eyes sparkled and he hesitated a moment, then told me that he was one of the best dancers in town. "That night I take five flashlights and balance them on my head. We know how to rejoice," he added, and he bade me a "good week."

I WALKED ACROSS the lobby, and I could hear the lady singer in the bar as she crooned something about "love and joy." Her voice seemed sad, though, and the melody was sad—like the people in Nachman's story who wanted to rejoice but didn't know "with what." Upstairs in my room I glanced through the book Arele had just given me, and found some lines captioned "A Prayer for Joy."

*Master of all the worlds, Fountainhead
of all happiness. . . .*

*Help me to immerse my meditations and
all the impulses of my heart, and the
depths of my thought in the mysteries
of joy, and let me remember ever and
well*

*That thou art my Rock and my Creator.
And grant, O my Creator,*

*That I believe with a complete faith that
all fires of suffering*

*And all the nine measures of destitution
and illness and pain, and the heaps of
trouble in this world, and punishment
in the next world, and*

All the deaths—

That they are as nothing;

As absolutely nothing

*Against the wondrous joy of clinging to
Thy Godliness,*

And the sweetness of the Torah. . . .

*Therefore does my prayer stretch itself
before Thee,*

My Father in Heaven,

*Save me and help me from this moment
to be alone in the fields every night. . . .*

*To cry out to Thee from the depths of
my heart. . . .*

*To set forth all the burdens and negations
that remove me from Thee,*

Light of life.

*And give strength to strengthen myself in
spite of everything—*

*To strengthen myself with great happi-
ness,*

With happiness that has no end,

*Until my heart lifts up my hands to clap,
to clap, to clap,*

*And my legs to dance until the soul
swoons, swoons, swoons.*

*And help me ever to make a new begin-
ning, and to be a flowering well of
Torah and Prayer,*

To work always with quickened spirit

*And to stand with powerful strength
against the scoffers and mockers*

*Who go about in our days—days of double
darkness. . . .*

*But oh, against all the troubles and bur-
dens,*

*Thy joys, and Thy delights, are strong
and powerful. . . .*

*Oh, our great Father, home of delights
and wellspring of joys.*

The Bratzlaver Hasidim, whatever their material condition, have continued to rejoice in spirit, as their dead Rebbe taught.

I ELECTIONEERING AMONG THE MINORITIES

Roma Lipsky

The existence of a minority group vote in America, or indeed of any bloc voting groups, is proclaimed and denied with about equal vigor—often by the same people. Politicians affirm the unity of all Americans, and then carefully balance their tickets. Racial, ethnic, and religious leaders deny that it is possible to deliver the vote of their group, and proceed to analyze the right and wrong ways of doing so. For the fact remains that “ever since politics began,” in the words of an election analyst, Richard M. Scammon, “people of similar backgrounds and religious opinion and economic interest . . . tend to identify certain interests together and oftentimes vote as groups for particular candidates.” In recent years, and with accelerating significance, the so-called “minority groups” have made their “interests” bulk large in campaign strategy, and this past election was certainly no exception.

Traditionally, both major parties have made their appeal to the “minority” vote through the nationalities divisions of their respective campaign organizations, split up along ethnic or racial lines: Polish, Italian, German, Jewish, Negro, and so forth. Among the techniques used in this traditional approach are advertisements in the minority press outlining the candidate’s position on issues which concern a particular group—a statement on Israel in the Jewish press, or on captive nations in the Polish and Hungarian newspapers, or on civil rights in the Negro press, etc. At the same time, carefully selected speeches—or, more often, excerpts from them—are translated and sent to the Spanish and Yiddish newspapers. The mails are deluged with literature in several languages, addressed to prospective voters of the various groups, and

repeating the partisan points made in ads or speeches; included are messages from this prominent Italian, or that well-known Czech, urging his fellow Americans to support Candidate X because he is a true friend of the Italians or Czechs, as the case may be. Similarly, the nationalities divisions provide appropriate speakers: a Jew is dispatched to YMHA study groups, a Negro sent to a Harlem church meeting. On Pulaske day, special greetings from the candidates go to Americans of Polish descent; and the local political clubs sponsor various group observances, in some of which the participants appear dressed in the peasant costumes of their native lands.

These campaign operations most often have been supervised by party workers who claim a special knowledge of minority group voting behavior, but whose relation to the mainstream of the campaign is often the tenuous one of a professional “hyphenated” American. The racial, religious, and ethnic groups each operate in separate sections of the party headquarters, autonomously. The result is apt to be that, instead of gaining coherence through the forging of common techniques, the various nationalities sections tend to split farther apart as the campaign progresses. It is not too inaccurate to say that by election day there are as many different images of the same candidate as there are minority groups.

Yet the traditional approach has had some positive results, particularly for the Democrats who, over the years, have worked harder at it in the course of providing a political home for the ethnic, religious, and racial factions. Until 1952, the combination of historical advantage and an elaborate program of special interest campaigning was sufficient to hold the minority group vote against the Republicans. For example, it is estimated that about 85 per cent of the “minority” population of America is Roman Catholic and about 60 per cent of the Catholics generally Democrats. Simi-

larly, Negroes and Jews, who bulk large in the remaining 15 per cent, have also tended to vote as Democrats. Meanwhile, the Republicans were still engaged in the initial stage of persuading their own workers, as one spokesman put it, to "open the doors of your clubs to these people." It was Eisenhower's candidacy that produced a marked shift in this vote in 1952 and an even more decisive one in 1956. Along with Eisenhower's universal appeal as a military authority regarded as a man of peace, the Republicans had for Catholics the attraction of a strong anti-Communist position that included liberation of the Catholic countries behind the Iron Curtain. Inroads were also made on the Negro vote—the Supreme Court decision to end school segregation and the enactment of the first civil rights legislation in almost a century both took place during the Eisenhower administration. The Democrats, on the other side, were hampered by the record of the Teheran and Yalta agreements as well as by the allegations of Senator McCarthy and his co-workers, and also by the weak civil rights plank in the 1956 platform—which Negro leaders read as a feeble and a pathetic response to the issues which so vitally concerned them. Thus while the Republicans won voters by their broad persuasive program, the Democrats persevered in the traditional appeals to narrowly defined minority interests—and lost voters.

EVEN BEFORE THE Democratic national convention in 1960, the Kennedy strategists were aware of the decisive effect the minority group vote was likely to have on the election. Many of the Negroes, Italians, Irish, Poles, and Jews who had slipped their customary political ties to vote for Eisenhower were concentrated in the urban areas which the Democrats had to win in order to stand a chance in the large key states. In Negro districts in Baltimore, for example, the Eisenhower vote had increased by 20 per cent from 1952 to 1956. In Chicago, Buffalo, and Detroit much the same trend had occurred among voters of Polish extraction, who provided Eisenhower with heavy support in 1956. So it had gone, in fact, with the bulk of the urban minorities vote; even among the Jews—Stevenson's most loyal bloc in 1956—serious inroads had been

made. Moreover, Kennedy's own presumed handicap—his Catholicism—increased the urgency of winning back decisive pluralities among Negro, Jewish, Irish, Polish, and other minority groups. This meant, of course, re-focusing the whole question of campaign strategy. For the candidacy of a Roman Catholic would not only alienate some Protestant voters but just as inevitably create all along the voting spectrum profound emotional and political repercussions which any successful strategy would have to take into account.

Clearly, the traditional tactics would not do. They had failed in 1956 to deliver the needed pluralities among the minority groups and now they would be bound to exaggerate, if anything, the inevitable divisive effects of Kennedy's candidacy. Among an increasingly sophisticated electorate, the number of voters who could be stirred to any response by old-style slogans claiming that Kennedy was good for this group or that were rapidly diminishing. And, in any case, a Roman Catholic candidate whose religion would automatically isolate some voters was the last man who should be using appeals to separate interests: his major, most urgent problem was to bring together, under his banner, as many diverse groups as he could.

This "attempt to bring all groups under one tent," as one Kennedy aide put it, took the form of "stimulating general interest rather than catering to special interest." Toward this end, the Kennedy strategists pursued a distinction which had been made by the former Democratic national chairman, Paul Butler, between "bloc voting" and "group voting." The former had been defined as "a conscious effort by political leaders to sway or manipulate the vote of a specific segment of the population"; the latter as "the identification of a group of people with a community of interest." Thus the strategy the Kennedy forces arrived at in this area of programmatic appeals was to identify their candidate, so far as possible, with issues of vital concern to the various minority groups while at the same time avoiding the parochial wooing of each separate group. The result was what came to be called "the integrated campaign."

Typical of Kennedy's approach was the series of national conferences which he initiated on such matters as civil rights and

urban planning. These were designed to attract a large and vocal body of both expert and public opinion, which in turn would, hopefully, have the effect of broadening and coordinating Kennedy's appeal to the interested groups. A good example of the strategy was the civil rights conference. To it Kennedy had invited every national leader and professional expert associated with strong civil rights legislation: included were members of the NAACP, CORE, the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, and of numerous other civic, labor, religious, and educational groups. Many arrived uncommitted to Kennedy's cause and skeptical of his motives, and there was a good deal of feeling among the conventional Democratic politicians that their candidate was not really aware of what he was tackling in summoning such a group. Kennedy, however, managed to persuade the members of the conference that he was more committed to the things they believed in than they had previously thought him to be; and it was only after "integrating" this influential body of opinion-makers into his campaign that he made the appearance which no Democratic candidate can avoid—the Harlem street rally.

THE CIVIL rights conference vividly illustrates the policy Kennedy was following in his other appeals to "minority" voters—placing the issues that most concerned them in a national, rather than a parochial, context—a procedure which, in turn, amplified the campaigning value of the particular issue. The Negro press, of course, gave full coverage to the civil rights conference, and it was also reported on the front page of the *New York Times* and in newspapers throughout the nation. In aiming at this type of general coverage, Kennedy was taking risks that could have been minimized if he had stuck to the conventional tactic of reserving his strong statements on controversial issues for exclusive release to the specialized press. As it was, UPI (United Press-International), which has many Southern clients, sent the veteran reporter James Killgallen to the conference as an expression of Southern interest—the point was not lost among the delegates or the campaign workers. Indeed, Kennedy's staff had been careful to include prominent dele-

gates from Michigan, Illinois, California, and other large Northern states, and the word passed among campaign workers was, "if this meeting doesn't lose at least three Southern states, it's a flop!"

Kennedy's successful use of the civil rights conference was but one of many benefits he was able to extract from his "integrated" strategy. Thus, the careful preliminary work done—in preparation for any major conference—on the issues involving minority groups served to provide him with the kind of detailed knowledge which was bound to impress these groups later on in the campaign: a fact which President Eisenhower was evidently not aware of when he remarked that Kennedy had won the Negro vote solely because of "a couple of phone calls" following the arrest of Martin Luther King.

Kennedy's action in the King incident offers a significant contrast to the play made by Nixon's running mate, Henry Cabot Lodge, for the Negro vote. The two incidents help to focus the differences between the campaign practices of the opposing parties. Lodge's pledge in Harlem that Nixon, if elected, would appoint a Negro to the Cabinet was typical of the sort of old-fashioned appeal to minority groups that the Republicans came to rely on heavily as the campaign progressed. Lodge himself was known to be totally lacking in a civil rights record or background; and little had been done up to then in the Republican campaign to convince Negroes—or liberal voters generally—that the Negro's role in the society, much less in the government, had any very central place in the political philosophy behind the Republicans' campaign. Moreover, the lack of coordination that generally had dogged the old *ad hoc* strategy of segregated appeals to segregated audiences was particularly visible following Lodge's Harlem promise, when Nixon, who at the time was actively working for votes in the South, was forced to repudiate it. And obviously, it was one thing for the vice-presidential candidate Lodge to speak of a Negro Cabinet member in Harlem (Lodge seemed unaware that he was in the largely Puerto Rican district of East Harlem—a fact that amused many Negroes), and quite another for Kennedy, in the course of his civil rights conference, to strongly reiterate

his promise that if elected he would issue an executive order to end discrimination in housing that received federal aid.

Ironically, many Republican strategists still believe they should have relied even more heavily than they did on the techniques which the Democrats tried hard to abandon. One official of the Republican National Committee told an audience of party workers that while there shouldn't be any bloc voting in America, the Republicans must be realistic and employ the same strategy as the Democrats. Another Republican party leader blamed Kennedy's election on the failure of the GOP "to develop techniques to appeal for bloc votes." It might be illuminating, here, to contrast the tactics by which both parties appealed to the "Jewish vote" in New York.

THE REPUBLICANS in 1960 engaged in a heavy advertising program in the Jewish press. Some of the advertisements featured prominent Jews explaining why they endorsed the Nixon-Lodge ticket; others followed the old-fashioned "what-we-have-done-for-the-Jews" approach. Also, mailings of specially slanted pamphlets and letters were sent out to Jewish names in areas heavily populated by Jews, both in the city and suburbs. The campaign for the Jewish vote in New York increased in intensity, and even became rather desperate—in both camps. One result was that many of the traditional Democratic party strategists fought the decision taken early in the campaign by Kennedy's tacticians—including, notably, Meyer Feldman—not to have a special Jewish campaign section, to limit the amount of advertising in the Jewish press, and to make the appeal for Jewish votes through the general liberal approach of the "integrated campaign." Thus what little advertising the Democratic National Committee took in the Jewish press presented Kennedy not as a friend of Israel or of the Jews but as the advocate of progressive programs in many areas. Also, those ads that listed Kennedy supporters emphasized their liberal, rather than their Jewish, aspect. Philip Klutznick, for instance, a former national president of B'nai B'rith, appeared as one of the businessmen supporting Kennedy rather than as a Jewish leader. Meanwhile, however, the veteran campaigners expressed

their feeling that "Washington isn't aware of how serious the problem is here," and began to design programs along the old-style lines to vie with the Republican campaign and win over the "disaffected Jews."

Thus, when a limited advertising budget was drawn up from New York Citizens Committee funds, conflict broke out on the question of local campaign tactics. Traditionalists argued that the ads should feature the conventional list of prominent Jews and excerpts from Kennedy's speeches on policy toward Israel; but there were others who wished to follow the example of the National Committee. This meant including the names of prominent liberals regardless of their religion—and in fact deliberately choosing some non-Jewish names; as for Kennedy's positive statements on Israel, the anti-traditionalists argued that these should be placed in the context of his international program in general. Eventually, the "integrated campaign" view prevailed.

The same policy—"integrated campaign"—was followed in the use of radio time directed to a Jewish audience. For spot announcements before and after such programs as "The Eternal Light" and "The Jewish Caravan" it was finally decided to use speeches by Mrs. Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson, for example, as well as by Senator Lehman, Irving M. Engel, Charles Abrams, and other prominent Jewish liberals.

Much the same difference in the campaign strategy of the two parties was detectable in the treatment of international issues of special concern to minority groups. Kennedy's criticism of the Eisenhower foreign policy, particularly his emphasis on the decline of American prestige abroad, is known to have carried great weight with Poles, Hungarians, and Lithuanians who were exercised over our policy toward the captive nations; with Jews alarmed at setbacks in the Middle East; and with Latin Americans worried about our fraying relations with Central and South American peoples. In articulating the foreign policy concerns felt by each of these groups into the broader context of America's direction and stature in the world, Kennedy again drew the various groups closer together under his banner—instead of separating them by the method of disconnected appeals to each. Nixon, on the other hand, used

many of the old *ad hoc* approaches. Conspicuously, his promise to visit the countries behind the Iron Curtain, clearly addressed to the Slavic vote, was ineffectual since there had been no previous statements by him on the level of a serious policy decision, providing a context for this pledge.

It is obvious of course that Kennedy's design to free himself from the traditional nationalities division approach was not absolutely consistent—even deliberately not so. The successful Viva Kennedy clubs among the Spanish-speaking population, for example, can be viewed as merely a shrewd adaptation of a long-standing method of registering and influencing minority votes. Also, as has been indicated, the more radical changes which the Kennedy organization tried to make in identifying itself with minority interests encountered a good deal of resistance within the Democratic ranks. Notwithstanding the exceptions, however, the major strategy throughout the campaign was persistently directed away from the segregated approaches of the past and toward the new concept of the "integrated campaign." Kennedy had thus devised a strategy which, by appealing to the *community* of interests among the minority groups rather than to their *special* ones, clearly helped to win him the presidency.

IN EFFECT, KENNEDY won the election in large Northeastern states with substantial "minority" populations, and in the South where heavy Negro support more than offset any losses resulting from his religion or his civil rights stand. The conclusion of most political analysts is that the 1960 election was one in which America's minorities made up the winning combination. A routinely comfortable *majority* of these votes would not have done the trick; Kennedy had to win in Negro, Jewish, and Catholic districts by majorities of from 70 to 85 per cent. The story of the tally is that he did just that.

The Negro vote for Kennedy in a good many areas exceeded the percentages that went to Roosevelt and Truman, and was greater—by margins ranging, in the various localities, from 14 to 30 per cent—than the

same districts gave to Stevenson in 1956. In South Carolina, for example, Kennedy received approximately 50,000 Negro votes while he carried the state by only 8,139. The slender margin of 8,000 votes in Illinois rested upon a startling plurality of 350,000 Negro votes. And so it went, in varying proportions, in Missouri, Michigan, New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Nevada, North Carolina, and Texas.

The results among Jewish voters were similar. Kennedy won 83–84 per cent of the Jewish vote, whereas the more publicized Catholic vote for him was several percentage points lower. In two heavily Jewish districts in Chicago, the vote for Kennedy was about 7 per cent higher than the total Stevenson received in 1956—despite Stevenson's acknowledged popularity among Jewish voters. George Gallup reports that nationally Kennedy increased the Democratic vote among Jewish groups by about 6 per cent.

Polish voters, largely concentrated in key election areas, had heavily supported Eisenhower in 1956. Kennedy's margins here were about 80 per cent. He also won significant margins in heavily Italian districts and the least politically experienced minority groups, the Puerto Rican and Mexican, furnished him with pluralities as high as 9 to 1.

Among the more assimilated elements of the Catholic population—the Irish and the German—Kennedy did not fare as well. This fact supports the view that Kennedy emerged finally as the champion of the groups who feel themselves farthest removed from the white Protestant majority, and that presumably the "integrated campaign" worked best among those Americans who feel the greatest need for integration into the main currents of American life. It remains to be seen whether Kennedy will manage to keep their support. But the technical question of whether or not there is a "minority vote" becomes academic, given the statistics of his election. This vote is not only there; it can be decisive. And it appears that today it can best be courted not by the use of old "bloc vote" appeals but by tactics based on a larger view of what constitutes the interests and concerns of minority groups.

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II ARTHUR MILLER OUT WEST

Henry Popkin

Arthur Miller's movie, *The Misfits*, is a curious article. It continues several of Miller's favorite preoccupations and, in some respects, it is a sequel to *Death of a Salesman* ("The Further Adventures of Biff Loman," it might be called); but it is, in the main, a violently forced dramatization of a theme that Miller has hitherto expressed only in passing and almost inadvertently. The theme is communication, and Miller now attacks it with a tireless, but also tiresome, patience.

The issue of communication has generally been built into Miller's plays because his characters tend to be inarticulate, and their inability to communicate has invariably contributed to the major crises of their lives. In his first two successful plays, father and son are basically separated by different views of life, but they are kept even further apart by their inability to find common terms of discourse. In the last full-length play (*A View from the Bridge*), Eddie Carbone is ruined by incestuous love which so bewilders him that he will not acknowledge it and refuses to understand when the lawyer-interpreter of the play breaks it down into little words for him. But the failure to communicate and to listen has remained secondary; primary attention has always gone to that meaning, that significance which is so unfortunately being overlooked.

But now, in *The Misfits*, the problem of communication has moved to center stage. Instead of being subsidiary, communication is the issue, and soon there is nothing to communicate but communication itself. Nothing hard remains here, no crisis except a purely personal one. A character complains of her husband that he was never there, that he never communicated. What kind of person was he? What might he have communicated? That is not the point, and we need not be told. The question about these people is whether, not what, they communicate, and who they are is rather secondary. At the end we learn rather abruptly that one of the four main characters is a scoundrel. The disclosure seems arbitrary, for all the clues Miller industriously sows in the published script. The original charge against this man is that

he failed to communicate with his wife, but, in this failure, he has done no more than share in the general contagion; no one has been communicating with anybody his whole life long. Controlled by this theme, the personalities are left as whatever we want them to be, whatever Miller decrees from this moment to that, or whatever actors care to make of them.

This emphasis on communicating while remaining inarticulate, on being *there* but not necessarily possessing any qualities of mind or character, is all highly appropriate to the participation of two of the great presences of all time—Clark Gable and Marilyn Monroe. No presence, just in itself, has ever been so reassuring as Gable's. And no one has ever been *here*, without any need for a word or a thought, quite so emphatically as Miss Monroe. We *know* they are present, and so, in the two main roles, we do not miss characters. Gable and Miss Monroe communicate themselves, and that is plenty. (How on earth the wife of the one character and the former husband of the other failed to get the message is more than most of us can imagine.) In the absence of written parts that would establish some individuality for them, these two great identities are indispensable to the film, and, in fact, the film is unthinkable without Miss Monroe, without this effulgent "golden girl" (to use Miller's phrase) shedding her light on the rest of the cast. She is Miss Communication herself, the great communicator of our time, and every male past puberty is tuned to her wave length.

Miller's plays, in spite of his preference for general issues and symbolic occupations, are full of substance. In the past, he wrote solid parts for his characters, instead of depending upon actors to give them life. Granted, the medium is different. Films necessarily reflect more of the actors' reality than of the author's intention, but other substantial elements are missing from *The Misfits*. Each full-length play is tightened by family issues, by a nexus of family and community from which no one can escape. Hard, inevitable facts dog the characters—the sale of deficient equipment to the air force, a salesman's failure to sell, witch hunts, and incestuous desires that motivate an informer. They have past lives, usually colored by guilt. But what has happened to the people

of *The Misfits*, in past or present? Gay has failed to communicate with his wife, his children, or his girl friends; Roslyn has failed to communicate with her parents or her husband; Guido has failed to communicate with his wife; and Perce has been unable to get through to his mother or his stepfather. In present time, they strive desperately at mutual contact, and, aided by the golden presence of the girl to whom one of them attributes "that big connection," three out of four succeed. But no family life has ever taken hold of these people; no past event has ever been anything to them but an emblem of communication or, to be exact, of its absence.

One common element remains. Miller still likes to play with symbolic vocations. In a play about the war, the central character makes munitions. In a play about capitalism, the central character sells—the verb is intransitive. A later stage hero works on the docks of New York and thus raises the question of an unwritten code that must not be betrayed. And now, in *The Misfits*, the three men embody the favorite symbolism of our popular culture, our most indigenous symbolism. Two are cowboys, and the third tries to be, and as such they are the last of the free men, pursuing the vocation of freedom itself, the vocation that Biff Loman undertakes in *Death of a Salesman* when he goes out West to escape the narrow confines of Brooklyn and the salesman's prosaic calling. "Cowboys are the last real men in the world," we are told in the film.

Recently and significantly, some other American dramatists have followed Miller's lead, choosing the cowboy's life as the ideal of freedom and nonconformism. This season, Arthur Laurents, in *Invitation to a March*, has created a wretched Texas millionaire who tearfully contemplates the road not taken: he should have been a cowboy. The heroes of Tennessee Williams' *Period of Adjustment* plot to escape wage slavery by going West to raise longhorn cattle. The three cowpunchers of *The Misfits* seem to have gotten wind of all this, for, as they cling proudly to their profession, they keep reminding themselves: "Better'n wages, ain't it?" "I guess anything's better'n wages."

The cowboys are, in the time-honored phrases, in touch with reality and in har-

mony with nature; with obvious symbolic intent, they are set down in Reno, the gathering place of people who are in harmony with nothing and with no one, not even themselves. Their leading attributes are precisely those that were present in Willy Loman on those rare occasions when he showed the best that was in him. They respond to the scenic wonders around them; Gay's home is the lone prairie: "Never was a better one, either." They work with their hands; Guido has been building his own house. Warmed by the love of the golden girl, Gay plants seeds.

Thus, the cowboys go through all the time-honored, symbolically proper motions associated with freedom. They are the last free proletarians, and, if being proletarians could save them, they would be saved. But their work has been corrupted. The same forces that poured cement in Willy Loman's Brooklyn Garden of Eden have corrupted the honorable vocation of trapping wild horses. Once the mustangs would become saddle horses for children, but now the machine age has ended that; children ride scooters, and so the mustangs are converted into dog food. Miller's characters faced this fact with equanimity in the short story of the same name on which the film is based. But in the film, Roslyn turns the tide and saves the horses; she converts Perce with ease, Gay with some difficulty, and Guido not at all. And yet, these gestures have no positive content. The machine age has permanently altered the cowboy's world. Roslyn and her friends cannot hope to repair it; all they can do is to retire from it and conceal themselves in a warm cocoon of communication. Society needs to be changed, but nothing can be done; the only possible course is to find the few private comforts that life can offer.

THE PARTICULAR PRIVATE comfort to which the film is primarily devoted is the personal illumination which belongs to Roslyn, the character played by Miss Monroe. The story develops in a random, haphazard fashion, and it is given unity only by Roslyn's inspiring presence. No guiding motivation governs things except the powerful attraction Roslyn exerts. The plot bears witness. Some accidental meetings are followed by a

party. Roslyn and Gay become lovers, and good effects are at once seen; Gay plants seeds and is temporarily persuaded not to shoot a rabbit. By way of showing Roslyn their lives and showing us their self-destructiveness, the male characters go off to a rodeo in which Perce is badly battered. The drinking that precedes and follows the rodeo produces two significant incidents, which are casually thrust into the pattern. Roslyn shows her superhuman proficiency with a paddle-ball, thus establishing again that she is a superior being; she might be hitting the ball to this day if a stranger had not tried to grab and kiss her. After the rodeo, Gay meets and then loses his children; calling out for them in vain, he enacts a painful scene of public humiliation and establishes again his problem of isolation, which only Roslyn can solve.

Baffled by their encounter with the populated world of the rodeo, the cowboys offer another side of their lives to Roslyn. They take her with them as they go hunting those other misfits, the mustangs. This is the most extended and the most consecutively motivated incident of the film, and the simplicity of its action is more eloquent than the soggy words that precede it. Nothing else in the film is so effective, dramatically and pictorially, as the trapping of the horses. Without the embarrassment of speech, the camera best displays the art of the director, John Huston. The men vigorously pursue and rope the horses, and Gay painfully retakes a mustang that has been released. But then the soggy, forced motivation takes over, the mustangs are freed, and, without any visible destiny except each other, Gay and Roslyn ride off into the starlight.

The language in which these events are embodied is incredible. The dialogue of the film is wooden, hollow, reeking of portent. I fear the trouble here is that Miller is trying to describe the indescribable effect of Miss Monroe upon the world around her, and he is, in his own phrase, "ropin' a dream." The dialogue is surely at its most unnatural when it reflects Roslyn's magical effect. The characters often exchange diagnoses by speculating about her and the state she has induced in them. She is "brand new," we are told, an innocent who makes impossibly high demands of others' conduct. "You got respect for a man," she is told. The catalogue of her

virtues is, in cold print, even more tiresome, since we are in danger of forgetting that she is Miss Monroe, and that any of her actions must have a certain interest. She cannot even attack her breakfast eggs without winning admiration and "enjoyment": "You really go all out, don't you? Even the way you eat. I like that." All the others try vainly to put her ineffable effect into words. An older woman tells Gay: "I just hope you know that you have finally come in contact with a real woman." Even Guido must acknowledge her peculiar quality: "You just walk in, a stranger out of nowhere, and for the first time it all lights up." Roslyn modestly asks "Why?" and is told: "Because you have the gift of life, Roslyn. You really want to live, don't you?" (Roslyn responds with a common sense that does her credit, especially since it is so unusual in this film: "Doesn't everybody?")

Characterization by compliment rises to an even more exalted and unnatural level as the film ends. Once the mustangs are freed, Roslyn says solemnly to Gay: "I honor you. You're a brave man." Gay tops that a minute later: "I know you now, Roslyn, I do know you. Maybe that's all the peace there is or can be. . . . I touched the whole world. I bless you, girl." Given the logic of the context, we can boggle only at the "maybe." There is no "maybe" about it. The main action of the film is, in fact, plucking verbal bouquets and handing them to Roslyn.

THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE language results directly from the peculiar attention given to communicating, to making contact and no more. It takes a good deal of effort for these empty characters to acknowledge each other's existence. With a last, mighty bound, they burst loose to say "Hello," and then they subside, exhausted. To communicate anything further is impossible and superfluous. One character in particular specializes in saying "Hello" in various ways; he conceals from us and the others the wicked personal qualities that lurk behind his simple greeting. This is Guido, who zooms around in a plane and is, as Gay guesses, "just sayin' hello." Later, he drives a car recklessly and will not slow down till he gets a greeting from Roslyn: "At least say, hello Guido." She complies, and she gets his message sufficiently to interpret his intention when, a

little later, he undertakes some carpentry in the dark and in a drunken state: "He . . . he's just trying to say hello. It's no crime to say hello." Still, anyone whose greetings are so troubled and so violent is in trouble. Far better is the casual, conversational "Hello" of the other characters. And yet, after saying "Hello," all of them hang up on us.

Miller has called his short play, *A Memory of Two Mondays*, "a kind of letter to that sub-culture where the sinews of the economy are rooted," and most of his other plays fit that description. The characters of *The Misfits* can barely use language. Guido reads comic books, and that fact helps to set him off as the sinister intellectual of the group. When Roslyn reveals that she never finished high school, Gay is relieved: "Well, that's real *good* news." Curiously, the unseen Roslyn of the short story is educated; Gay makes it clear, however, that any virtues she possesses have barely survived the soul-destroying influence of education: "Some of them Eastern women fool you sometimes. They got education, but they're good sports."

In other words, if there is too much to communicate, the lines get clogged.

In *The Misfits*, Miller reverses one of his old patterns and thereby gives us another lead to the play's lack of direction. Miller formerly specialized in presenting commanding father figures of dubious authority. The father-son conflicts of *All My Sons* and *Death of a Salesman* have been much commented upon. The Salem elders of *The Crucible* darken the atmosphere of that play. The head of the house in *A View from the Bridge* is confused but firm in acting in his folly. In *The Misfits*, the old man of the cast is Gay, a father separated from his children and possessing no power. He is as lacking in direction as any of the others. At the end, he is trying vainly to assert a meaningless authority, but he achieves only an empty gesture. He recaptures a horse that Roslyn has freed, and, having proved his point, having shown that he can do it, he lets the horse go. He is boxed in; he can not do a thing. This fate is hard on him, but it is equally hard on the story line.

[HENRY POPKIN has contributed a number of critical pieces on literature and the theater to COMMENTARY, his last being "Jewish Writers in England" (February). He is the editor of Four Modern Plays: Second Series, just issued by Rinehart Editions.]

IN THE COMMUNITY

MILTON HIMMELFARB

Principle and Interest

Many states require adoptive parents to be of the same religion as the natural mother, so far as possible. From time to time cases arising out of a departure from religious matching, as it is called, make the headlines and cause bad feeling, like the Massachusetts-Florida, Catholic-Jewish case a few years ago. New York has long had the matching provision in its law regulating adoption through social-work agencies, and the same clause is in a new law for tightening supervision over private adoptions. In hearings in February, before the law was enacted, everyone agreed that better control of private adoptions was needed, but there was disagreement about matching. Protestant and Catholic bodies were for it and Jewish organizations and the New York City Bar Association were against it.

For the Protestants and Catholics, matching was the accepted rule in agency adoptions and an expression of public policy, and therefore clearly necessary in a measure for bringing private closer to agency standards. The City Bar Association's experience was that matching is one of those *ceteris paribus* things, in theory, that become inflexible commands, in practice. For the Jewish organizations, matching violated religious liberty in that it would prevent or at best hinder a mother from agreeing that her child should be brought up in a different religion.

The Jews and the Bar Association were right and the Protestants and Catholics wrong, of course. Matching restrains and constricts. It is more appropriate for a pre-modern society of status than for a modern society of contract. It invokes the secular arm in defense of denominational corporativism. Why do not the Protestants and

Catholics see that? After all, they too are committed to democracy, not feudalism.

Perhaps they fail to see it because they see something else, which Jews, persuaded of their own rectitude, do not. If generally there are fewer children to be adopted than couples who want to adopt, the deficit is especially marked among the Jews. Abolition of the matching requirement, besides being a blow for liberty, would help Jews to adopt more children and therefore help the Jewish community to gain at the expense of the Christian. The Protestants and Catholics probably suspect that if the situation were reversed, the Jews would like matching. The suspicion is not entirely justified—though emancipation itself has caused us losses from the beginning, we are as devoted to it as ever—but it is natural.

Some years back, in New York City, there was a clash between Catholics and Jews over matching youthful offenders and their probation officers, the Catholics wanting probation officers to be as much as possible of the same religion as the children assigned to them, and the Jews wanting professional competence to be the only test. The ratio of Jewish probation officers was higher than the ratio of Jewish delinquents, and the Catholics probably suspected that the Jews were interested in jobs. As I remember it, finally competence was declared primary and matching secondary.

Some years ago, also, a high-level administrator of a federation pronounced before a convention of Jewish social workers what quickly became known as his Jewish-eyes-are-weeping speech. Neither in their emotions nor in their work were he and his audience hotly Jewish, but institutions, jobs, fund-raising machinery, and a communal

generosity existed and had to be justified. He said that there was a mysterious something that made it especially desirable and useful for a Jewish social worker to help Jewish clients in a Jewish agency—with the clear implication that it did not much matter whether anything Jewish was retained but the name. His interest was essentially the same as the Catholics' when they pressed for matching the religion of probation officer and offender. The difference was that they were serious about their principle.

We Jews of the modern West prefer the contract society of individualism—and not only because we fare so much better in it—to the status society of ascription. We ought to be able to believe that contract is intrinsically better than status without taking a high moral tone toward those with different interests and, consequently, different preferences.

In matters like adoption we disagree with Protestants and Catholics. In other matters we disagree implicitly with Negroes, and the disagreement is likely to grow. The Negroes, about 10 per cent of the American population, have less than 10 per cent of America's goods, including its rewards and promises, and it would be to their advantage if the goods were distributed according to quota. The Jews, about 3 per cent of the population, have more than 3 per cent of the goods, and a distribution according to quota would be to their disadvantage. The clash between the two positions is not merely potential. In Harlem the Negroes are bringing pressure upon liquor stores to buy from Negro salesmen. (Most of the salesmen are white, and most of the whites are Jews.)

Quotas do not fit easily into an ideology of individualism, and we like individualism better than any competing ideology. Individualism is better than any competing ideology. What complicates things is that individualism is not enough.

Sacred Idea

It has finally happened. Representatives of Orthodoxy have told a Congressional committee that they favor federal aid to sectarian schools, thus joining hands with the Catholics against an otherwise solid Jewish (and Protestant) opposition. For years the day-school people threatened that without the support of Jewish federations they

would have to ask for state aid. Now they, or some of them, have done it.

Less than two weeks before the first of two such statements, a Midwestern Jewish newspaper upheld in this language a federation's refusal to support a day school: "... the separation idea is sacred ... it applies to our schools as much as it does to ... government itself. ... [Support of the day school] becomes a private matter. ... " Not Judaism is called sacred, but the separation idea. And just as for the state, religion is held to be a private matter—a proposition that the great 19th-century Reformer Abraham Geiger was not very fond of—so for the Jewish community, intensive religious education is held to be a private matter. As someone said to me, those people not only believe in the separation of religion from government, they also believe in the separation of religion from the Jews.

I expect that after the Orthodox rebellion, federations will see reasons for supporting day schools that they never saw before, but I expect also that it will be too late. Many of the Orthodox are now committed to the Catholic position, and federation subsidies, unless very generous indeed, will not buy them off.

The Rational Symposiasts

The symposium of intellectuals in these pages last month, with all that talent, all that verve, all that candor and concealment—what is one to make of it?

The editor noted a central tone very similar to the tone of the symposium seventeen years ago—rejection of the Jewish community as it is and as it probably can be. Still, as the old proverb has it, even in bad luck it is nice to have good luck. The symposium showed a rather uniform respect, however shy and obituary, for the Jewish tradition. (Many sounded like the two Viennese Jews in the good old Dolfuss days. *First Jew*: What do you retain of Judaism? *Second Jew*: I still read the *Neue Freie Presse* [= *New York Times*]. And you? *First Jew*: I'm still afraid of dogs.) And while the symposiasts successfully dissembled their love for the Jewish community, they did not quite kick it downstairs. If we compare what they said with what the Jewish angry young men were saying in England very recently, and with the responses of Jewish university stu-

dents to a questionnaire in France some years ago, the American Jewish community could have fared worse, and so could the religion and tradition which the community is supposed to embody.

There is irony here. All the symposiasts find it hard to forgive American Jewry for its success, its thorough Americanization. Yet it is that very success which is responsible for their (grudging) respect. Jewish existence in America has affected American thinking. "The Judeo-Christian tradition" is more than a formula that serves the civic peace. It is taken seriously by serious people. An eminent New Testament scholar of foreign birth and education now teaching in the United States has been quoted as saying that until he came here and saw all those Jews he never fully appreciated Judaism and the Jewishness of Christianity, though he had certainly studied Strack-Billerbeck. Reinhold Niebuhr's ideas about Judaism have been strongly influenced by the many Jews he has known—most of them not very Judaic Jews, at that. Part of the respect for the Jewish tradition expressed by the symposiasts is to be traced to the prestige of Judaism in America, and that prestige reflects the numbers and achievements of the Jews in America.

Some random observations:

1. Why so much admiration for the older generation of socialist intellectuals? Orwell should have helped us to see that there was something ambiguous about the radical intelligentsia of the 30's and what it stood for and worked for. Rereading the literature, I incline to believe that the best of the Jewish socialist intellectuals in this country—those with the clearest conscience and the least arrogance, those least prompted to apocalyptic political gestures by a kind of aesthetic and emotional fauvism—were the tiny minority associated with the Labor Zionist *Jewish Frontier*. Why did no one mention Hayyim Greenberg? And why, when the *New Leader* was once mentioned, was it dismissed with a sneer? At least the *New Leader* has no blood on its conscience. The older generation of socialist intellectuals deserve to be an example, but an equivocal one, a warning as well as a model—often wrong, disastrously; always cocksure.

2. Several say that the Jews (every-

where?) are now so prosperous and secure, so tainted by complicity in their own success, that active sympathy can no longer go out to them. A generation or a half-generation ago most intellectuals were saying that to worry about the Jews was parochial and was to mistake the symptom for the cause. The thing to do was to abolish capitalism. It is easy to see why the United Jewish Appeal and the federations do not organize an intellectuals' division.

3. Everybody is agreed that the world is changing very rapidly. The wave of the future, as fact and as desideratum, is Afro-Asian. Why are they so happy? Say Sino-African instead, and we really have something to worry about. How does one reconcile a passion for such a future with a stated allegiance to the values of John Stuart Mill and E. M. Forster? Perhaps this is a time for caring about the Western tradition and how to keep it from being made into an archaeological relic.

4. The editor commented on Elihu Katz's statement: "The trouble with Israel is that it is such a big idea in the perspective of world history and such a little idea in the perspective of modern history." I am not sure that Katz meant land of Israel to the exclusion of children of Israel, or even religion of Israel. Perspective is a tricky thing, and so is world history. Greeks and Romans did not consider Israel to be a big idea at all. Neither did H. G. Wells, and neither, probably, would the Chinese or Hindu thinker. Voltaire was savagely contemptuous of the spiritual and intellectual state of the Jews just when Hasidism was being born and just before—as time should be measured in the perspective of world history—Veblen wrote his essay on "The Intellectual Preeminence of Jews in Modern Europe."

Early in the last century Archbishop Whately, satirizing the new Bible criticism, wrote in Biblical language a true chronicle of the French Revolution and Napoleon. Then, applying the best historical and philological analysis to his narrative, he was able to show that it must be a tissue of lies, myths, and errors. If anyone today were to write in Biblical language the story of the Jews in the past hundred years, it would seem as incredible as what happened between Joseph and Joshua. On any proper scale of measurement that is not little but big.

5. Werner Cohn does not like "cigar-smoking B'nai B'rith gentlemen." His great Jewish model is Freud—a cigar addict who valued his B'nai B'rith membership.

Security will not come with shuddering at the round, smooth faces of the vulgar. Form a community of the happy few and Mary McCarthy will be around to expose it.

6. It must mean something that the Jewish saint most often mentioned in the symposium is Marx. Alfred G. Aronowitz's brother-in-law likes Hank Greenberg because he is a Jew. At least he is a Jew. Heine may have regarded himself as a Jew, even Disraeli may have regarded himself as a Jew, but not Marx. Certainly not Marx.

They should find themselves a better Hank Greenberg.

7. There is a kitchen culture that teachers of foreign languages, especially, are familiar with. A son of Italian parents takes Italian in high school because he thinks it will be a snap. The teacher discovers, as he expected, that the boy knows only the familiar form of address, imagines that certain Italianized English words are part of Dante's vocabulary, and assumes that a regional dialect, as spoken by the untutored, is standard.

Most of the symposiasts have a smattering of Jewish kitchen culture—a peculiar position for intellectuals to be in. Yet most are not backward about declaring flatly what Judaism is or is not. For instance, they speak confidently about Jewish messianism. Now Jewish messianism is a subtle, complex thing—activist and quietist, utopian and restorative, cosmic and national, immanent and circumstantial, antinomian and halakhic. Gershom Scholem of the Hebrew University has written some remarkable things about it, and his colleague J. L. Talmon has discussed it too. No one would talk about, say, the Protestant ethic and capitalism without knowing something about Weber and Tawney. I rather doubt that most of the contributors know something about Scholem and Talmon.

Of course, their notions of Judaism come

from something else as well, besides kitchen culture—the prestige of Judaism in American culture generally, which I mentioned earlier. (A colleague has pointed out to me how curiously little most of them seem to know or want to know about Christianity.)

8. They agree that it is not tradition but persecution that accounts for Jewish sympathy with the downtrodden. Nat Hentoff puts it this way: "Growing up as a Jew, I very early and involuntarily acquired some understanding of and empathy with other minorities. . . . my concern with civil liberties was first stimulated by being beaten up as a child because I was Jewish." But the premise is false. Minorities do not necessarily or even typically sympathize with other minorities.

Reinhold Niebuhr knows the reluctance of Jews to attribute their generosity or social decency to their tradition, but does not share it. I am reminded of something that Jacob Viner once wrote in a study of mercantilism. Discussing the origins of an 18th-century war, he noted that economic causationists were delighted by contemporaneous justification of the war as designed to increase trade and fatten the treasury. What more explicit proof could there be of its economic causes? But, Viner asked, why should we assume that there was not then the same difference between good and real reasons as now? Trade was then a good reason. The real reason was dynastic.

I agree with Malcolm Diamond, who agrees with Nathan Glazer, that we should guard against self-righteousness in explaining the way we are about justice and compassion. Still, it is just possible that Jewish tradition, even though a suspiciously good reason, may be as real a reason as being beaten up.

9. The symposium produced a scientific discovery of some moment. Dynamic psychologists agree that there is a birth trauma and some would also say that there is a weaning trauma. Ned Polsky has disclosed the Bar Mitzvah trauma, and has shown how serious it can be.

Pluralistic Monotheism

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I found David Danzig's "Christianity in a 'Post-Western' Era" [January] enlightening. His resumé of the Christian literature is a contribution to those who cannot keep a whole eye on all the current thought in concerned Christendom.

Regrettably, when Danzig digs into his own knowledge of Judaism, he shows his incompetence. Thus in his summation he writes: "It goes without saying that no monotheistic religion has ever justified religious pluralism on the basis of its own system of beliefs," revealing his utter ignorance of: *Yesh Tsaddikim b'v'mot ha'olam she'yesh lohem chelek b'olam ha'ba*—"the righteous of all peoples have a position in the world to come." . . . Maimonides, of course, makes much of this in his *Mishneh Torah* and in his *Guide for the Perplexed*. Indeed, this fundamental is the primary restraint on Jewish missionary activity. . . .

(RABBI) ELY E. PILCHICK
Congregation B'nai Jeshurun
Newark, N. J.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

David Danzig's essay does describe one of Christianity's needs in the present world situation. However, I believe he goes too far when he assumes that "no monotheistic religion has ever justified religious pluralism on the basis of its own systematic beliefs." Mr. Danzig did concede that Judaism and Islam recognized the limits on their universal appeal. . . . Yet with regard to creeds and observances that do not violate its basic ethic and the prohibition against idolatry, Judaism is exceedingly tolerant. Neither ethnic nor religious diversity is frowned upon. Even in the Messianic era, there will be Jews and non-Jews, and the Messiah will only judge among the nations.

(RABBI) EMANUEL RACKMAN
Congregation Shaaray Tefila
Far Rockaway, N. Y.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . It is true that Jewish thought envisages the embracing of Judaism by all na-

tions. Isaiah 2:1-4 is perhaps the finest expression of this idea. Yet, this universal aspiration does not exclude a working relationship of religious pluralism, such as Christian thought must now confront along the lines that Mr. Danzig points out. . . .

(RABBI) MORRIS LIEBERMAN
Baltimore Hebrew Congregation
Baltimore, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Central to Mr. Danzig's argument is his contention that Christianity was geographically stabilized from the year 500 until the expansion of the West started about 1500. . . . This is the closest one can come to re-writing the history of Europe in one sentence. . . . In the year 500 only a fourth of Europe was ruled by Christianity, and the researches of Harnack indicate that the bulk of the rural population was probably untouched by it. By 1500 Europe was almost solidly Christian. . . .

VICTOR FOX
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . . David Danzig speaks mainly of those Christians whose faith is so immature as to lead them to visualize an all-embracing, worldwide, institutionalized Christianity which gathers into its bosom not only Westerners but millions of Africans and Asians, thereby promoting itself to the rank of spiritual club number one. Mr. Danzig rightly points to the more than dubious possibility of fulfilling such an expectation. . . .

Nevertheless, the claim to universality in Christ's message still holds good. It resides in the message's inherent ability to awaken any human being to spiritual life, and to make him accede to the discovery of his own self and to liberation. . . . The traditional teaching of the Catholic Church is that God has his own way of saving those who, through no fault of their own, remain outside the visible Church. "Fault" (or "invincible ignorance") should not be understood in a derogatory sense. It means simply that anyone who, *believing in the Church*, wilfully stays out of it, is guilty of insincerity; *ipso facto*, he is not saved. On the other

hand, a sincere Buddhist, Jew, Moslem, or even an atheist, can, through living a consecrated life, be nearer to God than a nominal Christian, and can thus be saved. That fact in itself justifies the existence of other religions and therefore pluralism.

This message has not been adequately presented to the non-Western world, except by the few Christians who understand that the need to which they should first attend is their own—the need for humility and for a deepening of their faith. . . . Such men as Father Ricci in 12th-century Japan, Charles de Foucauld in Africa at the end of the last century, and Father Monchanin in India in recent years, recognized the spiritual values of other religions and tried to identify themselves with those values without ceasing to be Christians. This attitude was inaugurated some two thousand years ago by a Jew, the Pharisee Paul, who, in his own words, became “all to all men.” . . .

The goal is not in Christianity's becoming mankind's majority religion. Christopher Dawson's theological pronouncement (which Mr. Danzig quotes) should not be interpreted geographically or numerically; nor does it exclude Arnold Toynbee's prophetic view. In this post-Constantine, “post-Western” era, the issue is whether or not we of the West will remove within ourselves the road blocks which stand in the way of the Christian principle of universality. (The work of Mircea Eliade and Father Teilhard de Chardin begins to point the way.) Mr. Danzig's thoughtful article is a healthy reminder that it is not the universality of Christ's message which is lacking but our own understanding of it.

CLAIRE HUCHET BISHOP

New York City

The Statistics of Affluence

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I suppose that most of your readers are as confused as Messrs. Coser and Seligman seem to think that Mr. van den Haag is [“Affluence,” January], after their exchange of vituperative nebulosities. . . . The statistics on education are a good example of what I am talking about—they are irrelevant. Both parties, I am sure, could agree upon the appropriate statistical yardsticks; the point is that Coser and Seligman, traditional liberals in this respect, want mass education because they look upon it as a panacea, while Mr. van den Haag obviously believes (I agree) that it would tend only to make a mass society more massive. . . .

[But van den Haag's] criticism of liberalism, often pertinent, is unaccompanied by very many positive suggestions. . . . For those of us who cannot, like Messrs. Coser and Seligman, accept a too facile optimism, and who will not, like Mr. van den Haag, go upon our way, the terrible dilemma remains.

HUGH WILSON STRAUSS

Brooklyn, N. Y.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In reply to Mr. van den Haag, Messrs. Coser and Seligman write: “Since 1950 . . . the increase in average spending per pupil has just kept pace with the increase in enrollment.” It is difficult to know for sure what is meant by this sentence, but I think most readers would interpret it to mean that, though school budgets have gone up since 1950, expenditure per child has remained constant. According to the Research Division of the National Education Association, current expense per pupil in average daily attendance was \$210 in 1949–50, and \$340 in 1958–59. Including capital outlay and interest, expenses per pupil rose from roughly \$250 to roughly \$450. Average salary “per instructional staff member” rose from \$3,010 to \$4,935. All these increases are far greater than the rise in the cost of living over this period. How do the Messrs. Coser and Seligman justify their statement that “we have only just kept pace with past levels—and by past levels we mean the recent past. . . .”? By what standard do they criticize Mr. van den Haag's statistics?

MARTIN MAYER

New York City

MR. SELIGMAN writes:

Martin Mayer evidently is as adept in statistical method as is van den Haag. The data he quotes are all in current dollars, a rather crude way of examining the issue, to say the least. The figures Dr. Coser and I cited were all subjected to an implicit price deflator to take account of changes in the price level. The technique for applying such a correction is available in most elementary texts. The logic underlying this approach is quite obvious: school buildings and the like are real things and should be compared to “real” dollars. If Mr. Mayer will repair to the nearest desk calculator, he will discover that expenditures per pupil have “just kept pace” with average daily attendance, numbers of teachers, pupil enrollment, or any other item he cares to measure. And if he uses the same statistical correction for his figures on teachers' salaries, Mr. Mayer will

discover that they have risen 33 per cent since 1950, rather than the 64 per cent he implies, a "pace" only somewhat better than the 26 per cent real increase we had in mind. To repeat, the increase in average spending per pupil has just kept pace with the increase in enrollment. *Quod erat demonstrandum.*

Barry Goldwater's America

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As a Jew, I find Andrew Hacker's resentment [in a review of Barry Goldwater's *The Conscience of a Conservative*, January] of Goldwater's mixed religious background puzzling. If a man chose a faith other than Judaism, the loss is his, and it is nobody's business anyway. . . .

Now, if we examine Goldwater's book, the "provincialism" Mr. Hacker finds turns out to be the Americanism of about fifty years ago, when many of our forebears came to the U.S. from great oppression in Europe. . . . Goldwater's philosophy, by giving fresh adherence to our Constitution, promotes the rebuilding of the healthy business climate we had before the government was involved in everything. . . . Individual initiative will again be rewarded by merit, and America strengthened from within. . . .

(MRS.) STEPHANIE COOPER SHULSINGER
Rolling Hills, California

Israel, "Commentary," Commitment

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

After reading Mati Meged's article on "The Intellectual in Israel" in the January issue of COMMENTARY, my mind went back about ten years to the first time I had heard the name of this publication mentioned. I was fifteen and had just been absorbed into a small Zionist youth movement which believed in *aliyah*, *hagshamah* 'atzmit, and other equally strange terms, all of which spelled out personal commitment to Israel. My *madrich*, who was a wise nineteen-year-old, warned me to beware of COMMENTARY, because it couldn't make up its mind vis-à-vis Zionism. "Was it with us or agin' us?" was the question, and the answer seemed to be "agin' us"; its very ambivalence and objectivity were seen as negative attitudes, part of the verbal sterilities of Galut life. (This did not stop my elders from submitting essays, critiques, or short stories to this same magazine, the rejection of which only confirmed their views.)

My Zionist youth movement is now de-

funct, yet COMMENTARY continues, and I can still hear my *madrich's* words cautioning me against it, against that objective and dispassionate view of Jewish life which peels the truth, or supposed truth, off an issue and leaves it ugly and deformed in its raw nakedness. *Ribono Shel Olam*, what did the Israelis do to you that COMMENTARY can't forgive them after twelve years? . . .

Chaver Meged brings in an indictment against the Israeli where it hurts most; in the intellectual stomach. Say what you will against an Israeli, call him an *apikores*, a fanatic, a Communist, a chauvinist, even a militarist, but don't say he is ignorant, don't say he is bourgeois, and never, never say he is an ignorant bourgeois. Mr. Meged in effect does all three. . . .

The young Israelis are not concerned with the greater moral issues, "the whole spiritual condition of modern man," according to Mr. Meged. He finds the Israeli student, "practical, utilitarian, and narrowly professional." They have stopped seeking for "the meaning" of life, and have rejected the personal involvement in Jewish and general affairs that is part of the struggle to hasten the Messiah's steps. In other words, they want the comforts and delusions of the middle class. The idealism that built the country is debunked, and the narrow pragmatism of the bourgeoisie is enthroned. The art of the country is already in a low state, we are told, and now the intellectual realm has joined it.

We have previously been forewarned of the rising non-Jewish peasant class of kibbutz children, and now we must add to the heathen mass the literate, and even highly knowledgeable intellectuals of Israel. . . .

These reflections occurred to Mr. Meged on his short visit to this country, in which he was struck by the enthusiasm of Jewish students and intellectuals for the very thing absent in Israel, moral concern. True, he did not find these American youths any the more prepared to become involved in moral issues than their Israeli contemporaries, but they were aware of the issues and felt a sense of responsibility for the world. In this respect, the author concluded that American Jews, for all their assimilatory patterns, are more Jewish than the Israeli Jews. . . .

I suppose we all recognize the undergraduate type of student Mr. Meged was so impressed with: eager, challenging, intense. It is interesting—and typical—that they turned to an Israeli for "the truth of existence." What did the author symbolize to them that no other Jewish type on the Amer-

ican scene could be expected to realize so immediately and characteristically? (Picture the size and expectations of an audience attending an American Hebraist's lecture on literature.) Mr. Meged was intrigued with their questions; but he seems to forget that in their eyes he possessed the answers; he could show them a meaningful interpretation of life because he had lived meaningfully. This assumption on the part of his audience was not based on his writings, which are generally unknown here, but on the simple fact that he is an Israeli.

We are not yet as disillusioned with the Israeli intellectual, old or young, as Mr. Meged is. Israel is still the prototype in the Jewish mind of an area where a person can do something meaningful, and its citizens assume a certain stature in our eyes. At a certain age we express this admiration openly, hence the favorable reception Mr. Meged received on a college campus. This enthusiasm wears a little thin as one moves through the twenties, and even shifts its core of interest to other noble causes closer to American reality. Wherever this Jewish moral passion centers, though, it gets shopworn and shabby if a proper outlet is not found for it. Few are the outlets on the American scene for a liberal's involvement, and fewer still those who activate themselves. Thus, Mr. Meged found our postgraduate liberals as morally concerned about things as in their younger days, but even less involved. I think we will all recognize this phenomenon too; the narrowed interests of postgraduate students, the dull unanimity in Jewish circles on liberal issues and the feeling of personal unimportance; the separation from Jewish and general affairs. We are all, clergy and laymen alike, rabbis without a cause.

To put it less kindly, as liberal citizens we are still alien Jews in America. But Jews we are, with our never ending and never answered questions. This makes us superior, or at least gives us the right, in certain circles, to be critical of Israelis. In addition to other imperfections, they have now stopped asking the liberal questions.

Without denying the importance of this point, can't we see it in perspective? The country has done so much with so little; whatever the standards of its arts, Israel has a Jewish culture more widespread and intrinsic to the people's life than anywhere else, with a daily rejuvenation of the Hebrew language and literature; hundreds of thousands of lives have been given meaning and dignity, and the very land has been re-

deemed from the dead; personal heroism and martyrdom have been the midwives of this miracle for all the world to see. . . .

I could continue in this vein, but wouldn't it be written off as Zionist propaganda? The liberal yawn would be: "All this is very true, but what about today, not yesterday? Didn't you read the article, they're shallow over there today, shallow." With this and similar reports with which to bolster himself, our liberal friend turns his back on Israel. Worse still, the young tourists, rabbinical students, college students, professionals, and such invariably come back from Israel with a balance sheet of likes and dislikes of the Israeli character. . . . It is my view that such reports and impressions serve very often to justify the course of least resistance, to cover a moral retreat with a liberal attack.

If the intellectual stimulation in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem is lacking, let the seeker find it in the Negev or Gallil; the rocks and sand will be moved by muscles and by ideas as well. And there is, still, more personal meaning for the Jew in rebuilding Zion today, than in talking liberalism in the meeting halls of New York or wherever.

This is again Zionism, and again—and still—the truth. The fact that *aliyah* and *chalutzit* are unpopular today does not mean that they are empty ideals. They are worthy minority causes. . . .

ZIONISM, LIKE ALL CAUSES, needs to be acted upon to become meaningful. As my Zionist friends went through college and afterwards, they talked less of going to Israel and more of reasons for not going. Even those who went into "professional" Jewish life found many reasons for "dedicating" themselves to the American Jewish community. Their arguments, while plausible, seemed too facile. Their path is frustrating, but comfortably so. There were some others, however, who pointed in their own lives to a more courageous, more liberal alternative. Such a person was a woman from Chicago whom I met while she was visiting this country from Israel with her husband and two children. She told me that they lived in a kibbutz a few minutes down the road from a Syrian machine gun placement; that she was frightened, physically exhausted, and very disappointed in kibbutz life. I asked her why they didn't leave the kibbutz, and in an immediate and natural way, she replied, "why we can't, that would be deserting." This is the response, the urgency, the heroism that cannot be duplicated for the Jew on the American scene. The young Israeli

may not talk commitment, but he lives it; he is forced to be part of a heroic society. Let not Mr. Meged underestimate the existential meaning of Israeli life for young and old alike. Nor let him not overestimate the existential hollow core of Jewish life in America, and of liberal life here as well. . . .

ALFRED IVRY
Allston, Mass.

Sartre & Camus

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Lionel Abel decisively marred his sensitive interpretation of Camus ["Albert Camus, Moralism of Feeling," February] by including some irresponsible comments on Sartre's contrasting position. Most spectacularly, Abel suggests that Sartre supported the Communist charge that the United States had used germ warfare in the Korean war "although he knew perfectly well that it was false." No documentation or clarification is provided. We are left with this naked double thrust: first, Sartre accused the U.S. of germ warfare, and second, that he knew the accusation to be false at the time he made it.

This is a rather startling disclosure. If it is accurate it profoundly undercuts one's respect for Sartre's activist role in contemporary politics. If it is inaccurate, then Mr. Abel, in the course of his pious disquisition on morality, has inflicted upon us a smear job. . . . It seems permissible to insist that Mr. Abel gives us some evidence. . . . My insistence refers especially to the portion of his comment that alleges that Sartre made the charge of germ warfare when he knew it to be false. Less pertinently, but in the interests of calm evaluation, Mr. Abel should cite us to the occasion on which Sartre made the charge itself. . . .

I might add that there is more to Sartre's general claim than Mr. Abel is willing to allow. . . . Sartre in word and act has given great energy, courage, and talent to the fight against oppression in the world. Only a superficial reader could confuse his rejection of traditional morality with moral indifference. Under no circumstances is it moral to follow Mr. Abel's lead and call Sartre "a moral pornographer."

RICHARD A. FALK

Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his review of Albert Camus's *Resistance, Rebellion, and Death*, Lionel Abel seems more interested in making several

generalized, hurried, and therefore questionable judgments of Camus's over-all position than in reviewing this specific book. . . . I disagree with Mr. Abel's assertion that calling Camus a moralist is ambiguous because he ". . . never recommended an ethic, nor was he an exceptionally 'good' man, certainly not if we judge him by conventional standards." Are attitudes (or values) such as honesty, modesty, and compassion to be ruled out as ethical qualities? . . . Further, I reject Mr. Abel's suggestion that Camus was sometimes "falsely noble," or guilty of taking a "pose." . . .

GERALD RUBIN

Minneapolis, Minnesota

MR. ABEL writes:

Professor Falk is no doubt well intentioned in his defense of Jean-Paul Sartre. However, I never said that Sartre "accused" the United States of using germ warfare—I did say that he supported the Communist charge that the U. S. had done so.

My ground for this assertion: when General Ridgway came to Paris to assume military leadership of NATO, the Communist party called a demonstration against him charging him with having used germ warfare in Korea. Sartre supported this demonstration. My grounds for saying that he knew the charge was false: (1) intelligent people in Europe, among whom I include Sartre, knew it to be false; (2) Sartre defended the Communist party for calling this particular demonstration in several articles ("Les Communistes et la Paix," *Les Temps Modernes*), and in these never once asserted that the charge was true, but merely that it was in the interest of the French working class to support actions of the French Communist party. Quite typically, he gave political support to something for which he was not willing to take intellectual responsibility.

Finally, if I gave Professor Falk the impression that I consider Sartre to be a "moral pornographer," then I did not express myself with sufficient precision. What I wanted to call attention to in passing was a certain component of moral pornography in Sartre's literary work. One has only to read with some care *No Exit* or his new play *The Condemned of Altona* to find this. But I certainly did not mean to describe Sartre's whole activity in literature, thought, and politics as "pornographic."

As for Mr. Rubin's indignant defense of Camus against me, I am afraid I can only say that Mr. Rubin did not understand my review.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

George Lichtheim: SHIRER AS HISTORIAN*

HITLER'S REICH CONTINUES to fascinate the historians, more especially perhaps the amateur historians. Quarrying in the vast documentary mine excavated by their professional colleagues, they come up from time to time with one-man syntheses, bolder and less burdened by academic caution than the work of the professionals. There are merits to be weighed against the inevitable danger of rushing in where experts fear to tread. Specialists in German military history have pointed out errors of fact and judgment in John Wheeler-Bennett's *Nemesis of Power*, published in 1954 and subtitled *The German Army in Politics 1918-45*. It remains a notable *tour de force* and a masterly piece of writing. Now, six or seven years later (and with echoes of Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's performance clearly ringing in his mind), William Shirer comes along with an even bulkier and more ambitious tome: nothing less than a history of the Third Reich itself—that great, bloated, monstrous projection of the German nationalist dream, from its inception to its Wagnerian fall. A work which truly encompassed this barely credible saga of blood and mud could hardly fail to have its immortality guaranteed.

In fact, of course, Mr. Shirer has written nothing like the definitive historical study of the Third Reich which it has been his ambition to compose for the benefit of future generations. And the reason is obvious: no one possibly can. No single individual, that is. It is not just that there is simply too much to write about (including the entire Second World War, to which Winston Churchill alone has devoted six volumes of stately Augustan prose). There is the inherent

limitation imposed by nature upon the range of experience and understanding available to a single mind. In his preface, Mr. Shirer rather daringly invokes Thucydides in justification of his own enterprise—apparently because, like his model, he too “lived through the whole war, being of an age to comprehend events and giving my attention to them in order to know the exact truth about them.” But Thucydides at one stage was in command of the Athenian navy. Had he been merely a chronicler for the Athenian equivalent of CBS, one wonders if his reminiscences would still be read.

This is not to deny that Mr. Shirer has made an effort to rise above journalism. Hostile reviewers have been unduly tart in dismissing him as a well-intentioned amateur, and his book as nothing more than an overblown biography of Hitler. He has cast his net wider than that—possibly too wide—and weighted it with an impressive array of documentary evidence churned up by years of research. Yet the ground he occupies has not been secured against damaging criticism. It is, inevitably, a middle ground. His aim after all was to be read by the average non-specialist with little knowledge of either German or European history. It may also be that his own mind is rather better attuned to that of the general reader than he himself suspects (his sketchy observations on German history and philosophy suggest as much). Hence the awkward impression of an enormously inflated newspaper report on Hitler's Reich, self-consciously addressed to a middle-aged, middle-class, middle-brow readership. This is not altogether fair to Mr. Shirer, but not as unfair as his admirers seem to suppose. At any rate it must be said that—save for Professor Trevor-Roper—he has found no genuinely appreciative

* A review of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* by William L. Shirer (Simon & Schuster, 1245 pp., \$10.00).

reviewers in Britain. And Mr. Trevor-Roper's weird preface to the recently published Hitler-Bormann documents described as the *Testament of Hitler* suggests that his fertile mind has been a trifle unhinged by long contemplation of the late *Fuehrer*.

There may be a clue here to some of the weaknesses of Mr. Shirer's tome, which for all its gigantic size and weight remains from first to last firmly centered on the personality of Hitler. Though no one could loathe the *Fuehrer* more than Mr. Shirer, a kind of inverted hero worship comes through the obligatory reference to "Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon" with which he regales the reader of his preface. Mr. Trevor-Roper, in his preface, falls into the same trap, and then entangles himself further by asserting, in his worst rhetorical manner, that Hitler was "the Rousseau, the Mirabeau, the Robespierre, the Napoleon of his revolution: its Marx, its Lenin, its Trotsky, its Stalin." This tasteless nonsense is bolstered by the absurd claim that he "devised, made, and carried out a great revolution from start to finish." In fact Hitler's "revolution" had been prepared by half a century of Pan-German propaganda and racial theorizing, plus a century and a half of German nationalism. Not only did he not possess a single original idea, he was not even very good at spouting the ideas of his masters—principally Haushofer and the other "geo-politicians" (whose creed did not differ profoundly from that of imperialist ideologues like Halford Mackinder in England). Curiously, Mr. Shirer—no professional historian, let alone an Oxford don, just a conscientious chronicler—is sounder on this point than Mr. Trevor-Roper. His hold on German intellectual history is a little insecure, as witness his naive bracketing of Hegel with Treitschke, but he does record that the Third Reich was in a solid tradition. So it was, and historians do harm by treating Hitler as though he had been spawned by Chaos itself. There was no trace of Miltonic greatness about Mr. Churchill's antagonist, whatever patriotic writers like Mr. Trevor-Roper may infer to the contrary.

Mr. Shirer, being an American, is secured against such romantic, or nostalgic, temptations to read super-sensible significance into the second round of the Anglo-German struggle for mastery in this century. If any-

thing he is a trifle too pedestrian for his subject. There is a certain flatness about his prose which contrasts oddly with the unbelievable personalities swarming across his canvas. He has also erred in taking in so much territory—including large chunks of diplomatic and military history—that the outline becomes blurred. At times one does not quite know whether he is writing an account of the Second World War or of the Nazi regime. Possibly he thought he could do both. The reader certainly obtains a highly competent and meticulously documented introduction to the subject, but the subject itself—the *Daemmerung* of so many traditional Germanic gods—is rather lost from view. It must also be confessed that Mr. Shirer's most graphic chapter—his description of the July 20, 1944 plot against Hitler—is distinctly inferior in style to Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's classic account.

LEAVING ASIDE QUESTIONS of literary merit and niggling points of detail (e.g. Mr. Shirer's regrettable failure to make better use of the publications of the Munich *Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte*), what do we learn from his story? Or perhaps the question had better be: what does the average non-specialist learn? (For German readers there are other sources—notably Professor K. D. Bracher's monumental series of studies, which allot as much space to a single theme as Mr. Shirer does to the entire rise and fall of Hitler's Reich.)

Principally, perhaps, what the general reader obtains from this work is a kind of perspective on Europe in general and Germany in particular. It is of course a highly idiosyncratic perspective. Mr. Shirer is a Wilsonian liberal, to whom nationalism—especially German nationalism—is profoundly unsympathetic. It is odd how little the peacemakers of 1919 (who in principle favored every kind of national movement) foresaw the effect of stoking this particular cauldron. About the only national movement they really did understand was the Czech one represented by that aged humanist, Thomas Masaryk: perhaps the last surviving classical liberal in Central Europe. This also explains why Munich was such an awful shock to American liberals (the British took it more philosophically, even when they disapproved of the arrangement). The Re-

public of Masaryk was something like a miniature replica of the heavenly city built (on paper) by the Wilsonians. Its fall was as great a blow to them as the almost simultaneous collapse of the Spanish Republic was to people further left. Mr. Shirer rightly devotes much space to Munich, and draws the appropriate conclusion that it made war both more certain and easier for the Germans to win. (Hitler, characteristically, was disappointed by Munich. "That fellow Chamberlain has spoiled my entry into Prague," he told his entourage.) But one feels that the betrayal of October 1938 signifies more to him than a political debacle: it is treated as a turning point because it showed that Germany aimed at European hegemony, and that German hegemony was incompatible with everything the Wilsonians stood for: freedom, democracy, national independence. Central Europe of course has never really had any of these things (and now has less chance of getting them than ever), but as long as the Weimar Republic lasted, it looked as though it might acquire them. It took the second Russo-German war of the century to trample the remaining hopes underfoot.

Although Mr. Shirer knows all this, he is obstinate enough to write his history of the Third Reich as though Germany had been a Western democracy which unaccountably went wrong owing to the loss of the 1914-18 war, inflation, unemployment, and other factors exploited by the demonic Nazis, and Hitler in particular. In fact Hitler—to give him his due—was simply hankering after the traditional Central European set-up, wherein the Germans were the dominant factor—the "master race" in Pan-German terminology—lording it over subject Slav populations. This aim was regarded as respectable by millions of Germans who were *not* Nazis. As far back as 1890, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, Count Waldersee, lectured William II on the need to create a Greater Germany in Central Europe "including of course Bohemia which has to be re-Germanized" (see F. L. Carsten, "Germany—from Scharnhorst to Schleicher," in *Soldiers and Governments*, London, 1957). He also advised the Emperor that preventive war against Russia was required, and "if your Majesty wants to preserve peace, it is better to do so by firm

measures; Slavs want to be treated with kicks; they kiss the boot that has kicked them." This kind of attitude was so traditional that Hitler really had very little trouble recruiting millions of ordinary conservative Germans to his cause. The same applies to anti-Semitism. Mr. Shirer refers with indignation to the callous attitude of Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Hitler's Finance Minister, when after the first great Nazi pogrom in 1938, the necessary bureaucratic measures were taken to relieve the German Jews of their remaining property. In the "cabinet" meeting, Krosigk—in Shirer's words this "former Rhodes scholar who prided himself on representing the 'traditional and decent Germany' in the Nazi Government"—casually agreed that "we will have to do everything to shove the Jews into foreign countries." Mr. Shirer is deeply shocked by this, but then no one has told him that as far back as 1893 the Conservative party—the embodiment of German aristocratic and Lutheran traditionalism—adopted a straightforward anti-Semitic platform. The signatories of course would have been appalled could they have foreseen the consequences; in fact some of their descendants belatedly joined the resistance and were hanged for their part in the 1944 plot against Hitler; but by then the damage had been done.

AS HISTORY, THEN, Mr. Shirer's work fails, because his perspective is somehow not quite appropriate to the subject matter. One needs to understand that what was regarded as normal and reasonable elsewhere, was not—until 1945 anyhow—so regarded in Germany, except by the Social Democrats and a minority of liberal intellectuals (many of whom were Jews, and on that account virtually without influence, although they did not realize it). Germany simply was not the kind of country where a liberal like Mr. Shirer could spontaneously feel at home, though as a reporter stationed in Berlin since the 1920's he appears to have enjoyed the intellectual freedom of the Weimar Republic. But then the Republic was a pretty fragile thing, and in some respects had little reality beyond the radius of Berlin and a few other cities.

As a biography of Hitler, on the other hand, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*

has very considerable merits. Its journalistic manner is appropriate to its matter, for Hitler is not really a proper subject for academic historians. He was much too melodramatic to fit their analytical models, and the mental brew he hatched from Darwin, Nietzsche, Treitschke, and the geopoliticians, lacks the kind of orderliness and symmetry historians need for their categorization. One can of course compare him to Napoleon, on the grounds that both tried to conquer Europe, both failed, and both were instrumental in overstraining and ultimately wrecking the military power of the nation they led. But whereas Napoleon has continued to fascinate historians and poets—possibly because he embodied the latent tension between classical rationalism and romantic extravagance which was beginning to become a problem around 1800—one suspects that Hitler will find few biographers. His personality is too grotesque and repulsive to inspire a new generation of myth-makers, and no military dictator, unsuccessful conqueror, or captain of industry (if there are any left a hundred years from now) is going to take the *Fuehrer* as his model, in the way many of them have (consciously or unconsciously) modeled themselves on Napoleon. Indeed it is to be feared that Mr. Shirer's work will be among the last—outside Germany anyhow—to be devoted to this particular subject, which of course is an excellent reason why it should have been written. The world is moving on toward global complications which—whatever the outcome—will increasingly make the Third Reich seem both remote and grotesque: the final convulsion of European nationalism. A fitting tombstone for a dead epoch, Mr. Shirer's conscientious chronicle serves to remind the reader that the almost unbelievable horrors of the 30's and 40's really did happen in the way in which they were witnessed by those condemned to live through them.

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THE NEW PAROCHIALISM

CEREMONY IN LONE TREE. By WRIGHT MORRIS. *Atheneum*. 304 pp. \$4.00.

THE NEPHEW. By JAMES PURDY. *Farrar, Straus & Cudahy*. 210 pp. \$3.95.

Reviewed by ELIZABETH TORNQUIST

RALPH ELLISON has written that the novel communicates a moral vision "by amplifying and giving resonance to a specific complex of experience until, through the eloquence of its statement, that specific part of life speaks metaphorically for the whole." These words, I think, illuminate some of the failures and successes of the contemporary American novel. For example, one reason why the fiction of Wright Morris continues to be disappointing is that for all his ease with the novel, his inventiveness, his ideas, grace, and wit, he does not create a satisfyingly authentic context of experience. Because he does not start with something solid, he does not end with something meaningful. His latest novel, *Ceremony in Lone Tree*, is a case in point.

This very readable book brings a number of people together for a birthday celebration at Lone Tree, Nebraska, a ghost town which symbolizes the past that lies heavy on all of them. It is the ninetieth birthday of old Tom Scanlon, the man who never really entered the 20th century but looked resolutely backward to the great trek westward across the plains. Gathered in his deserted hotel are the three daughters, burdened and embittered by husbands who no more live in the present than Scanlon does: Maxine with her Bud Momeyer, the postman, who hunts cats with a bow and arrow at night; Lois, lovely and frigid, with McKee, who has lived a successful life while asleep to everything except his boyhood; the sporting Edna, with Colonel Ewing, who claims Indian blood and cares only for a ten thousand dollar bulldog he carries around in his house trailer. And there is the granddaughter Eileen, with her two sons: Gordon, a little monster in a coonskin hat who shoots everybody with a toy gun and would cheerfully shoot himself if it would make them suffer; and Calvin, the stutterer, a lover of horses and of Maxine's sexy daughter, Etoile. Finally there is McKee's old friend Boyd, the

"self un-made man," dragging with him a fast girl he picked up in a Nevada bar.

Mr. Morris leads us to believe that in their meeting these characters will come to terms with their past so that they can begin to face the realities of the present. These are overwhelming realities. On the way to the celebration Boyd spent a night in a Nevada town where "the Bomb" was to be tested next morning; and after his name in the registry, his landlady wrote "Wake before Bomb." The idea of "waking before the Bomb" drums through the book. So does the fact that in Lincoln, the place from which others of them have come, Momeyer's nephew, Lee, has just run over two high school bullies because he was tired of being pushed around, and a friend of Lee's has killed ten strangers to be somebody.

DURING THE NIGHT in the hotel, the novel explodes into chaotic actions—Calvin and Etoile elope in a buggy, Momeyer kills the bulldog, old Scanlon dies in a fit of joy when the buggy pulls up, Lois shoots a pistol out the window. But when the night is over and Boyd cries, "The past is dead, long live the past," nothing has happened, nothing has changed. What has happened to McKee, for example, after that grave warning to Wake before Bomb? Sitting at the hotel desk in the dark, he has thought for a moment he was dying; he has discovered an unopened letter Boyd wrote to his (McKee's) wife Lois forty years ago; he has heard the shot and run to see Lois standing at the window with the pistol in her hand. He has had every opportunity to become conscious of who he is and what he faces, but at the end he is the same old McKee who came out of the bullfight at the end of *The Field of Vision*, an earlier novel which, like this one, tried to make some relation between the past and present, and, like this one, failed.

The reason for the failures is that Mr. Morris presents the reader with neither a real past nor a real present. These characters who dream of pioneer days in Nebraska might as well be natives of an Eastern suburb for all the connection they have to that past. The old days contain nothing more real and specific for them than the question of who kissed whom on the porch when everyone was young. It is Mr. Morris who has an idea of the past, not his char-

acters. They are not Midwesterners; they are not anybody at all. Instead of a specific context of experience, there is an intellectual's bogus regionalism. Thus, when the author attempts to make of it a moral situation, he runs into the impossible. How could McKee, who is incapable of waking up to the most concrete meanings of his life, manage to wake up before something so abstract as "the Bomb"? With nothing to start with, these characters are unable to deal with their present problems, so that after all his fine description of the olden days, and after implying the necessity for making a connection to the days of the Bomb, Mr. Morris retreats from the crisis, under cover of all the excitement in the hotel. If there was a moral vision, it is forgotten, and we are left with no more than the impression that Midwesterners are as badly off as everyone else, and in the same way—a sociological fact of some value, but not what we were expecting.

JAMES PURDY, in his second novel, has the same problem as Wright Morris, the problem of creating a specific context of experience which seems authentic. On the surface, *The Nephew* is a simple cliché about typical small town people who learn something about themselves and others in the course of a year, and come to be better people for it. Alma Mason, a retired old-maid schoolteacher who lives with her widower brother Boyd, is the center of the book. One day their nephew Cliff, who lived with them before he went to Korea, is reported missing, and Alma decides to write a memorial to him. She discovers shortly that she knows almost nothing about him, and in her reluctant attempts to gain information about her nephew, she finds that everyone, perhaps even Boyd, knows not only more about Cliff, but about life, than she does. As events reveal some mysterious facts about Cliff and his entanglements with the homosexuals next door, Alma learns at last something else as well: that we are all pretty much strangers to each other. This new understanding comes also to the other characters and makes them accept what is known and what is unknown about each other, so that they live together with more love. There is a positive glow of sunshine about the end of the novel, the glow of a perfectly worked out moral drawn from a perfectly set up cliché.

But *The Nephew* is not simply a cliché. For three-fourths of it the small town people are like characters in a nightmare, familiar yet menacing. And Mr. Purdy, in his impeccable staccato style, quietly forces this upon us with every sort of dislocation and crudity: all the inadmissible habits of his characters are paraded against a familiar backdrop of small town gossip and scandal and small men's patriotism and prejudice, and the foreground is one of sinister—because never explained—sexual intrigue. In time the conventional image of small town types is replaced in our minds by the unaccustomed and uneasy sense of waking up to what is an original vision. And just then the book turns. All becomes sweetness and light, innocence is everywhere and everyone is happy. The transformation is possible, but it goes so far that the good will becomes as gratuitous—and therefore as unnerving—as the ill will which preceded it.

Until now, Purdy's best work has been done with experience that lies beyond the "normal"—with dwarfs who paint and West Virginia boys who murder their brothers on Chicago's 63rd Street. His less successful stories have dealt with ordinary life; in them a rather banal pathos replaces the powerful grotesqueness of *Malcolm* or of such stories as "Why Can't They Tell You Why" or "63: Dream Palace." In *The Nephew* he attempts to start with an ordinary context of experience and then impose upon it an authenticity that it does not itself convey. What is most solid in the book is his vision of these ordinary people as grotesque; the characters are not conscious of it, for it is not a part of their experience, which is flat and conventional. The result is that the novelist's viewpoint becomes very obvious while the characters remain as flat as their experience.

THE AUTHENTICITY of a character's moral experience depends largely on his consciousness of the meanings of it. This puts the contemporary novelist in an almost impossible position, for ordinary Americans like those in *The Nephew* or *Ceremony in Lone Tree* are not conscious of the meanings of their lives; indeed, their consciousness is so fragmented that the novelist who depends upon them to bear the weight of his vision ends up with a very small vision—or with chaos.

A few years ago it could be said that the

Southerner was an exception. His experience was specific; that is, it had limits and because of its limits, a character, a focus. And that focus imposed its meaning upon the man who lived in it. But if we did not already know that that meaning has degenerated into an identification with segregation and that otherwise the Southern experience is no longer specific, we would know from recent Southern novels that it is not a solid starting point for the novelist. The Southern background of the characters in William Styron's *Set This House On Fire* fails to seem even relevant.

In the last decade it has been the Jewish and Negro novelists who have been able to discover a focus in their experience, one which they share with other, more ordinary men. This is an immense advantage. It means in part that the Jewish writer with a moral vision does not have to search out the extraordinary individual to bear the weight of that vision, or else bear it all himself; he can find in the salesman or the unsophisticated storekeeper a hero whose specific experience has helped him to achieve an identity, that is, a moral and spiritual consciousness of *who I am*. So it is with the Negro in America; he begins with something concrete which he cannot ignore. A Negro novelist has little trouble finding a hero who knows what it means to be a Negro.

To mention this advantage of Jewish and Negro novelists is not to explain away their achievements. Men like Bernard Malamud and Saul Bellow, Ralph Ellison and James Baldwin have made a specific part of life reach out to the whole; they have written about Jews or Negroes, but they have spoken metaphorically for all men, so that one of the most profound statements about American ideals comes in Ellison's *Invisible Man*, and one of the most moving definitions of morality from Malamud's *The Assistant*.

But I speak of this advantage in order to point to the difficulty of other American novelists who cannot find any specific context of experience to start from—because it exists less and less. The American experience is no longer concrete but increasingly vague and amorphous and mixed. It seems no wonder that so many talented writers cannot present us with what seems an authentic experience, or if it is real, that they can do so little with it. James Purdy has overcome

this difficulty in using the grotesque; because he is an extremely honest writer with a clear vision, I would guess that he may yet overcome it in writing about the "normal," that he may make something coherent out of what we do not admit is grotesque.

EARLY SCIENCE & THE SLAVE

THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: Scientific Attitudes Toward Race in America, 1815-59. By WILLIAM STANTON. *University of Chicago Press.* 245 pp. \$4.00.

LOUIS AGASSIZ: A Life in Science. By EDWARD LURIE. *University of Chicago Press.* 449 pp. \$7.50.

Reviewed by CHRISTOPHER JENCKS

FOR THOSE WHO like to think of science as an orderly and progressive march toward ultimate truth, neither William Stanton nor Edward Lurie is likely to provide very agreeable reading. Their descriptions of the "American School" of ethnology and of America's first great naturalist evoke an era which, like so many in the history of science, has something of the quality of a lost weekend. The leading figures of these two narratives, Samuel Morton and Louis Agassiz, unquestionably made contributions of lasting importance to our understanding of both animal and human life. But Morton, today half forgotten, has been readably revived by Stanton primarily because he led the 19th-century ethnologists who maintained that the Negro was a separate and inferior species to the Caucasian. And Agassiz, his achievements in geology and zoology now obscured, remains memorable to laymen primarily as Darwin's most distinguished and persistent scientific opponent (and incidentally as a supporter of Morton's racial theories).

It is perhaps unfortunate that of these two books, Stanton's should be incomparably the better written and the less discursive. For the reader of his story is likely to wonder not at all the mistakes which Morton and his colleagues made, but at the fact that they were ever set right. America was not, in this era at any rate, a nation which set great store by abstract truth, nor was American culture one in which great voices habitually preferred scientific to religious or political

rhetoric. As in every civilized nation, there were some who cared more for knowledge than for salvation or power. But they were a beleaguered minority, without professional organization or respectability to bolster their intellectual integrity. Science was still very much a matter for amateurs, and their research was inevitably shaped and limited by the fact that they worked before a public of doctors, clergymen, publicists, and laymen, rather than a public of fellow researchers. Such an audience could be enthusiastic enough when research merely added to America's growing material wealth by accumulating hitherto unmined knowledge in museums and libraries. But support usually turned to anger when these raw materials were shaped into theories with unpopular extra-scientific implications. Small wonder, then, that evolution and equality were slow to win acceptance in scientific circles when these were so seldom closed against most unscientific draftsmen.

Agassiz, perhaps more than any other man, was responsible for changing all this. He brought with him from Europe not only a scientific training and reputation of distinction, adorned with an accent and poise of incalculable value, but even more important, a familiarity with German universities and an understanding of the importance of organization in scientific work. Not only did he help create the Lawrence Scientific School and the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard, but by taking a professorship and training a generation of apprentices there, he created a sub-culture in which scientists could work without continually worrying about the judgments (and payments) which their labors would earn from the public. It was only after such scientific institutions had arisen that the ideal (and often the substance) of academic freedom could follow, with its implication that scientists and scholars were professional men who should depend both for their livelihood and their self-respect on the judgments of their colleagues rather than those of laymen.

BUT SUCH ORGANIZATIONS and ideologies emerged only after the Civil War, and by then Darwin had made both Agassiz and the "American School" of ethnology of only historical interest. It may be, then, that some of their blunders can be explained by

their dependence upon a popular audience, and by the lack of professional organizations to correct inevitable mistakes. But surely this is not a sufficient explanation—as the revival of racism in scientific circles early in this century emphasizes. Even today, growing in the air-conditioned calm of research institutes, scientific views on race are largely shaped by the fact that anthropologists, like other American intellectuals, tend to identify with minorities. The “objective” evidence in this field seems to be little more conclusive than that of the past, and only an inveterate optimist would assume that the case for Caucasian supremacy has now been relegated to the intellectual dustbin. Until Mendelian explanations of racial differences gain visual support from noticeable redistribution of racial characteristics (through intermarriage), the possibility of reviving the “American School” cannot safely be ignored.

Such a revival would be in some respects far more unfortunate than the original construction, for cloaked in the respectability and veneration now accorded to science, it would have far more disastrous consequences for Negroes, Indians, and Orientals in America than did its 19th-century predecessor. Indeed, one of the consoling facts about the “American School” was how little influence it had. Lacking the authority of university podiums, and the backing which a respected professional society would have provided, most 19th-century ethnologists had little more effect on the great theological debates of the pre-Civil War era than a first-night heckler in the second gallery. If more of them had had the influence of an Agassiz, they could have done far more damage than they did.

As it was, ethnology never supplanted theology. The North rested its case for abolition on the assumption that since we are all descended from Adam, we are all brothers under the skin, with no right to enslave one another. The South replied that we were, at best, distant cousins, and that since the time of Ham, the Caucasians had definitely been the main legatees of divine grace. Noting that slavery was common in ancient times, they claimed God’s sanction for their property rights.

Needless to say, Southerners were not slow to employ any additional arguments supplied by the ethnologists. When the meticulous

Morton produced evidence that Negro skulls were smaller than Caucasian, the South was pleased. When the anti-clerical Gliddon showed that racial differences had been present in ancient Egypt, at a date just subsequent to the Flood, Southerners rejoiced at the implication that racial differences could not simply be responses to environment as Jefferson had supposed, and could not be expected to vanish in America. But when science suggested that Negro and Caucasian were altogether different species, the religious South balked. For if they were different species, coming from separate creations, then the authority of the Bible was undermined, and their tried and true defense against abolitionist speakers was pierced. Only a handful of Southerners were willing to abandon their superiority with conventional theological weapons for the uncertain risks of modern science; and this minority, as it turned out, was betrayed when 20th-century anthropology abandoned racism for a neo-Jeffersonian view that ethnic differences derived from cultural environment.

If the North had anticipated what Darwin and Mendel would do for the scientific view of race, they might have been ready to accept the value of scientific evidence in social reform. Lacking prescience, the philanthropists found the temptations of Bible-thumping too much for them. Whether today’s sociologists and anthropologists can make a better job of philanthropy than John Brown remains to be seen.

NEGROES IN SUBURBIA

PEACEABLE LANE. By KEITH WHEELER.
Simon and Schuster. 345 pp. \$4.50.

FIRST FAMILY. By CHRISTOPHER DAVIS.
Coward-McCann, Inc. 253 pp. \$3.95.

Reviewed by MILTON HINDUS

SOME PROBLEMS admit of no real solutions. That is at bottom the feeling conveyed to me by these two novels which treat the subject of Negro integration (on the level of housing) into white communities. Insoluble human problems of the highest kind are the subject of tragedy; on a humbler level, they are in the province of pathos. Both Mr. Wheeler’s story and Mr. Davis’s are extremely pathetic, and optimistic readers are

sure to be frustrated, provoked, and even alarmed by their portrayals of futility.

The initial situation in both books is about the same. A colored family has bought a house (or is trying to buy a house) in a white suburb. In Keith Wheeler's book (the more hopeful of the two), the community is in Westchester and the homes cost somewhat more than \$30,000 each. In Christopher Davis's book (the more sensitive study), the community is a few hundred miles from Chicago and the homes are valued at somewhat less than \$20,000.

I mention these cash figures first of all because both writers stress the fact that economics is perhaps the most important part of the situation they are depicting. In Northern suburbs, though a residue of racial prejudice against the Negro remains (mostly on the part of neurotic or hysterical women), the major source of resentment among nearly all whites—Gentile and Jew, immigrants and native-born—is the immediate threat posed to the property values of the neighborhood. One gathers that if some enormous public fund existed to stabilize property values, objections to the Negro as neighbor in the suburb might largely disintegrate; but this thought contributes to one's depression instead of dispelling it.

In both novels, the Negro family is not representative but exceptional. In Wheeler's book, it is the family of an extraordinarily talented commercial artist, and in Davis's that of a classical scholar and university teacher. Davis's professor is a gentle, retiring character; the militancy and aggressiveness in his family is concentrated in the women—his wife and sister—and in his twelve-year-old son. But Wheeler's Negro protagonist is presented as a more difficult case: brashly assertive and self-confident to the point of arrogance. Here, it is his wife who has to work hard to slow him down. The allegorical expression of this fact (from its title, *Peaceable Lane*, to its smallest detail, the book is consistently allegorical) is that the commercial artist, Lamar Winter, likes to drive his Jaguar at a hundred miles an hour—a taste for speed that brings him to a bad end eventually.

Lamar Winter is painted, in fact, as a generally unattractive person. He is positively jagged in his individualism, and he is intolerant of all organized social activity, par-

ticularly on the part of what he calls the "do-gooders." He is going to make it on his own as a most successful practitioner of private enterprise. His belligerence and perversity are essential to the complication of the fictional problem. The book is a quite clever and cerebral production. The characters of the allegory are flat, mechanical affairs, but the plot turns nimbly with what is sometimes surprising wit. The story is told mainly from the white point of view, and the character most cruelly hoisted on the horns of the American dilemma is Lamar Winter's Anglo-Saxon business associate and friend, appropriately named Matthew Jones.

CHRISTOPHER DAVIS's story concentrates on the Negro point of view. The plotting is simpler and less cerebral than Wheeler's, but the characters and feeling are more fully realized. The author's attention focuses on the effect of conflict and rejection within a Negro boy, an exceptionally intelligent, sensitive, sickly boy who has to bear on his shoulders the weight of a world he never made and cannot endure. It is a world in which reason, wisdom, and justice have the illuminating power of a candle, and the passions and prejudices of people, both white and colored, have the power of a volcano, often quiet, sometimes erupting. It is all much too much for him, and like Ivan Karamazov, of whom he has never heard, he decides to give his "entrance ticket" back to God, of whom (at least in the traditional sense) he seems also never to have heard. In the last scene, we watch him throw himself off the roof, and this suicide seems to be Davis's commentary on the hopelessness of the present impasse in race relations.

The conclusion of Keith Wheeler's more popular study is only a shade less pessimistic. The automobile accident in which Lamar Winter kills himself to avoid hitting his own son fighting in the street with Matthew Jones's boy, suggests plainly enough that the author sees little prospect for the amelioration of race tensions at the present time. By making Winter's widow decide to stay on in *Peaceable Lane* and bring up her son there, Wheeler hints that it may be a different story in the next generation. But his present story contains small comfort.

One interesting aspect to me of both books is the emergence in them of liberals

as quasi-villains. The publisher of Mr. Davis's book tells us that "it won't please the NAACP." The liberal Charleses in his book are not outrightly villainous perhaps (to portray a villain, the author should have to believe in evil, which, as a philosophic naturalist, he cannot do), but they are cowardly, ridiculous, and more than a little stupid. At first they try to be good neighbors to the colored McKinley family and take its part against the rest of the neighborhood, but when their thirteen-year-old daughter drifts into a troubled emotional relationship with Scotty McKinley, the son, they fail completely in dealing with the situation. After some feeble efforts to live by principles that are infinitely more difficult to apply to a living situation than they have imagined, they decide that they simply "want out." Ironically enough, they sell their house and move away just at the time that frankly hostile and unenlightened Neanderthal men like "Captain" Longman (whose wife, an unreconstructed Southerner, has circulated a petition asking the McKinleys to leave Courtland Park quietly and voluntarily) have almost decided to ride out the storm and—in the interest of real estate values—not to sell their houses in a panic.

In Keith Wheeler's book, Lamar Winter (trying to buy into a white residential section) has almost as much trouble with "organizations" that support him as with individuals who oppose him. He delivers himself of a tirade to his wife: "Let those do-gooding dynamiters get their hands on you and you ain't a man any more; you're an exhibit, a laboratory specimen for civil rights. Honey, maybe I do things a hard way, but I'll be a nigger sonofabitch if I'm going to be put on the road in a Westchester side show of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*."

The nearest approximation of a villain in *Peaceable Lane* is Barton, a Negro "blockbusting" lawyer and real-estate finagler, who explains in some detail how he manages to combine what he regards as a socially useful and progressive activity with highly profitable speculation. (It may seem farfetched to some readers, but I think there is a resemblance between the attitude implicit here toward the exploiter of laudable sentiments, the group "spokesman," and the attitude one finds more subtly developed in Philip Roth's story "Defender of the

Faith.") Mr. Wheeler has judiciously balanced his portrait of Francis Barton with a less memorable sketch of an obnoxious, white, "fighting liberal" radio commentator named Peter Yale. Yale, whose true name is as doubtful as that of Bronson (the jeweler who immediately sold out to a "blockbuster" as a way of revenging himself on his neighbors), is a combination of spinelessness, selfishness, and self-righteousness. His life gives the lie completely to the moral views he peddles to the public. Barton and Yale bear about the same relation to liberalism as Tartuffe and Elmer Gantry do to religion. Their base hypocrisy may not destroy the faith they profess, but the exposure contributes to undermining it.

THESE books confirm what the newspapers have already told us—that changes in social mores (except perhaps in such times of upheaval and catastrophe as war and revolution) necessarily take place with much more deliberation than speed. From the ordinary citizen's short-term point of view, the process may seem completely disheartening. And it is moods of discouragement, not to say despair, that these novels reflect. Yet Mr. Wheeler's story, at least, suggests the thought that the application of American pragmatism to social problems may have something in common with the British notion of muddling through. The rigorous logician is compelled to predict an explosion whenever an irresistible force meets with an immovable object; but the observer of human affairs is inclined to think that some outcome short of this worst is more probable—perhaps because in practice, as opposed to theory, no irresistible forces or immovable objects really exist. There is a ray of hope in Mr. Wheeler's conviction that time is the great solvent of social problems, that patience and fortitude will prevail, and that in ways not yet foreseen, all will be well. The alternative to Mr. Wheeler's faith is the cynical suggestion that social problems, like individual ones, are less often solved than forgotten.

Mr. Davis, on the other hand, is beyond cynicism. The mood which his book evokes is completely misanthropic. This whole country for him is filled with Yahoos, and he seems ready to take up residence among more cultivated Houyhnhnms. As if in con-

firmation of this hypothesis, the book-jacket of the ironically titled *First Family* informs us that the author has now expatriated himself, or at least absented himself, from the United States and has taken his wife and two daughters with him to Spain.

SOCIAL SCIENTISTS IN INDUSTRY

THE SERVANTS OF POWER. By LOREN BARITZ. *Wesleyan University Press*. 273 pp. \$4.50.

Reviewed by WALTER KARP

IT IS ONE SIGN of the times that a swarm of psychologists, sociologists, psychiatrists, human relations experts, and similar quasi-academics now occupy high staff positions in most of America's large industrial corporations. What they do there is obvious to anyone who has ever read an inkblot in order to get a job or filed out for a coffee break at the sound of a company bell. How all these thinkers got into the land of the hardheaded businessman is a revealing bit of 20th-century history that Loren Baritz somewhat portentously examines in his new book, *The Servants of Power*.

Professor Baritz's tale is quickly retold. Fifty years ago business was as innocent of social science as the available social scientists were. Occasionally a manufacturer would hire a phrenologist to examine the heads of his foremen, but the average tycoon was skeptical about professors running his business. Yet the independent industrialist soon began to be stymied by the sheer size of his growing enterprise. The ordinary foibles of a worker multiplied by ten thousand—carelessness, laziness, job-quitting, absenteeism—could make a perceptible dent in a company's profits, but the boss, high above the line, could make little dent in his workers. It became increasingly important, Professor Baritz explains, to hire the right workers. Enter the psychologist, armed with Dr. Hugo Munsterberg's pioneering *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency* (1912) and Alfred Binet's intelligence tests, with an offer to pick new factory hands scientifically. Despite the crudities of the tests (it took several years before a psychologist suggested that a man might be *too* intelligent for his job), many managers began using them.

The major breakthrough came in 1931 when experimenters at Western Electric's Hawthorne plant discovered that workers would be content without a pay raise if only they received some humane attention. Prospects of happy employees, low pay, and no unions rose before the eyes of depression-harried managers. The more advanced paid sociologists to make "attitude studies" of workers, had counselors to hear employee troubles and "drain off grievances," and, finally, used psychologists to identify only "peaceful" workers—i.e. non-union types.

After World War II, Professor Baritz's history continues, the "human relations approach" got its grip on the managerial elite; it promised to diagnose and deliver, as the phrase went, a "custom-built" man. With "human relations," a mixture of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, comes the full personnel paraphernalia of modern industry: inkblot tests, resounding job titles, canned music on the assembly line, chirping house-publications, the shipping room glee club, worker "participation groups," and, failing these, the staff psychotherapist to turn workers' "aggressions into constructive channels." Like the fluorescent light, the industrial social scientist becomes a permanent fixture of modern business.

IN THIS PARTNERSHIP, who did what to whom? Professor Baritz asks. On the one hand, he sees cynical businessmen who care only for profits, on the other, servile industrial social scientists, the businessmen's "animated tool." According to him, then, it is the old, sad story of mind serving power, in this instance, of the managerial lion eating the scientific lamb.

Professor Baritz is undoubtedly correct about the social scientists. Yet the facts of his history make clear that they were a sorry lot from the start. They thought like management before management knew they existed, and, as scientists, even their wildest theoretical conceits would not ruffle a meeting of the NAM. Some of them believed that the man who joins a union is a maladjusted personality, and their most distinguished and far-ranging theoretician, Elton Mayo, believed implicitly that workers were emotional and that businessmen were logical. The happy cooperative idyll Mayo wished to establish in industrial America meant lit-

tle else, ultimately, than that workers should do as management said. Even in the days when independent social scientists received mainly rude rebuffs from the business world, they eagerly offered to serve it as mere technicians. In 1921, for example, psychologists whose names still appear in every standard psychology text—men like John Watson, the “father of behaviorism,” Lewis Terman, Edward Titchener, and William McDougall—founded the Psychological Corporation, one of whose main purposes was to “convince management of the utility of psychology.” Why bother, one wonders. A few of these men, I suppose, were simply opportunists, but most of them wanted something more than money from businessmen; they wanted their blessings—as if in those days only the sanction of “practical men of affairs” could bestow worth and dignity on a mere enterprise of the mind.

PROFESSOR BARITZ himself holds these practical men in awe, and, as a result, he leaves a few important questions unasked. While he does not like businessmen, he never doubts the absolute rationality of their business motives; all the softheadedness in industrial social science he finds on the social scientists’ side. The modern manager, Professor Baritz believes, has bought up a few job lots of human relations only to turn himself a larger profit. But exactly how profitable is a given amount of human relations? Is it possible that the managers are less businesslike about human relations than Professor Baritz believes? Managers seem to have been so eager to buy psychological tests after World War I that they were being continually gulled by enterprising graphologists, palmreaders, physiognomists, phrenologists. After World War II, as Professor Baritz himself notes, “fewer and fewer industrialists could resist the [human relations] fad. One either authorized human relations or human relations research or was made to feel like an anachronism left over from the Neolithic period.” In 1947 *Fortune* warned that businessmen were getting “test-happy,” and one management consultant discovered that managers were becoming suckers for all kinds of “research mish-mash.” What businessmen had long called the “weird jargon” of sociology, they began to sport themselves, and for some ten years now they have been

absorbed like schoolboys in learning the psychological principles of leadership.

Now there is nothing purely businesslike about this zeal for human relations—not even management can tell exactly how profitable it is—nor did it grow inside a vacuum-sealed executive suite. Human relations, personality, psychological prattle about the emotional side of life, and America’s new sense that working with people is more dignified than working with ledgerbooks, are all part of the postwar ambiance. Over a thirty-year period businessmen have rapidly lost their power to awe America simply by being businessmen, and they are no more immune to the times than the rest of us. Less cynical than Professor Baritz believes, they are now paying their respect—as well as their money—to hired students of the human side of corporations. By insisting that even in business one must confront the full complexity of the human psyche with scholarship, the modern manager is trying to confer some of the newly-recognized “human” dignity onto the mere business of business. He is no more completely his own man today than were the scientists of the Psychological Corporation.

Professor Baritz concludes his history of the industrial use of social science with a warning about the dangers of intellect blindly serving power. But his history, as I have suggested, does not really bear out the warning. The social scientists were never independent thinkers, and the businessman has now yielded some power to intellectual expertise. There is much misplaced admiration and hence a good deal of muddle on both sides of this particular partnership. In fact, the partners may be merging into one new type of man. At Ford a few years ago, the director of planning for market research held his business colleagues in awe simply by wearing academic tweeds, a professorial air, and by living in a university town. After the Edsel died on the market, he got a position teaching the “Dynamics of Social Behavior” at the New School for Social Research and is now using his Edsel market research material for a doctoral dissertation. Now *that* seems more like the conclusion to fifty years of the industrial use of social science. Employees have coffee breaks and clean toilets, and America has a new type of worldling—a non-intellectual non-indus-

trialist, shapeless enough to fit a growing number of high academic, industrial, and governmental non-jobs.

THE EVERLASTING JOKE

DER JÜDISCHE WITZ, SOZIOLOGIE UND SAMMLUNG ("THE JEWISH JOKE, ITS SOCIOLOGY AND A COLLECTION"). By SALLIA LANDMANN. *Walter-Verlag*. 531 pp.

Reviewed by ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER

INCLUDED IN this book is a collection of over a thousand Jewish jokes, a brief but scholarly preface by Professor Carlo Schmid, and an introduction of some ninety pages in which the author—a doctor of philosophy—summarizes several general theories of humor and proposes a special "sociology" of the Jewish joke. She sets forth Freud's theory that the joke is an expression of the subconscious wish, as well as Bergson's notion that we laugh when the sentient being is dealt with as if it were mechanical and lifeless. Now we cannot hold Miss Landmann responsible for the inability of these theories to completely explain the joke, which, like a work of art, is a highly individualized product, defying theories.

Miss Landmann, however, devotes the major part of her introduction to a discussion of the Jewish joke from Biblical times to the present. Since there are no jokes in the Bible, there is actually not much to say about ancient humor. Scholars did discover a single item in the Bible which they think may be a joke—but they are not quite sure. Our prophets—who themselves were not humorists—denounced the scoffers but did not bother to quote their witticisms: thereby depriving us, possibly, of a glimpse of ancient Jewish wit. The Midrash cites how the mockers in Abraham's time contended that Sarah had not conceived out of Abraham, but out of Abimelech, King of the Philistines, who held her captive. This is perhaps not exactly mockery, belonging rather to the realm of ancient gossip.

Miss Landmann quotes the exaggerations of Rabbah bar bar Hana as found in the Talmud; still, exaggerations are not quite jokes. Actually, Jewish jokes were not written down until the 19th century, and it is to this fact that Miss Landmann's theory of the Jewish joke seems linked.

According to her theory, three conditions are needed to produce a climate favorable for the creation of the joke. First, the Jew must have broken with Orthodoxy—his belief in God, the Torah, the Shulchan Aruch, the world to come: as long as he has hopes of Paradise, he does not need to seek compensation for his worldly miseries in a joke. Second, the Jew must be in a situation where he is eager to assimilate but the Gentile is not yet willing to accept him: under such circumstances, the Jew becomes exceedingly jocular, poking fun both at himself and at those who have rejected him. Third, though the Jew's circumstances be unhappy—economically and spiritually—they must not be completely hopeless. Total despair chokes off humor.

These being the conditions that make possible the blooming of the Jewish joke, according to Miss Landmann, it follows that the Jewish joke could develop only after the Emancipation, flourish for a brief time in early 19th-century Germany, and continue later on in Eastern Europe—in Poland, Russia, Rumania—up to the Bolshevik revolution and the advent of Nazism. Miss Landmann states flatly that today the Jewish joke is dead. The time of creation has passed. There remains but the task of collecting the scattered inheritance. How, indeed, can the Jewish joke still be alive? In Israel, the problem of assimilation hardly exists; nor is there in that land the kind of persecution whose sting need be eased with a joke. In such countries as the United States, England, and France, there remain few barriers to assimilation. And in places where the Jews are terribly oppressed, there can be no thought of humor—according to the theory.

THIS THEORY would appear plausible were it not for the facts. I am afraid Miss Landmann shot the arrow first and then drew the target. Even though the old Jewish literature shows few traces of the joke, we cannot therefore assume that the joke was nonexistent before the Emancipation. It simply was not recorded; or if it was, it may have been prevented from reaching posterity by the watchful eyes of the rabbinical censors. Humor does not alone depend on circumstances and environment. There is a certain consistency in the way in which a

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WILLIAM B. SILVERMAN

THE DANGER OF
RESPECTABLE RELIGION

people reacts to life, regardless of external changes. Rabbis were often famous for their sense of humor. There have even been professional humorists in our history, the wedding jesters, although not enough is known about them to come to any true evaluation of their role. As for Miss Landmann's contention that the Jews do not make jokes under abject conditions, we know that there was much joking and laughter in the Hitler ghettos. Thousands of jokes were created in the concentration camps, at the very gas chambers of Auschwitz and Treblinka. Modern Israel, which should be devoid of humor if we were to apply strictly Miss Landmann's criteria, in fact brims over with humor. The Jews tell more jokes about Ben Gurion than they ever did about the Czar or the vicious Stolypin. Miss Landmann does not entirely ignore the existence of these Israeli jokes, but she weakly dismisses them as mere aftergrowths of the East European brand of humor.

To deny all humorous creativity to American Jewry is equally unjust. Not everything which the Jews in the United States have produced in the way of humor has been imported from the old country. America has had a number of Yiddish humorists—among them Moshe Nadir and Joseph Marshelik (Finkel), to mention the two greatest. Both spent most of their lives in the United States and produced all of their work here. There were times when two or three Jewish joke magazines were being published simultaneously in New York. To paraphrase Mark Twain, the death of the Jewish joke is grossly exaggerated. It reminds one of the anecdote about the doctor who had completely given up on a patient, and when the patient came to visit him, vigorous and healthy, the doctor ordered him, "Get out of here. Theoretically, you're a corpse."

As a matter of fact, Jews do not readily comply with the various theories predicting their demise. This in itself is a Jewish joke. According to some theories, the Jews could never have regained the land of their fathers; Hebrew was doomed to remain a dead language; as for Yiddish, it was supposed to have expired long ago. This reviewer's theory is that the Jewish joke is as old and widespread and eternal as the Jewish people. Who knows? archeologists may one day find a scroll of Jewish jokes in the

Twentieth century man is "hurling his imprecations at the universe, defiant of God, hostile to religion, and yet in desperate need of help.

"If man is to derive help and strength from God, he must advance from a puerile, infantile, kindergarten conception of religion to a rational, ethical, prophetic, mature, and radical faith devoid of magic, miracles, and theological anachronisms. The religious obscurantism that equates religion with cultural lag, reactionary political doctrines, fundamentalist theology, resistance to science, and antagonism to progress must give way to a revolutionary attitude — a radical approach . . .

"Religious respectability encourages us to take refuge in religious clichés and bask in the warm and the comforting assurance that 'God's in his heaven: all's right with the world.' Reason, however, dictates the conclusion that God is not restricted to heaven and that there is much that is wrong and evil in the world."

(The above quotation is from *GOD HELP ME!: From Kindergarten Religion to the Radical Faith* — by Rabbi William B. Silverman. Now available at your bookstore. \$4.95. The Macmillan Company, A Division of The Crowell-Collier Publishing Company.)

caves at the Dead Sea. And when they are deciphered, they will be found to bear a strong family resemblance to the jokes published today in the *Jewish Daily Forward*. Miss Landmann clearly intends, with this book, to erect a monument to the Jewish joke. But the body is not quite in its grave. It is still very much alive and busy turning out new jokes in New York, Tel Aviv, Buenos Aires, and even Moscow.

It is a pleasure to turn from the long introduction to the jokes themselves, which Miss Landmann has collected conscientiously in large numbers from many sources, books as well as people. Although her book is written in German, Miss Landmann has retained Yiddish words and expressions, well explained in parentheses. She has attempted to group the jokes according to subject matter—the community, prayer and ritual, the *shnorrer*, Rothschild, army life, the Czar, *kashrut*, and, of course, matchmaking. There

is a large number of jokes about converts and Jews who try to change their names. But the Jewish joke does not submit easily to category, just as the general classification of humor into satire, sarcasm, irony, etc., is artificial and overlapping. Since most of the jokes originated in Yiddish, they inevitably lose some of their tang in translation, but enough remains to make the reader laugh heartily, or, at least, smile. Salcia Landmann has given us, when all is said, a rich collection of Jewish jokes. One would be tempted to recount some of them here were it not for the danger that the reader may already have heard them. There is an anecdote about a boy in *cheder* who asks his *melamed*: “Why did Cain kill Abel?” and the *melamed* answers, “Because Abel told old jokes.” So it seems that shortly after the Creation, when everything else was yet new, the jokes of the Jewish people were already old.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

GEORGE LICHTHEIM, one of our Contributing Editors, published “The Role of the Intellectuals” in our April 1960 issue.

ELIZABETH TORNQUIST, a free-lance writer, is a new contributor to COMMENTARY.

CHRISTOPHER JENCKS is also new to COMMENTARY. A Contributing Editor to the *New Republic*, Mr. Jencks is currently working with David Riesman on a study of higher education.

MILTON HINDUS is a professor of literature at Brandeis University and the author of critical studies of Céline and Proust. He reviewed *Letters of Theodore Dreiser* in January 1960.

WALTER KARP, our third new contributor, has had reviews in *Midstream* and the *Reconstructionist*.

ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER, the well-known novelist, had a short story in our March issue.

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

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